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Abstract   
The core of this study is directed towards an analysis of the laws, rules and guidelines that 
embody legal aid provision in present day Nigeria. This study will employ a socio-legal 
approach to investigate the root causes of Nigeria’s limited legal aid scheme. It will also focus 
on the relationship between law and society and will employ appropriate empirical research 
methods for an in-depth understanding of significant causal factors that influence legal aid 
provision in Nigeria. These factors will include an examination of Nigerian legal institutions, 
legal processes, and legal behaviour,1 particularly how legal institutions and legal processes 
affect individuals and how they are perceived by ordinary citizens and potential recipients of 
legal aid. This research considers the potential for other sources of law, and other legal 
institutions, such as customary legal systems, to be used as an additional, credible way to 
access, develop and expand legal aid provision in Nigeria.  
This study adopts two qualitative techniques: semi-structured telephone interviews and self-
administered questionnaires, which were completed and returned via email. The request for 
respondents was launched on social media. In total, fifteen respondents partook in the study: 
twelve via self-administered questionnaires and three via telephone interviews. The inquiry 
was focused on a people’s perspective, the respondents were a variety of ages above 18, and 
evenly distributed by gender. They were spread across North Central, South West, South East 
and South South geopolitical zones of Nigeria. Therefore, they are not representative of all the 
regions in Nigeria; for this reason, the study was not able to capture all ethnic groups and their 
customary practices. However, within the 15 observations, coverage was obtained from ethnic 
groups that represent the Yoruba, Igbo, Delta and Kogi regions. Some of the participants were 
recruited through a snowball sampling strategy by primary participants. Data was analysed, 
and preliminary codes were established using in vivo coding procedure to categorise findings 
and generate key themes that could help address the research question and objectives driving 
the study. Hence, six key themes were uncovered.  
The findings of the study reveal the various perspectives on the matter of legal aid and of 
customary legal practice, including the prospect of expanding the scheme through customary 
legal systems. The research also highlighted the limited scope of legal aid and the importance 
of custom and tradition in the daily activities of individuals who are bound by them. It also 
 
1Banakar Reza and Travers Max (eds.) (2005) ‘Introduction to Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research’ 




uncovered the need to develop customary legal systems to further support and protect the rights 
of individuals that are embedded in their customary practices.  This study presents an original 
contribution to knowledge on access to alternative legal institutions for the protection of legal 
rights via legal aid. The findings of this thesis also contribute to socio-legal studies, which are 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction  
“The administration of justice is at the core of any successful democracy in the world. If the 
Legal profession fails, anarchy will be the only beneficiary.” - Justice Oyeyipo2 
“The principle of the rule of law, from which, after all, the modern state developed, is central 
to our democracy, and there are no more important duties upon the state than upholding it and 
ensuring that citizens have access to the court.” - Alister Webster QC3 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This study is crucial and relevant to the promotion of the provision of legal aid within the 
realms of human rights in present day Nigeria. Legal aid is a fundamental right derived from 
international and regional human rights instruments4 which guarantees equality before the law, 
equal protection of the law and an effective remedy for human rights violations. In instances 
where legal aid for criminal and civil cases are not explicitly articulated in domestic law, the 
duty enshrined in these instruments ensure that the guarantees are upheld.   Hence, it is deemed 
a distinct component of the principle of equality. Legal aid plays a vital role with regards to the 
provision of fair and equal justice to individuals who are at risk of being excluded from the 
legal system due to social disadvantage. The right to legal aid plays a fundamental role in 
ensuring the right to be heard in a court of law, even if a litigant is unable to afford the services 
of a lawyer. A typical example is the right not to be deprived of life and liberty without the due 
 
2Observation by Chief Judge T.A. Oyeyipo, ‘Professional Misconduct: Problems and Solutions’, Paper presented 
at the 2003 Annual General Conference of the Nigerian Bar Association 20 (Aug. 24-29, 2003). Quoted in 
Okechukwu Oko (2005) ‘Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the Problems and Failures of 
the Judiciary in Nigeria’ Brooklyn Journal of International Law Volume 31 Issue 1 p. 12. 
3Alister Webster QC’s response to the amended legal aid proposals in the UK, regarding “states’ obligation to 
uphold the rule of law by avoiding restricted access and ensure that its vulnerable citizens are entitled by right 
to equal access to courts via legal aid” http://www.libdemlawyers.org.uk/articles/alistair-webster-qc-speech-
vanishing-justice-the-legal-aid-debate-14/09/2013/  (accessed 24/08/2016).  
4The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) 1986 CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); the 
Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (Tunis Resolution) 1992 ACHPR/Res.4(XI)92; the Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003); African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights, 2003, para. A(2)(i), and the Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal 






process of the law and necessary representation. Thus, legal aid guarantees equal standing 
before the courts. 
In the case of Kuti v. AG Federation (1985),5 Hon Justice Kayode Eso affirmed the pertinent 
obligation of fundamental rights within the Nigerian judiciary system: “What is the nature of a 
fundamental right? It is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in 
fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilised existence 
and what has been done by our constitution, since independence…” According to Dada,6 the 
Nigerian constitution(s) post-independence to date7 have always made provisions for human 
rights issues. However, Dada maintains that, in relation to the protection of fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Nigerian constitution, “it is important to do a critical content analysis of these 
constitutional provisions with a view of achieving their real value against the concept of 
universality, interrelatedness and interdependence of human rights.”8  
This study adopts a critical content review of the Nigerian constitutions from independence 
until today to understand the developmental process of the legislation underpinning the legal 
aid scheme. However, Aguda9 a former Nigerian High Court Judge was of the opinion that, 
considering the state in which the majority of Nigerians lived, the attainment of equality would 
be almost impossible. His illustration included the underlying impact the conditions of those 
living in poverty would potentially have on the morale of individuals seeking access to the 
courts and all efforts to achieve protection for their fundamental rights, by virtue of the current 
1999 Nigerian Constitution. Aguda further contended that: “The practical actualization of most 
of the fundamental rights cannot be achieved in a country like ours where millions are living 
below starvation level...In the circumstances of this nature, fundamental rights provisions 
enshrined in the constitution are nothing but meaningless jargon to all those of our people living 
below or just at starvation level.”10  
 
5See Chief Dr. (MRS) Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti & ORS. v. The Attorney-General of the Federation & ORS 
(1985) LPELR-2940(SC). 
6Jacob Abiodun Dada (2012) ‘Human Rights under the Nigerian Constitution: Issues and Problems’ 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 12 pp. 34-35. 
7The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960, 1963, 1979, 1989 and 1999. 
8Jacob Abiodun Dada (2012) ‘Human Rights under the Nigerian Constitution: Issues and Problems’ 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 12 pp. 34-35. 
9Aguda Akinola T.  (1988) ‘Judicial Process and Stability in the Third Republic,’ Nat’l Concord Nov.7, at 7. In 
Jacob Abiodun Dada (2012) ‘Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria’ Annual Survey of 





Edoumiekumo et al.11 posit that the daily rise in poverty in Nigeria has become a matter of 
concern. This includes a deterioration in the general well-being of vulnerable individuals, and 
is directly connected to human capabilities e.g., food, water, health care, fundamental rights, 
security, education, and employment. These are crucial components that could adversely affect 
their ability to access crucial resources, such as courts and lawyers. They may also potentially 
hinder the expansion and efficiency of legal aid provision in Nigeria. According to a 2011 
National Bureau of Statistics report, 60.9% of Nigerians in 2010 were living in "absolute 
poverty", compared with 54.7% in 2004.12 In this study, I will investigate claims by Rhode13 
that, in most nations, equal protection principles such as legal aid are routinely subverted in 
practice. The study will also investigate how the legal aid scheme is being executed and 
interpreted in practice through the varied legal aid laws14 in Nigeria. Hence a competence 
analysis of corresponding legal aid institutions, such as the Legal Aid Council, will examine 
the role and administration of such institutions and their impact on the legal aid scheme.  
In addition, this study will attempt to investigate any links between the Nigerian constitution 
and the way the scheme is being interpreted in practice. This will include a brief inquiry into 
the impact of military government intervention on the national constitution and its human right 
obligations through case law. Regarding this subject, Okeke15 argued that the repeated 
violations of human rights by the military contradict Nigeria’s human rights obligations. For 
example, in 1966, the military declared the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 
1. The decree superseded the functioning 1963 Nigerian constitution and denied Nigerian 
courts the competence required to deal with human rights issues such as the right to legal 
representation, thereby preventing them from presiding over any human rights infringement 
perpetrated by the military.  
Legislative barriers such as locus standi, which relates to the jurisdictional scope of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) as third-party representatives of legal aid, will also be 
evaluated. This study will venture into the nature of their enterprise and the law that guides 
 
11Edoumeikumo Samuel Gowon, Tamarauntari Moses Karimo and Tombofa Steve S. (2014) ‘Income Poverty in 
Nigeria: Incidence, Gap, Severity and Correlates’ American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Vo1. 2, 
No. 1 pp. 1-2.  
12Okoroafor M.O. and Nwaeze C. (2013) ‘Poverty and Economic Growth in Nigeria 1990-2011.’ The 
Macrotheme Review, 2(6) p. 105. 
13Rhode Deborah L. (2001), ‘Access to Justice’, Fordham Law Review Volume 69 Issue 5 pp. 1785-1787. 
14The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960-1999, The Legal Aid Act of Nigeria 1976-2011. 
15Okeke C.N (2015) ‘The use of International Law in the Domestic Courts of Ghana and Nigeria’ Arizona Journal 




their legal aid activities, such as the power of authority allocated by the Legal Aid Act of 2011. 
The limitations locus standi places on their role as legal aid providers will be discussed.16 Locus 
Standi refers to whether an applicant is entitled to seek redress from the courts in respect of an 
issue.17 A 2001 report cited Nigeria as a country with a relatively restrictive interpretation of 
locus standi, as it limits action for judicial review to only those who have a ‘personal right’ to 
the litigation in question.18 Locus standi has been a great challenge to NGOs in Nigeria, 
especially those who wish to take on a case by way of legal aid on behalf of individual(s) of 
limited means, as well as those whose rights have been infringed by governments. Litigant(s) 
must demonstrate sufficient interest in the matter being presented to the court. As a result of 
the strict rules surrounding locus standi, NGOs have typically found it difficult to seek redress 
on behalf of clients who may have been unable to exercise their rights without their assistance.19  
The pluralistic nature of Nigeria means there is more than one constitutionally permitted legal 
system through which different types of courts operate.20 Legal pluralism is a complex 
phenomenon which represents the basic structure of the Nigerian legal system. It also requires 
a comprehensive analysis for a better understanding of the interpretation of social justice 
through the various courts systems in Nigeria. This study is focused on the customary legal 
system. Hence, this study will explore the phenomenon in relation to the distinct social and 
cultural character of the customary legal system in Nigeria; further in chapter 5. Interpretation 
of rights would depend on the courts hearing them and the law guiding them. Thus, 
Chinamasa21 asserts that the interpretation of rights should not be randomly applied or left 
dormant, as courts are generally accepted as the avenue through which the application and 
interpretation of the law on rights is obtained. Courts play a definitive role within the legal aid 
scheme; yet, in order to dispense this role effectively, they must rely on other actors that are 
indispensable to the protection of rights via legal aid (e.g., lawyers, paralegals or NGO 
representatives), which is restricted by locus standi. This study will also inquire into the 
 
16Jacob Abiodun Dada (2012) ‘Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria’ Annual Survey of 
International & Comparative Law Vol. XVlII p. 86. 
17Zoila Hinson and Dianne Hubbard (2012) ‘Locus Standi: Standing to Bring a Legal Action’ Legal Assistance 
Centre Paper No. 2 p. i. 
18Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (2001) ‘Judicial Colloquium on Locus Standi in 
Administrative Justice and Human Rights Enforcement’ p. 4. 
19Ibid. 
20Common Law, Sharia Law and Customary Law court systems. 
21Chinamasa A. Patrick ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Justice Proceedings for African Jurists.’ In 
Bassiouni M. Cherif, Motala Ziyad (1995) (eds.) ‘The Protection of Human Rights in African Criminal 




Nigerian customary legal system and its operations with respect to the promotion of justice, 
fairness and the protection of human dignity. It will also consider its prospects as a feasible 
judicial institution by virtue of the legal aid provision. As well as propose a framework 
regarding how the innovation would work in practice. Ultimately, the bulk of this study will be 
directed towards the perception of ordinary Nigerian citizens and potential recipients of legal 
aid regarding seeking access and securing fundamental rights via customary legal systems, 
through a qualitative method of inquiry. 
 
1.2 Overview of the Legal Aid Scheme in Nigeria 
There is a consensus derived from the current literature on the obstacles facing the provision 
of legal aid for the disadvantaged in Nigeria. Research on the scheme posits that the main 
obstacle faced is the lack of readily available funding, inadequate legal and non-legal 
personnel, and insufficient courts and legal clinics that are required to carry out crucial legal 
duties.22 There are also other documented impediments to the scheme such as the minimal 
budgeting allocation, a limited number of willing pro bono lawyers and inadequately wide-
spread legal establishments to cater for disadvantaged individuals who seek free legal 
assistance.23  
However, there are other pressing factors that have been overlooked in the literature, creating 
a gap in the current information on the scope and expansion of the legal aid scheme. Questions 
on whether enough is being done to increase the scope of its operations have emerged, for 
example: how are the funds managed? How many signed-up legal personnel are providing the 
service in Nigeria? What are the steps being taken by the courts or judges to ensure that 
individuals with limited means can access legal aid at the initial stage of their case? Are such 
barriers in any way related or fundamental to the potential beneficiaries of legal aid themselves 
(e.g., illiteracy, disability, language barriers or the inability to travel to areas where formal 
courts are mostly situated). How can these complexities be tackled to ensure that all individuals 
 
22See an Overview of The State of the legal aid scheme in Nigeria (Open Society Justice Initiative). In ‘Access to 
Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems in Africa’ Survey Report 2011 pp. 11-21 
23See Nigeria’s 4th Periodic Country report: 2008-2010 on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human 
and People Rights in Nigeria, produced by the Federal Ministry of Justice, Abuja August 2011 p. 10. 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/50th/state-reports/4th-2008-2010/staterep4_nigeria_2011_eng.pdf 




who require legal assistance have access regardless of the barriers? Is the scope of access 
restricted by legislation? Are potential beneficiaries dissuaded from embracing the system due 
to inherent norms, beliefs, and a culture of pride? Or is it a matter of distrust in the formal 
judiciary? This study will investigate the efficacy of legal aid provision through the Legal Aid 
Council’s statistical review of the scheme. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Currently, there is a wide range of literature regarding the legal aid scheme in Nigeria, 
including categorical references to the limited scope and unavailability of the pivotal provision 
of legal aid. However, there are still visible gaps in the existing knowledge with regards to 
factual data and empirical research-based conclusions on other understated yet crucial barriers 
impeding the expansion of legal aid in Nigeria. This thesis is directed at tackling other social 
issues that further deter potential beneficiaries from access to free representation in the country, 
as well as looking beyond the barriers that have been established by the current literature and 
exploring other under-researched areas that would be of benefit to the expansion of the scheme 
in the distant future. 
Rhode,24 regarding the debate surrounding the access to legal aid, stated that “one central 
problem in discussions of equal justice is a lack of clarity or consensus about what exactly the 
problem is.” Beqiraj and McNamara,25 in exploring the obstacles that serve as a hindrance to 
achieving access to justice across jurisdictions, argue that access to justice is a process and 
legal aid is a crucial factor in its success in both civil and criminal justice issues. However, the 
process must entail a thorough understanding of the law underpinning legal aid provision as 
well as a comprehensive understanding and awareness of such rights.26 Hence, the principal 
concern of this study is to investigate and articulate the socio-legal barriers impeding the 
expansion of legal aid in Nigeria through empirical research. 
 
24Rhode Deborah L. (2013) ‘Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and Research for the Consortium 
on Access to Justice’ Journal of Legal Education, Volume 62, Number 4 p. 532.  
25Beqiraj Julinda and McNamara Lawrence (2014) ‘International Access to Justice: Barriers and Solutions’ 
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law Report.  
http://binghamcentre.biicl.org/documents/365_2014_ibatokyo_beqirajmcnamara_internationalaccesstojustic





Frynas27 acknowledges that one of the barriers to the legal aid scheme in Africa stems from the 
lack of the needed, up-to-date, and well documented empirical data. The author posits that 
empirical data is “relatively scarce and lacking in the research on problems of access to courts 
in Africa”. Collecting and analysing empirical data will paint a clearer picture of the 
impediments to the expansion of legal aid in Nigeria through the perception of ordinary 
individuals and allow stakeholders to act accordingly. Lack of access to fundamentals such as 
legal aid is grounded in the universal notion of disproportion. Inequality stems from social 
stratification, which emanates from a difference in social status among certain groups in 
society.28 Systems of stratification are based on social class and their inability to access crucial 
social, political, economic, civil, and cultural resources on an equal standing. Social class in 
determined by an individual’s status in society and is measured by race/ethnicity, gender, 
education, disability, income, and occupation.29 Hence, the existence of a social division and 
an inequitable distributive system of income and opportunity based on class30 which is 
prevalent in developing countries such as Nigeria. 
Social status and mindset of individuals are crucial factors when examining access to legal aid. 
Limited faith in the legal system has been cited as one of the major reasons why many would 
not seek the assistance they need. According to Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke,31 the majority of the 
Nigerian population are living under the poverty line and their numbers are on the increase due 
to many factors, such as the inability to access basic socio-economic institutions. Hence, 
restricted access to fundamental entitlements has led to economic deprivation, gross 
unemployment, and poor infrastructural facilities, exacerbated by ineffective poverty 
alleviation policies. According to Osinbajo,32 in 2015, about 110 million Nigerians were living 
below the poverty line despite the policies of past governments to improve their welfare. That 
is, about two-thirds of over 180 million Nigerians are extremely poor with high levels of 
 
27Fynas Jedrzj George (2001) ‘Problems of Access to Courts in Nigeria: Results of a Survey of Legal 
Practitioners’ Social & Legal Studies, Sage Vol. 10 No. 3 p. 398. 
28Anthias Floya (2001) The Concept of ‘Social Division’ and Theorising Social Stratification: Looking at Ethnicity 
and Class Sociology, journal?’ 35(4), pp. 835-854.  
29Grusky, D.B (1994) ‘Social stratification.’ Boulder: Westview. p. 2. 
30Dabla-Norris Era, Kochhar Kalpana, Suphaphiphat Nujin, Ricka Frantisek, Tsountan Evridiki (2015) ‘Causes and 
Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective’ pp. 4-9.  
31Ali-Akpajiak, S. C., & Pyke, T. (2003) ‘Measuring Poverty in Nigeria.’ Oxfam. Chapter 3 pp. 5-19. 






illiteracy, residing mostly in rural areas and unable to access fundamental resources such as 
legal aid.  
Blasi33 argues that the perception of individuals towards justice is crucial to how they perceive 
their own circumstances. Blasi further posits that “attitude surveys” will give a clearer picture 
of how individuals liaise with the judiciary. Greiner & Pattanya34 observed that many studies 
suffer from methodological problems and consequently reach inconclusive arguments. They 
insist that, in the absence of measurable information revealing the impact of legal services on 
the clients, advocates of legal aid would have to rely on intuition and guesswork to make 
impactful decisions concerning the administration of legal aid. Frynas35 contends that previous 
research on access to courts in Africa by socio-legal scholars is based on speculative evidence 
and mostly confined to one aspect of the subject matter: for instance, the inadequate access to 
legal assistance available to women in Africa.36 Marmot37 argued that the social status of an 
individual is pertinent to two human fundamental needs: to have control over one’s everyday 
life; and the ability to engage in social activity within a society and be recognised and perceived 
as such.  
Through empirical research, this thesis seeks to investigate and deeply understand the current 
status of the legal aid scheme from the perspective of ordinary individuals in Nigeria. It will 
further explain the scheme as they perceive it in order to understand how the scheme is being 
managed to benefit the people that it was established to protect. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
➢ To what extent can customary courts be utilised to bridge the gap and solder relations 
between the legal aid scheme and the disadvantaged in Nigeria? 
The research question posed will highlight the impact of obstacles for individuals residing in 
the vast, rural areas of Nigeria and whether alternative measures such as the availability of legal 
 
33Blasi Gary (2004) ‘How Much Access? How Much Justice?’ Fordham Law Review Vol. 73 Issue 3 p. 871. 
34Greiner D. James & Pattanya Cassandra Wolos (2012) ‘Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What 
Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?’ The Yale Law Journal 121 p. 2126. 
35Fynas Jedrzj George (2001) ‘Problems of Access to Courts in Nigeria: Results of a Survey of Legal 
Practitioners’ Social & Legal Studies, Sage Vol. 10 No. 3 p. 398. 
36Ibid. 




aid in customary courts would increase the provision and address the needs of individuals who 
need legal assistance. It will also pave the way for further exhaustive research into the long-
term implications of the limited scope of legal aid on disadvantage in such areas in Nigeria. 
 
1.5 Research Gaps, Aims and Objectives 
Through empirical field work research, this thesis will endeavour to examine the various 
barriers that are not mentioned in the current legal aid literature in Nigeria. It will also act as a 
foundation of evidenced information to investigate and further clarify the documented 
obstacles, including many other unexplored impediments that are responsible for the failing 
legal aid scheme in Nigeria. This study will make efforts to ascertain that valid conclusions are 
drawn from unbiased primary data. Access to legal aid is an important determinant in legal 
matters that govern an individual’s right to equality before the law. As Rhode38 states, equal 
justice for all is widely proclaimed by various nations but is the most violated of human rights. 
That is, despite all the diverse legal systems and legislative instruments positioned within the 
judiciary to enforce equality before the law, it is not often achieved in practice. Rhode goes 
further, positing that the judiciary is one of the most disturbing institutions in terms of failing 
to protect fundamental rights of disadvantaged individuals. The long narratives regarding 
access to justice by way of legal aid do not reflect the reality of its existence.39  
Hence, there is a need for exhaustive research and education into the justice gap to deal with 
unsolved legal problems and to formulate a coalition for progress.40 This thesis will endeavour 
to address the gap that previous legal and socio-legal researchers have omitted in terms of 
groundwork research and candid data acquisition. Furthermore, it will explore the legal 
structures that are put in place to uphold the protection of the right to access justice via legal 
aid. Andrew and Nyirenda41 explain the difference between having a comprehensive legal 
framework and achieving an effective order, and argue that, in the quest to achieve non-
 
38Rhode Deborah L. (2004) ‘Access to Justice Equal Justice Under Law: The Gap Between Principle and Practice’ 
Chapter 1 p. 1. 
39Ibid.  
40Rhode Deborah L.  (2013) ‘Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and Research for the Consortium 
on Access to Justice’ Journal of Legal Education, Volume 62, No. 4 p. 532. 
41Andrew K.C. Nyirenda SC JA2 (2014) ‘The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting the Rights of Vulnerable Groups 
in Malawi.’ In ‘Using the Courts to Protect Vulnerable People: Perspectives from the Judiciary and the Legal 
Profession in Botwana, Malawi and Zambia’ [Paper presented at the Judicial Colloquium on the Rights of 
Vulnerable Groups, held at Sunbird Nkopola Lodge, Mangochi, Malawi, on 6 and 7 March 2014] p. 1. 




discrimination within society, substantive equality must take precedence from national legal 
frameworks.  
This study will also examine the role of past and present Nigerian legal frameworks, which 
include the Constitution(s) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1960-1999),42 the Nigerian 
Legal Aid Act(s) (1976-2011)43 and other essential human rights instruments (e.g., the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986)44 and other subsidiaries45 advocating for access 
to free legal representation). This will further highlight the efforts being made to achieve equal 
opportunities for all through legal aid, regardless of an individual’s social status.   
However, this study will also highlight the elements, if any, within the legal aid legislation that 
might directly or indirectly hinder its progress. This will include an assessment of other 
compelling legal institutions, such as the customary legal system, as potential tools to expand 
the scheme in Nigeria. Thus, there is a unique opportunity to further protect the rights of the 
disadvantaged by analysing and clarifying fundamental principles of fairness and equality 
under regional human rights instruments; and, most importantly, by clarifying how such laws 
are being implemented and interpreted in national legislation in Nigeria.  
Rhode46 asserted that there are various other barriers not frequently mentioned in legal aid 
literature. Among others, they include age, ethnicity, culture, illiteracy, gender, language 
barriers, geographic isolation, disability, and lack of confidence. The author went further to 
state that there are still many prevailing issues with regard to legal aid, which include: a lack 
of national data to give a true picture of the activities and progress of the scheme; the absence 
of an independent, systematic evaluation structure which can rate services and gather feedback 
 
42See fundamental rights sections of the Nigerian Constitution(s) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960, 1963, 
1979, 1989 and 1999: The right to fair trial, the right to legal aid, Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy, Special jurisdiction of the court, Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 
(FREP Rules); where applicable.  
43See the Legal Aid Act(s) of Nigeria No 56 1976; CAP 205 LFN 1990; CAP L9 LFN 2004 and CAP L9 2011: The 
concept of legal aid, eligibility criteria; the Legal Aid Council (LAC) and scope of legal aid representation.  
44See the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) 1986 CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982).  
45See the Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (Tunis Resolution) 1992 ACHPR/Res.4(XI)92; the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003); African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, 2003, para. A(2)(i), and the Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the 
Criminal Justice System in Africa (2006) ACHPR/Res.100(XXXX)06. 
46Deborah L. Rhode (2013) ‘Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and Research for the Consortium 




from recipients; insufficient information regarding the impact of legal aid or the lack of it on 
the recipients themselves (e.g., on their psychological wellbeing).47 
Alcock48 states that the legal profession itself is crucial to the potential major changes that 
could take place within the legal aid scheme. This study aims to evaluate the role of the 
judiciary and other legal aid providers and how they can improve and expand the provision of 
legal aid in Nigeria. It will also appraise where non-legal aid staff such as NGO representatives, 
paralegals and newly graduated law students are positioned within the legal aid process in 
practice. This study will review the alternative strategies, if any, put in place to assist and 
relieve other governmental agencies of the burden and backlog of cases subject to legal aid 
(e.g., non-legal aid staff). Any propositions for governments to pay more attention to the 
importance of legal aid, which expose negligence and disregard for the legal needs of the 
disadvantaged, will be examined. Alongside this, the impact of limited or non-existent access 
to legal aid on the disadvantaged in Nigeria will be examined from their own perspective. The 
theme of this study is to also fully establish the provision of legal aid as a system that is 
imperative to providing fair and equal access to courts in Nigeria. In the absence of free legal 
representation in both criminal and civil cases, disadvantaged individuals are at risk of being 
excluded and denied access to the legal system and compelling judicial remedies.  
The justification of this study is: to gain more insight into the mechanics of the Nigerian legal 
aid scheme; to analyse Nigeria’s position in guaranteeing the human right of access to justice 
and legal aid, by exploring and investigating its current legal aid system; to expand the scope 
of understanding on the issue of legal aid in practice and investigate other uncharted barriers 
affecting the scheme’s expansion. The study will also include an in-depth inquiry into why the 
provision has remained inaccessible to the disadvantaged in Nigeria and will also explore other 
alternative modes of service delivery to further optimise and extend the scope of legal aid 
provision, most especially for those that reside in the vast, rural areas of Nigeria.  
Summarily, this study will observe and analyse the opinions of various Nigerian individuals 
regarding their understanding of the concept of legal aid, and the potential of expanding legal 
aid through other avenues such as customary courts. For an in-depth understanding of the topic, 
this thesis will delve into the diverse literature on access to justice via legal aid, both old and 
new. This will include literature that is directly as well as indirectly related to the legal aid 
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scheme in Nigeria. Ultimately, this study seeks to procure answers to the crucial research 
question regarding policy implementation and regulation, discretion of the judiciary, the rule 
of law, and legal decision-making in Nigeria. 
 
1.6 Scope of Study 
This study investigates the legal aid scheme within the realms of human rights (the equal and 
inalienable49 entitlements of every person). The initial focus is to establish the status of legal 
aid through African human rights mechanisms, such as: the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; the Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992); The Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003); and The 
Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Africa (2006). 
The previous and current national fundamental rights provisions contained within the Nigerian 
constitutions will also be examined, which is essential in order to investigate the scope of 
operation of legal aid since independence in 1960. In addition to the examination of other 
intrinsic human rights standards, connected to the security and the legal rights of individuals 
who cannot afford legal protection. For instance, the past and current Legal Aid Acts of Nigeria 
and the directives of the Legal Aid Council.  
Furthermore, this study will explore the operations of the Nigerian customary court system, 
including the principles that underpin the interpretation of customary law in practice e.g., 
jurisdiction, ascertaining and validating customary law. These principles have created a 
distinction between living (on the ground) customary law and state (judicial) customary law 
whereby variants have evolved due to numerous interpretations of the same customary law. 
This occurs when cases heard in a Customary Court are escalated to the Customary Court of 
Appeal to review the customary law in question and judgement of the customary court. As a 
consequence, a divergent judgement from the appeal court would have no bearing on other 
similar cases brought before customary courts unless it goes through the appeals process or if 
the customary court decides to follow the judgement of the higher court and eradicate such law 
e.g., female inheritance matters.   
 




In addition, this study will appraise the research question by collecting and analysing empirical 
data on the perception of Nigerian individuals towards the legal aid scheme and the prospects 
of expanding the scheme via the intrinsic customary legal system. The respondent sample was 
limited to Nigerian indigenes of mixed gender who are over the age of 18 and familiar with 
legal aid provision and the customary legal system in Nigeria. In total 15 respondents took part 
in the study, 3 of which participated in semi-structured telephone interviews, while the 
remainder completed 12 self-administered online questionnaires. All 15 participants were 
required to answer 14 questions. 
 
1.7 Methodology 
This study adopts a qualitative research method for an in-depth investigation of the research 
question. It employs the qualitative triangulation approach, using in-depth semi-structured 
telephone interviews and online self-administered questionnaires to collect data. This study 
makes the assumption that a more personal and flexible research structure is required to capture 
meanings in human interaction (interpretivism)50,51 Hence, respondents give a detailed analysis 
of what they perceive as their reality52 and, as a consequence, justify the motive of this study. 
This also means that the researcher is able to acquire knowledge as well as understand and 
formulate a conclusion based on the multiple perspectives.  
The telephone interviews were recorded via a voice recorder. While the completed self-
administered questionnaires were received electronically via email. Data collected through 
both approaches was stored, transcribed, and analysed using conventional (inductive) content 
analysis. This approach aims to generate meanings from the dataset so to identify patterns and 
relationships and form a theory.53 The focus is on creating a new in-depth understanding and 
interpretation of social worlds and their surroundings.54 The coding process involved both 
initial and focused coding. The research findings were categorised into initial preliminary codes 
 
50Carson, D., Gilmore, A., Perry, C., and Gronhaug, K. (2001) ‘Qualitative Marketing Research’ London: Sage. 
51Black, I. (2006) ‘The Presentation of Interpretivist Research’ Qualitative Market Research: An International 
Journal, 9(4), pp. 319-324. 
52Carson, D., Gilmore, A., Perry, C., and Gronhaug, K. (2001) ‘Qualitative Marketing Research’ London: Sage. 
53Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. (2012) ‘Research Methods for Business Students’ 6th edition, Pearson 
Education Limited pp. 154-155. 




and then appropriate key themes for further simplification aimed at addressing the research 
questions, as well as the aims and objectives of the study. 
 
1.8 Expected Research Contributions and Ramifications 
The empirical research that this study intends to undertake will endeavour to attain the answers 
that have eluded the extant legal aid literature concerning the expansion of the legal aid scheme 
in Nigeria. This study is expected to make an extensive contribution to academic theory, as 
well as to the field of socio-legal research in Nigeria. In terms of theory, this study introduces 
an original narrative on the prospects of expanding legal aid provision in Nigeria through 
customary legal systems. With regards to socio-legal research in Nigeria, the inter-disciplinary 
model is still under-developed in Nigerian academia and this is reflected in the limited and 
inadequate data accessible to legal institutions on legal aid. The goal here is to challenge the 
conventional black letter law approach which merely describes the principles of law with no 
consideration of the realities of the wider public. Hence, this study adopts a socio-legal 
approach of investigating the link and far-reaching relationship between Nigerian society 
and the law that structures judicial decision-making. It also serves as a tool to analyse the 
collected empirical evidence on increasing the scope of legal aid through the Nigerian 
customary legal system. The outcome of the study aims, through the analysis of collected data, 
to increase knowledge on the topic while informing and influencing stakeholders that are 
responsible for reform in areas of access to appropriate judicial institutions in Nigeria (e.g., 
policymakers, legislators, the judiciary, NGOs, and practitioners). 
 
1.9 Research Structure  
➢ Chapter one: This section introduces the research topic and the primary aim of the study. It 
presents the background and significance of the study via an overview of legal aid provision 
in Nigeria. The chapter also details the gaps in the current legal aid literature through the 
research question, and justifies the study through its aims, objectives, and scope.  
➢ Chapter two: This chapter examines the domestic law and institutions guiding legal aid 
provision in Nigeria. It will also perform a critical analysis of African human right laws 
and supplementary instruments affiliated with legal aid. This analysis will further test the 




highlight the complexities within the wording and operation of the equal justice laws and 
how they are being interpreted and applied in practice. 
➢ Chapter three: This chapter investigates the Nigerian Constitution from independence from 
colonial British rule55 to the present day 1999 constitution on the matter of free legal 
representation as a fundamental right. A critical content analysis method will be adopted to 
further evaluate: the infrastructure of all Nigerian constitutions; the additional efforts to 
ensure rights of equality are protected; and the legal impediments faced. This method will 
produce a conclusive interpretation of legal text56 via the wording of the constitution(s) that 
is specific to legal aid in Nigeria. It will identify the role and intent of the Nigerian 
constitution with regard to embracing African human right instruments and providing legal 
aid to individuals who are eligible for free legal assistance.  
➢ Chapter four: This section critically explores the inherent characteristics of Nigerian 
customary court systems and considers its prospects as a tool of legal aid reform in Nigeria. 
It examines the historical background, progress, and practice of customary courts during 
the British colonial era. It also discusses the concept of customary law and the customary 
courts system in Nigeria. This section also looks at customary courts from a law and society 
perspective.  
➢ Chapter five: This chapter is an extension of the assertions made in chapter four. It discusses 
the concept of contemporary customary law in practice, and the scope of their jurisdiction 
in the Nigerian national legal system. It considers the impact of legal pluralism and the 
potential drawbacks of applying law in customary courts. In addition, this section explores 
international human rights standards that guide customary law as well as the 
implementation and application of legal aid through customary courts. 
➢ Chapter six: This section presents the methodological approach adopted to achieve the aims 
and objectives of this study. It also justifies the research methods utilised to answer the 
research question posed. This section introduces the various research paradigms that are 
crucial to any research, especially research that aims to investigate views of social reality. 
It also justifies the adoption of the interpretive approach as a means to give meaning to the 
personal experiences of the respondents. It highlights the rationale for choosing a 
qualitative research method over a quantitative one and discusses the potential limitations 
 
551st October 1960.  
56Weber R.P. (1990) ‘Basic Content Analysis’ Second (ed.) Sage University Paper Series on Qualitative 




of the former. This chapter considers qualitative legal research methods and demonstrates 
the importance of empirical legal scholarship to further understand legal problems 
associated with society. It also highlights the benefits of an interdisciplinary research 
method to address the study topic. Furthermore, the process of triangulation via semi-
structured telephone interviews and self-administered questionnaires was discussed to 
illustrate the adopted methods of data collection. Sampling, coding, and content analysis 
were also considered in relation to the data analysis and interpretation. This section also 
discusses the criteria followed to ensure trustworthiness and credibility in this study. 
➢ Chapter seven: This chapter presents and discusses the research findings. It introduces the 
emergent themes that originated from the collected data and discusses each theme in 
relation to the research topic. In addition, this section reveals how the findings of this study 
reflect extant views on the provision of legal aid and the customary legal system in Nigeria. 
It also establishes various perspectives on expanding legal aid through Nigerian customary 
courts.  
➢ Chapter eight: This chapter concludes this study. It re-examines the research question and 
acknowledges how the research findings address the main objectives of this study. This 
section also establishes the research contributions as well as the limitations that were 














Chapter 2: The Concept of Legal Aid in Nigeria 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces and examines the legal aid scheme in Nigeria. It discusses the 
development of the scheme within the Nigerian judiciary. It also investigates the process by 
which legal aid became accessible through the current and previous Nigerian Legal Aid Acts. 
This will include an overview of the Legal Aid Council and an analysis of the reports detailing 
the operations of legal aid provision in Nigeria from 2011-2017. This chapter analyses the 
African regional legal system through The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(ACHPR) (1986) and other supplementary human rights instruments, such as The Resolution 
on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992), The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003) and The Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing 
Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Africa (2006). This chapter will also examine how 
legal aid rules and guides within these instruments are interpreted and applied in practice via 
domestic law.  
Doran and Leonard57 posit that a legal aid scheme acts as a resource for low-income individuals 
experiencing legal issues. It is targeted at those who are unable to afford the services of a lawyer 
by providing legal representation at no cost. The concept of legal aid in Nigeria was initiated 
in 1961 during the African Conference on the Rule of Law held in Lagos. This conference 
addressed “the hollowness of a constitutional right to a fair hearing, if the financial aspect of 
access was ignored.”58 A bill (Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1961) was prepared; however, due 
to the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), it was abandoned. Cottrell59 argues that an increase in 
court fees by the Western State government in 1969 played a decisive role in the development 
of legal aid. 
 
57Doran Jay, Leonard Beth (2016) ‘The Power of Story: How Legal Aid Narratives Affect Perceptions of Poverty’ 
Seattle Journal for Social Justice Vol. 15 Issue 2 pp. 333-355. 
58Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, the Chief Justice of Nigeria at that time made the initial public acknowledgement 
of the need for legal aid in Nigeria. A Bill titled:  Legal Aid and Advice Act 1961 for Parliament was prepared by 
Honourable Attorney-General, Dr T.O. Elias to formally establish legal aid in Nigeria and grant low-income 
individuals legal aid and legal advice. Legal Aid Council of Nigeria. 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=111&Itemid=1960&lang
=en (accessed 03/06/2019). 




Hence, in 1974, the Nigerian Legal Aid Association was established by notable senior lawyers   
of the Nigerian judiciary60 to further the legal aid scheme and create “a new Nigerian nation 
where there is equal access to justice for all irrespective of means and where all Constitutional 
rights are respected [and] protected […] to ensure justice for all”. Thus, legal aid was launched 
in various states across Nigeria.61 The Legal Aid Act No. 56 of 1976 formally introduced the 
legal aid scheme into law and was later incorporated into the 1979 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria.62 Bradway63 identifies legal aid as a solution found by lawyers who 
recognised they had an additional professional obligation to the public as well as to their paying 
clients. 
 
2.2 The Nigerian Legal Aid Provision  
“The policy direction must elevate Legal Aid to the level of a fundamental right of deserving 
citizens. It must not be seen as charity for the poor but a fundamental right.” Ayorinde Bolaji64 
This study is crucial and relevant to the promotion of legal aid as a fundamental right in present 
day Nigeria. The right to legal aid is protected under Nigerian domestic law and plays a vital 
role in promoting fair and equal justice for individuals at risk of being excluded from the legal 
system due to their lower social status. The provision of legal aid is shaped by social as well as 
legal institutions which govern the behaviour and expectations of individuals. It is also an 
obligatory right for people who are unable to afford legal counsel in Nigeria. The availability 
of free legal representation is designed via legislation to protect the interests and rights of 
disadvantaged individuals before the courts. However, Novack65 posits that there has been an 
 
60Initiated by Chief Chimezie Ikeazor (SAN) and other founding members such as Chief Debo Akande (SAN) who 
was the Director of Operations. Chief (Dr) Solomon Lar C.O.N. was the Secretary General. Other active 
members of the association include Chief Edwin Ume-Ezeoke and Chief Adebayo Ogunsanya (SAN) who was 
the President of the Nigerian Bar Association during that period. https://legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/historical-
profile-of-the-council/ (accessed 04/04/21). 
61Ibid. 
62Legal Aid Act No. 56 of 1976 came into force on 2nd day of May 1977.  
63Bradway John S. (1954) ‘Legal Aid: Its Concept, Organization and Importance,’ 14 Louisiana Law Review. Vol. 
XIV pp. 554-567. 
64See Ayorinde Bolaji’s (SAN) interview: ‘Legal Aid Should Be Elevated to the Level of a Fundamental Right.’ 
Cited in This day (10/05/2016).  http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/05/10/legal-aid-should-be-
elevated-to-the-level-of-a-fundamental-right/ (accessed 04/08/2018). 
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increasing shortage of legal aid in Sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria despite 
constitutional guarantees.  
 
2.2.1 Statutory Basis for Legal Aid in Nigeria  
The fundamental right to legal aid is detailed in the current 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, where it guarantees legal representation and other free legal services (e.g., 
legal advice) to individuals who are deemed eligible.66 The provision is means tested and is 
prescribed by the Federal Executive Council.67 The Legal Aid Acts of Nigeria has, since its 
inception in 1976 and through various amendments up until the current 2011 Act, aimed to 
increase the scope of legal aid; however, the provision continues to face impediments that serve 
as barriers to access, for the individuals it was enacted to protect. Bamgbose68 links the 
obstacles hindering access to legal aid to the Nigerian judiciary system. He argues that the 
provision is non-existent and unattainable for the disadvantaged in Nigeria and insists that 
developing countries such as Nigeria suffer significantly from barriers that impede access to 
free legal representation due to weak and inaccessible legal and judicial institutions.69  
 
2.2.2 The Nigeria Legal Aid Decree/Act 1976-2011 
Section 19 (1) of the Legal Aid Decree70 No. 56 1976 introduced the concept of free legal 
representation into the Nigerian judiciary. The scheme covered only criminal cases of a serious 
nature involving personal injury,71 such as murder, manslaughter, grievous bodily harm and 
assault (omitting other serious offences such as armed robbery).72 This included aiding or 
abetting offenders, as listed under s.6 of the Act.73 Section 6 (3) allows for a defence via legal 
aid only in a court where the persons have a right to be defended or represented by counsel. 
 
66See s. 46 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
67McQuoid-Mason David (2003) ‘Legal Aid in Nigeria: Using National Youth Service Corps Public Defenders to 
Expand the Services of the Legal Aid Council’ Journal of African Law, Vol. 47, No. 1 p. 111. 
68Bamgbose O. (2015) ‘Access to Justice through Clinical Legal Education: A Way Forward for Good Governance 
and Development’ 15 African Human Rights Law Journal pp. 378-396. 
69Ibid. p. 380. 
70Decrees were legislative acts used by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria to rule the country. Once 
the power is handed back to a civilian government, all qualifying decrees (some may be voided if necessary) 
are converted to Acts of National Assembly. 
71Cottrell Jill (1976) ‘Legislation: The New Nigerian Legal Aid Decree,’ J.L.A Vol. 22 No. 1 p. 80. 
72Ibid. 




However, s. 6 (4) (b) provides for the representation by a legal practitioner before ‘any’ court. 
This potentially presents more options for litigants who may wish to be heard in a court of their 
choosing e.g., customary court. Section 6 (4) (c) extends legal aid to ‘additional aid’, including 
advice in civil matters.74 Section 7 of the Legal Aid Act 1976 establishes the Legal Aid Fund.75 
Section 8 (2) of the 1976 Act defines eligible persons as those whose income does not exceed 
720 Naira ($1.99)76 per annum.77 While Section 12 considers lawyers in private practice and 
lawyers serving in the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)78 are qualified to provide legal 
aid, only legal practitioners can receive payment for their services. However, lawyers serving 
in the NYSC79 are paid via a government monthly allowance for their personal upkeep.80   
Section 20 (1) establishes the Legal Aid Act CAP 205, LFN 1990. This Act represents a 
notable shift from the preceding 1976 Act,81 to ensure that the scheme remained effective in 
practice. For instance, s. 7 (1) increased the scope of legal aid to include both criminal and civil 
matters, as specified within the Second Schedule of the act.82 According to s. 9 (1), legal aid is 
granted to persons whose income does not exceed 1,500 Naira ($4.14)83 per annum, an increase 
in the eligible income level.84 Sections 1385 and 1486 reiterate the mandates of the 1976 Act 
with regards to the providers of legal aid and the remuneration afforded. With the Legal Aid 
Act CAP L9, LFN 2004 (s. 7),87 the scope of legal aid increased dramatically to incorporate 
 
74The mandates that dictate the jurisdiction and additional aid of the legal aid scheme are sustained in the 
succeeding 1990 and 2004 Legal Aid Acts.   
75“Funds shall be provided by the government. Contributions may be received from philanthropic persons, 
organisations or other.”  
76In today’s currency, adjusting for inflation, this is equal to roughly $9.30: https://www.inflationtool.com/us-
dollar/1976-to-present-value?amount=2 (accessed 18/03/20). 
77“Legal aid may be approved for individuals whose income exceeds the amount prescribed, who are of limited 
means, on a contributory basis.”  
78See s.13 Legal Aid Act No. 56 of 1976. 
79See National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) Official Website https://www.nysc.gov.ng/ (accessed 13/04/2021). 
80See Current allowance for NYSC https://guardian.ng/news/buhari-approves-n33000-allowance-for-nysc-
members/ (accessed 13/04/2021). 
81However, many of the successive directives maintained those contained in the previous 1976 Act e.g., legal 
aid Fund. 
82“Subject to the provisions of s.7, legal aid may be granted in respect to matters such as: (A) Murder of any 
degree; manslaughter, inflicting grievous bodily harm, assault/ actual bodily harm; (B) Aiding and abetting to 
any offence listed in A; (C) Civil claims in respect of accidents.” 
83In today’s currency, adjusting for inflation since 2004, this is around $8.20: 
https://www.inflationtool.com/us-dollar/1990-to-present-value?amount=4 (accessed 18/03/2020) 
84“Legal aid may be granted to those whose income exceeds the eligibility standard but of limited means, on a 
contributory basis.” 
85“Legal practitioners will be managed and paid by the Legal Aid Council.” 
86“Lawyers serving in the Youth Corps will receive no remuneration for their service.”  




other serious criminal offences and provided extra protection for civil matters.88 This reflects 
the explicit fundamental rights directive of the 1999 Nigerian constitution that pledges to 
protect all individuals facing litigation regardless of the category of the case. Section 9 (1) 
states that, to be eligible for legal aid, income of recipients must not exceed 5,000 Naira 
($13.82)89 per annum. This is a further increase in eligible income, with the added discretion 
to provide legal assistance if income exceeds this amount. Sections 13 and 14 remain the same 
as in previous Acts.90 
The current Legal Aid Act CAP L9, 201191 repealed the 2004 Act. The scope of the provision 
under s. 892 is explicit and extensive, as compared to preceding Acts, with expansive support 
for both criminal and civil cases. The 2011 Act places more emphasis on fair trial rights and 
equal standing before the courts. Thus, s. 8 (2)93 establishes the Criminal Defence Service, 
which aims to ensure that individuals accused of a criminal offence can access legal aid 
services. Section 8 (3) 94 initiates the Civil Litigation Service to ensure diligent defence of all,95 
while s. 8 (5) (a) empowers a legal practitioner to represent a person before any court.96 Section 
8 (7) establishes the Community Legal Service to empower disadvantaged and marginalised 
individuals and ensure access to services that meet the needs of recipients. Section 9 (a) and 
(b) declares the Federal and State Governments as the main source of funding. However, 
external funding by philanthropists and others permitted in previous Acts are excluded in the 
 
88“Subject to the provisions of s.7, legal aid may be granted in respect to matters such as (A). Murder of any 
degree; manslaughter, inflicting grievous bodily harm, assault/ actual bodily harm; common assault; affray; 
stealing and rape. (B). Aiding and abetting to any offence listed in A. (C). Civil claims in respect of accidents and 
civil that cover breach of fundamental Rights as guaranteed by Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria.”  
89In today’s currency, adjusting for inflation, this is equal to roughly $19.50: https://www.inflationtool.com/us-
dollar/2004-to-present-value?amount=14 (accessed 18/03/20). 
90The payment of legal practitioners and non-payment of services provided by Lawyers serving in the Youth 
Corps remain the same under s. 13 and s. 14 of the 2004 Act. 
91By virtue of s. 25 Legal Aid Act CAP L9, 2011. 
92According to “s. 8(1): The grant of legal aid, advice and access to justice shall be provided by the Council in 3 
broad areas, namely, Criminal Defence Service, Advice and Assistance in Civil matters including legal 
representation in court and Community Legal Services subject to merits and indigence tests for the parties.” 
93“The Council, shall establish, maintain and develop a service known as the Criminal Defence Service for the 
purpose of assisting indigent persons involved in criminal investigation or proceedings…access to such advice, 
assistance and representation as the interest of justice requires.” 
94“The Council shall establish and maintain a service to be known as the Civil Litigation Service for the purpose 
of assisting indigent persons to access such advice, assistance, and representation in court where the interest 
of justice demands…” 
95Federal Ministry of Justice. The Department of Civil Litigation and Public Law. 
https://www.justice.gov.ng/index.php/the-ministry/departments/civil-litigation (accessed 12/11/2019). 
96“Section (5) Legal Aid shall consist, on terms provided by this Act, of: (b) representation by a legal 




2011 Act. Lack of funding is cited as one of the main factors limiting the scope of the scheme 
as government funding continues to be inadequate. Thus, this inadequacy may have been 
reconstructed by the boost in approved legal aid providers introduced by this Act i.e., NGO 
representatives, Law Clinics, paralegals whose services can be secured at a lower or at no cost 
at all e.g., NGO’s.   
According to s. 10 (1), eligibility is subject to the national minimum wage,97 which is set at 
18,000 Naira (roughly $50.70, adjusting for inflation)98 per month according to the National 
Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act 2011.99 This is a substantial increment as compared to the 
previous eligibility criteria. The eligibility criteria are set according to the national minimum 
wage. This may become very problematic in a country where the majority are self-employed 
and unable to keep track of their annual wage. In addition, Novak100 argues that there are many 
disadvantaged individuals who earn too much to qualify for legal aid but earn too little to afford 
legal representation due to the high costs and may be at a disadvantage if they were to face 
litigation. 
Akin to the previous 1979, 1990 and 2004 Legal Aid Acts, Sections 15 (1) and 16 reiterate the 
reimbursement standards for legal assistance providers.101 In addition to the established 
providers,102 s. 17 of the 2011 Act increases the scope of legal aid providers and recognises 
NGOs, Law Clinics, and paralegals as legitimate legal aid providers to advance the legal aid 
scheme. The increased scope of providers is crucial to this study, as limited legal aid personnel 
is another main obstacle to access. It is also an important factor when considering the prospects 
of expanding legal aid through other court systems such as customary courts. For instance, 
NGOs are able to travel through the vast rural areas and engage with various communities 
through their volunteers while other legal personnel such as community-based paralegals, 
 
97“Section 10 (2) and (3) allow for discretion by the Board/Governing board to grant legal aid to persons whose 
minimum wage exceed the amount stated, depending on their circumstance.” 
98See https://www.inflationtool.com/us-dollar/2011-to-present-value?amount=50 (accessed 18/03/20). 
99Section 2 (1), National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act 2011. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/956/National%20Minimum%20Wage%20Act%20amendment%202011.p
df (accessed 19/06/2019). 
100Novak Andrew (2010) ‘The Globalization of the Student Lawyer: Toward a Law Student Practice Rule for 
Indigent Criminal Defence in Sub-Saharan Africa Human Rights and Globalization’ Law Review Vol. 3 p. 36  
101“Section 15 (1) approves payment for legal practitioners for services while Lawyers serving in the Youth Corp 
will receive no payment for their assistance”: see s.16 Legal Aid Act CAP L9, 2011. 




which this study suggests could be locally trained by qualified lawyers serving in the National 
Youth Corp Service would be of great benefit to further expand the legal aid scheme.  
Paralegals tend to be more familiar with the law, the custom and language in their area and will 
not need to travel too far from their locality. The Legal Aid Council103 recognises that the bulk 
of Nigerian lawyers reside in the urban areas and are reluctant to travel inland due to security 
issues while most of the disadvantaged live in the rural areas and as such there is a pressing 
need for community-based paralegals to bridge the gap and ensure that free legal advice and 
representation is available in such areas. A proposal of how this would work on ground is 
further detailed in chapter 5. 
 
2.2.3 Legal Aid Council (LAC) 
The LAC is the principal authority for the administration of policies specific to free legal 
representation for the disadvantaged in Nigeria. The permissible modes of delivery of legal aid 
currently available within the Nigerian judiciary are pro bono lawyers, public defenders, 
paralegals, lawyers serving in the National Youth Service Corps (Law School graduates), legal 
clinics and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The first LAC was established in 
accordance with the provisions of s. 1 (1) of the LAC 1976104 to oversee the execution and 
implementation of legal aid in Nigeria.  
The LAC acknowledges that one of the main obstacles to its legal aid operations is that of 
insufficient funding105 and, according to McQuoid-Mason,106 it has been lobbying extensively 
for increased spending on the legal aid scheme. As a result, in 2000, the Federal Government 
set aside N20 million107 for the LAC108 to improve and extend the scope of its undertaking. 
 
103Towards a National Paralegal Movement in Nigeria (2020) 
https://legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/2020/07/15/towards-a-national-paralegal-movement-in-nigeria/ (accessed 
08/04/2020). 
104See s. 1 (1) Legal Aid Act 1976 A253 and subsequent Legal Aid Acts: Legal Aid Act CAP 205, LFN 1990; Legal 
Aid Act CAP L9, LFN 2004 and Legal Aid Act CAP L9, 2011. 
105See Legal Aid Reports 2011-2017. 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118&Itemid=1966&lang
=en (accessed 01/07/2019).  
106McQuoid-Mason David (2003) ‘Legal Aid in Nigeria: Using National Youth Service Corps Public Defenders to 
Expand the Services of the Legal Aid Council’ Journal of African Law, Vol. 47, No. 1 p. 110. 
107About $200,000 or $0.0017 per capita at that time.   
108Information by the Chairman of the Governing Council of the Legal Aid Council at the Legal Aid Council of 





The author believes the budget was inadequate when compared to the population, which were 
approximately 120 million people during that period. In 2001 the LAC submitted another 
budget109 totalling N400 million,110 but was only granted N9 million,111 a substantial decrease 
from the previous year and a major setback to the scheme as it depends on government funding. 
Currently, the LAC has state offices in all 36 states of the Federation, including the Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT), and has 23 legal aid centres in 17 of these states.112 In 2010, the LAC 
secured funds to establish legal aid centres in the 774 Local Government Areas across Nigeria. 
The centres sought to eliminate the financial obstacles faced when pursuing legal aid support 
in urban areas by individuals residing in rural areas. Nonetheless, to date there are still only 23 
legal aid centres.113 This leads to questions on the efficacy of the scheme and whether there are 
enough legal aid offices to support disadvantaged individuals who may need free legal advice 







David (2003) ‘Legal Aid in Nigeria: Using National Youth Service Corps Public Defenders to Expand the Services 
of the Legal Aid Council’ Journal of African Law, Vol. 47, No. 1 p. 110. 
109Interview with Chief Bayo Ojo S.N, Chairman of the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, by Jude Igbanoi on 10 
January 2001. Quoted in McQuoid-Mason David (2003) ‘Legal Aid in Nigeria: Using National Youth Service 
Corps Public Defenders to Expand the Services of the Legal Aid Council’ Journal of African Law, Vol. 47, No. 1 
p.111. 
110About $4 million or $0.33 per capita at that time.  
111About $90, 000, 00 or $0.00075 per capita. 
112Legal Aid Council of Nigeria. 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=112&Itemid=1962&lang
=en (accessed 04/06/2019). 
113Currently, the Council has established 23 Legal aid centres in: Ningi, Bauchi State;  Gwagwalada, FCT; 
Otuocha, Anambra State; Owo, Ondo State; Ogbia, Bayelsa State; Auchi, Edo State; Karu, Nasarawa State; 
Shendam, Plateau State; Sagbama, Bayelsa State; Suleja, Niger State;  Bida, Niger State;  Katsina-Ala, Benue 
State;  Abonnema, Rivers State; Bwari, FCT; Ungogo, Kano State; Badagry, Lagos State; Warri, Delta State;  
Odo-Ere, Kogi State;  Kaduna South, Kaduna State; Jema’a, Kaduna State;  Sabon Gari, Kaduna State; Chikun, 
Kaduna State; Ahmadu Bello law clinic, Kaduna State. Legal Aid Council of Nigeria Report to the Nigerian Bar 
Association Delivered at the 2016 Annual General Conference holding at Port-Harcourt, Rivers State from 19th 





2.2.3.1 Statistical Review of Legal Aid Provision in Nigeria 2011-2017 
(Table 2.1) Statistics of Cases from April 2010 to March 2011114  
Types of Cases   Cases Granted  Case Completed 
Criminal 4118 2451 
Civil 999 646 
PDSS115 3287 3287 
Total 8404 6384 
 
(Table 2.2) Statistics of Cases from April 2011 to March 2012116  
Types of Cases   Cases Granted  Case Completed 
Criminal 6987 3634 
Civil 1560 964 
PDSS 2617 2617 
Total 11164 7215 
 
 
114The Legal Aid Council Report to the Nigerian Bar Association delivered at the 2011 Annual General 
Conference holding at Port Harcourt, Rivers State from the 21st – 26th August 2011. 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/docs/2011_LAC_NBA_Report.pdf (accessed 18/06/2019).  
115Police Duty Solicitors Scheme (PDSS) established in 2004 was part of a Pre-trial Detention Project where 
duty solicitors intervened on behalf of the suspects held in Police custody by way of legal aid. Ibid. 
116Legal Aid Council Report to the Nigerian Bar Association delivered at the 2012 Annual General Conference 
holding at Abuja, Federal Capital Territory August 2012.   




(Table 2.3) Statistics of Cases from April 2012 to March 2013117  
Types of Cases   Cases Granted  Case Completed 
Criminal 10561 5799 
Civil 2813 1196 
PDSS 1407 1407 
Total 14781 8402 
 
(Table 2.4) Statistics of Cases from January 2013 to December 2013118  
Types of Cases   Cases Granted  Case Completed 
Criminal 9761 6223 
Civil 3717 2063 
PDSS 2314 2314 
Total 15,792 10,600 
 
(Table 2.5) Statistics of Cases from January 2014 to December 2014119  
 
117Legal Aid Council Report to the Nigerian Bar Association delivered at the 2013 Annual General Conference 
holding at Calabar Cross River State August 20th – 30th 2013. 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/docs/2013_LAC_NBA_Report.pdf (accessed 18/06/2019).  
118Legal Aid Council of Nigeria Report to the Nigerian Bar Association delivered at the 2014 Annual General 
Conference holding at Owerri, Imo State. August 24-29 2014. 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/docs/2014_LAC_NBA_Report.pdf (accessed 18/06/2019).  
119Legal Aid Council of Nigeria Report to the Nigerian Bar Association delivered at the 2015 Annual General 
Conference holding at Abuja. 21st – 28th August 2015. 




Types of Cases   Cases Granted  Case Completed 
Criminal 10,452 6,702 
Civil 4,898 3,522 
PDSS 2,551 2,551 
Total 17,901 12,779 
 
(Table 2.6) Statistics of Cases from January 2015 to December 2015120  
Types of Cases   Cases Granted  Case Completed 
Criminal 6,518 3,867 
Civil 3,581 2,409 
PDSS 730 730 
Total 10,829 7,006 
 
(Table 2.7) Statistics of Criminal and Civil Cases Granted and Completed from January 2016 
to December 2016121  
Types of Cases   Cases Granted  Case Completed 
 
120Legal Aid Council of Nigeria Report to the Nigerian Bar Association Delivered at the 2016 Annual General 
Conference holding at Port-Harcourt, Rivers State from 19th to 26th August 2016. 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/docs/2016_LAC_NBA%20Report.pdf (accessed 18/06/2019). 
121Legal Aid Council of Nigeria Report to the Nigerian Bar Association Delivered at the 2017 Annual General 
Conference holding at Lagos. 18th – 24th August 2017. 




Criminal 9,326 3,724 
Civil 4,117 2,462 




Figure 2.1 - Comparative Analysis of Completed Legal Aid Cases from 2010 to 2017 
 
The LAC annual reports122 provide up-to-date information on the efforts and progress of the 
legal aid scheme in Nigeria. In total, there are seven annual reports123 and five124 of these 
provide comparative data analysis on the LAC’s overall annual performance with regards to 
providing legal aid to those who require it and ensuring that every case is completed.  
 
122Legal Aid Council of Nigeria Report to the Nigerian Bar Association. 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118&Itemid=1966&lang
=en (accessed 19/06/2019). 
123Legal Aid Council of Nigeria Report to the Nigerian Bar Association 2011-2017 Ibid.  
















These reports show consistent improvement in the number of completed cases between 2010 
and 2017. In 2012, the LAC reported an increase of 13.02% in completed cases in 2010-11 
(April-March) compared to 2011-12 (April-March). Similarly, in 2012-2013 (April-March), 
there was a rise of 16.45% on the previous year. In 2014, the LAC reported its greatest yearly 
improvement on record, equalling 32.04% increase in January-December 2013. However, this 
rate of improvement was not maintained, and dropped to 19.82% in 2013-2014 (January-
December). There are no comparative statistics listed in the 2016 LAC report. Finally, the LAC 
report of 2017 reports only a 15.47% increase in 2015-2016 (January-December). The reports 
are crucial to establishing the current status of the scheme as well as identify specific areas that 
need improvement. However, the reports are generic and do not give any detail on specific 
areas of the country. Erugo125 contends that despite the yearly improvements, there are 
concerns that the scope of legal aid remains limited and does not cover individuals who need 
it the most. 
 
2.3 Legal Aid via African Regional Human Rights Instruments 
According to Wiseberg,126 as a result of regional human rights law in Africa, member states 
are under the obligation to uphold the fundamental rights of their citizens in the interest of 
equality. State parties are instructed to protect the rights and freedoms of its citizens in line 
with international human rights instruments such as the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR).127 The African system is the youngest of the three existing regional 
human rights systems,128 the others being the Inter-American and the European systems.129 
According to Heyns and Killander,130 human rights are widely used and recognised in the 
African context through these instruments. Human rights instruments are not typically enforced 
and so require domestic legislative implementation before they may be applied by the courts. 
 
125Erugo Sam (2016) ‘Legal Assistance by Clinical Law Students: A Nigerian Experience in Increasing Access to 
Justice for the Unrepresented’ Asian Journal of Legal Education 3(2) pp. 160–173. 
126Wiseberg Laurie S. (1996) ‘Introductory Essay.’ In Lawson Edward H., Bertucci Mary Lou, Dargel Jan K.  (eds.) 
‘Encyclopaedia of Human Rights’ Second Edition Taylor & Francis p. XIX. 
127See UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
128Baderin Mashood A., Ssenyonjo Manisuli (2011) ‘Development of International Human Rights Law Before 
and after the UDHR.’ SOAS School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No.2 p. 19. 
129Heyns Christof, Padilla David, & Zwaak Leo (2006) ‘A Schematic Comparison of Regional Human Rights 
Systems: an update.’ Sur. Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos, 3(4), pp. 160-169. 
130Heyns Christof and killander Magnus (2006) ‘The African Regional Human Rights System. In International 




Thus, the directives are written in or, as in the case of Nigeria, domesticated by the national 
constitution to reflect their commitment to the protection of freedom, dignity, equality, and 
social justice of all citizens. 
 
2.3.1 The African Regional Legal System 
The African regional legal system was initiated through the African Union (2002) (AU)131 
(formally known as the Organization of African Unity 1963 (OAU)).132 In 1999, the OAU 
government issued a declaration, known as the Sirte Declaration, to establish the AU. Its goal 
was to further unity, and economic and social development among African states, as well as to 
further promote and protect the rights of Africans in accordance with the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1986 (ACHPR) and other relevant human rights instruments.133  
The African Union (AU) initiatives were intended to act as a substructure to further access to 
justice mechanisms through African regional human rights instruments. Such efforts are critical 
to the general performance of the legal aid scheme. In addition to domestic legislation, legal 
aid provision depends on regional human rights instruments for administrative purposes, which 
include the regulation, application, execution, and enforcement of legal provisions. The AU 
also leads on issues such as scope of provision, access, and eligibility to ensure that member 
states comply with international human rights standards.  
The evaluation and analysis of the nature and scope of regional human right laws are of utmost 
importance to the systematic sustainability of the legal aid scheme in Nigeria. This would give 
more insight into how African regional laws are applied and manifest through domestic law 
throughout Nigeria. The unique structure of the Nigerian legal system, a pluralist system 
incorporating English common law, indigenous customary law, and the constitutional 
devolution of governance to Nigeria’s federal states, is of importance here.134  
 
 
131See Organization of African Unity (OAU), Constitutive Act of the African Union, 1 July 2000. 
132See Organization of African Unity (OAU), Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 25 May 1963.  
133Ibid. see Objectives of the AU. 
134Osaghae Eghosa E. (1992) ‘The Status of State Governments in Nigeria's Federalism’ Publius, Vol. 22, No. 3, 




2.3.2 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People Rights (ACHPR 1986)135  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) was as a result of a 
demand by states, for an African human rights system that would be applicable and structured 
to suit the wellbeing of the African people. According to Kufuor,136 this demand was initiated 
by Nnamdi Azikiwe in response to the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which gave the right to all 
citizens to be subject to a government of their choice. The 1941 Charter was not intended for 
British colonial subjects, but was instigated to deal with Europeans under Nazi authority; 
nonetheless, it inspired the Banjul Charter, which is the only human rights instrument that has 
been domesticated into the national legislation of Nigeria and marked the onset of the 
development of human rights norms and institutions in Africa.137 The Banjul Charter does not 
explicitly provide for the provision of legal aid, but was central to the systemisation of legal 
aid within the African access to justice framework. In the fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Charter on the principle of fairness, as well as in other human rights treaties, the right to legal 
aid is clearly defined. In addition to civil and political rights, the Charter contained a wide 
range of significant social, economic, and cultural rights. Hence, it was not only extended to 
safeguard peoples’ rights, but also places duties on citizens.138 
According to Smith,139 the Charter seeks to embody a uniquely African concept of human and 
peoples’ rights which stipulates that all peoples are equal. Bondzie-Simpson140 posits that it 
was instigated by the notion of self-determination. African member states felt it was their duty 
to liberate and completely rid the African continent of colonial domination and seek 
independent development. Thus, member states are mandated to adopt legislative measures to 
give effect to the directives contained within the Charter in their respective domestic legal 
systems: “[t]he Member States of the Organisation of African Unity […] shall recognise the 
 
135See Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), 
27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
136Kufuor Kofi Oteng (2010) ‘The African Human Rights System Origin and Evolution’ Palgrave Macmillan p. 1. 
137Odinkalu Chidi Anselm (2003) ‘Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritising for the Protection of Human 
Rights in Africa’ 47 Journal of African Law p. 19. 
138Naldi J. Dino (2008) ‘The African Union and the Regional Human Rights System’ In Malcolm Evans Rachel 
Murray (eds.) ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006’ Second 
Edition p. 25.    
Bondzie-Simpson Ebow (1988) ‘A Critique of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights’ A. Howard Law 
Journal 31(4) p. 644. 
139Smith Rhona K. M. (2016) ‘Textbook on International Human Rights’ 7th Edition Oxford University Press p. 
85. 
140Bondzie-Simpson Ebow (1988) ‘A Critique of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights’ A. Howard 




rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or 
other measures to give effect to them.”141 Unlike other international human rights treaties, state 
parties to the African Charter assume obligations with immediate effect. As Article 45 of the 
Charter stipulates, all rights contained within the Charter were justiciable before the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.142  
The Charter was also considered a system capable of tackling the gross human rights violations 
that continued unabated in African states.143 The human rights violations, according to 
Bondzie-Simpson,144 could be traced back to the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other state members. This principle reflected the closely guarded state sovereignty 
agenda many African states acquired after attaining independence. Nigeria played a dominant 
role in the process that led to a human rights system in Africa145 to protect and promote the 
rights of individuals.146 Smith147 gave a narrow overview of the Charter and contends that it 
represents many African regions that have similar linguistic, religious and cultural traditions.148 
However, the author maintains that the Charter succeeded in establishing a coherent African 
regional legal system, despite the lengthy history of dictatorial regimes and excessive human 
rights violations.149 Bondzie-Simpson considers the notion that Africa has one homogeneous 
culture a misconception but accepts that there are similarities among African regions. The 
author further asserts that the people of Africa are of multifarious ethnic groups with different 
social structures and cultures, 150one of which being their traditional legal systems.  
 
 
141See Article 1 of The African Charter on Human and People Rights.  
142Ibe Stanley (2010) ‘Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Nigeria: Challenges and 
Opportunities’ African Human Rights Journal Vol. 10 No. 1 pp. 199- 200. 
143“Human rights abuse inflicted on the African people by internal authoritarian and dictatorial governments 
e.g. Idi Amin of Uganda, Jean Bedel Bokassa of Central African Republic and Francisco Marcias Nguema of 
Equatorial Guinea including the early surge of ethnic rivalry, irredentism and secessionism which led to 
“varying degrees of civil strife, authoritarianism and refugee problems.”Bondzie-Simpson Ebow (1988) ‘A 
Critique of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights’  A. Howard Law Journal 31(4) pp. 644-645. 
144Ibid. 
145Dada Jacob Abiodun (2013) ‘Human Rights Protection in Nigeria: The Past, the Present and Goals for Role 
Actors for the Future’ Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization Vol. 14 p. 4. 
146Bekker Gina (2007) ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of African 
States’ Journal of African Law, Vol. 51, No. 1 pp. 151-172. 
147Smith Rhona K. M. (2016) ‘Textbook on International Human Rights’ 7th Edition Oxford University Press p. 
85. 
148Ibid. p. 85. 
149Ibid. p. 88. 
150Bondzie-Simpson Ebow (1988) ‘A Critique of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights’ A. Howard 




2.3.3 Historical Background of the Banjul Charter  
Before the Charter was adopted, many efforts were made to ratify a regional human rights 
instrument. In 1961, the first Congress of African Jurists, held in Lagos, Nigeria, adopted a 
declaration known as the ‘Law of Lagos’ calling on African governments to adopt an African 
convention on human rights with a court and a commission.151 After the Law of Lagos 
Declaration, the charter establishing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not have a 
clear human rights mandate. The OAU founding charter referred state parties to the UDHR,152 
which required signatories to have due regard for the rights set out in its directives. In 1967, 
the first Conference of Francophone African Jurists held in Dakar, Senegal saw a relaunch of 
the Law of Lagos declaration,153 and various other regional human rights related conferences 
and seminars followed. In 1979 a draft regional human rights instrument was proposed. After 
a few setbacks (e.g., the hostility of certain African governments to the idea, and a failed 
attempt to adopt the draft charter at a conference scheduled in Ethiopia), the draft Charter was 
finally adopted. Consequently, the Banjul Charter (after the efforts by the President of The 
Gambia to hasten the adoption of the regional human rights instrument) was finally adopted by 
the OAU Assembly on 28 June 1981. It came into force on 21 October 1986.154 
“The Banjul Charter is an international human rights instrument that is intended to promote 
and protect human rights and basic freedoms in the African continent.”155 Its mandates are 
derived from international human rights law via the United Nations UDHR.156 In addition, the 
Charter explicitly imposes duties on individuals, private organisations, member state 
governments and all other government agencies.157 It uprooted the inherently traditional type 
 
151History of the African Charter African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/history/ (accessed 03/07/2016). 
152See UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
153Ibid. 
154Ibid. 
155See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/banjul_charter.pdf (accessed 06/06/16). 
156The United Nations Charter is the treaty that established the United Nations (UN). The UN was adopted 
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of governance in African states, where a state member would treat all matters within its 
domestic jurisdiction as free from international interference and scrutiny.158  
While highlighting the significant amount of time that elapsed before the treaty was officially 
ratified, Bondzie-Simpson159 acknowledges the significance of the Charter to the all-important 
socio-economic and political development in Africa. The Banjul Charter was an advancement 
on the African regional human rights system because within its mandates there was a clear 
indication of its aims and a promise to protect the legal rights of individuals.  
 
2.3.4 Status and Applicability of the Banjul Charter in Nigerian Domestic Law 
Crucial fundamental rights such as legal aid is dependent on the implementation and 
enforcement of international human rights instruments in domestic law. Steiner et al. 160 critique 
the capabilities of the Charter, arguing that it is only nominally developed and that the 
Commission of the ACHPR lacks resources and support from member state governments.161 
The authors held that the ACHPR also lacks a specific enforcement procedure applicable in a 
domestic framework. On the other hand, in Nemi v. The State,162 the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
held that the absence of an enforcement procedure in the Charter does not constitute an 
impediment to the enforcement of the rights contained within it.  
According to Bello CJ163: “since the Charter has become part of our domestic law, the 
enforcement of its provisions like all our other laws falls within the judicial powers of the 
courts as provided by the Constitution and all other laws relating thereto.” As such, the 
application of the Charter to enforce the rights it upholds is at the discretion of the judiciary. 
However, Okeke164 posits that the Charter seems to be the only human rights treaty to which 
Nigeria is a signatory, and which has been domesticated into national law through the ACHPR 
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by virtue of the (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
1990.165 Thus, the recognition of legal rights via international law and the ACHPR emerged 
within the Nigerian domestic judiciary. The status and applicability of the Charter within 
Nigerian domestic law was affirmed in the case of Abacha and Others v. Fawehinmi.166 The 
Supreme Court held that “the African Charter is thus enacted that all authorities and persons 
exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers in Nigeria are enjoined to give full 
recognition and effect to the African Charter. That is, the plenitude of the government of 
Nigeria cannot do anything inconsistent with the Charter.”167 The implication was that the 
Charter is indeed part of Nigerian domestic law and therefore enforceable in the courts like any 
other statute.  
However, the court noted that the Nigerian constitution would take precedence if it conflicted 
with the provisions of the Charter. Durojaiye168 argues for the supremacy of the Nigerian 
constitution over the Charter based on the dualist state ranking of the Nigerian legal system. 
This is where international instruments have no automatic effect on national law until after 
such directive has been fully incorporated by legislation. Egede169contends that the superiority 
of the Nigerian constitution over the Charter is justified based on the provisions of the 
supremacy of the 1999 Nigerian constitution in Section 1 (1): “[t]his Constitution is supreme, 
and its provisions shall have binding force on the authorities and persons throughout the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria”. Section 1 (3) states that: “[i]f any other law is inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”170 However, Onyemelukwe171 deems the matter of 
the supremacy of the Nigerian Constitution to the Charter “restrictive as well as problematic”. 
 
165This Act was enacted to give full effect to “the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights which are set out in the Schedule to this Act shall, subject as thereunder provided, have force of law in 
Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising 
legislative, executive or judicial powers in Nigeria.” See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. 
166See Abacha and Others v. Fawehinmi (2001) AHRLR 172 (NgSC 2000) The African Charter was pitted against 
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168Durojaye Ebenezer ‘Litigating the right to health in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects.’ In Killander Magnus 
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He holds that such an approach will invariably undermine the directives of the Charter and 
frustrate all efforts to protect the legal rights of vulnerable individuals, even as a duly 
incorporated human rights instrument within Nigerian domestic law.  
Sections 1 (1) and (3) of the 1999 Nigerian constitution (quoted above) present another flaw in 
the administration of justice when utilising African regional human rights law through 
domestic law. In the situation where a gross violation of individual rights according to the 
Charter is considered inconsistent with that of the Nigerian constitution, no action could be 
taken. In addition, there are no additional directions or clarification on the definition of 
‘inconsistent’ or a clear example of what could potentially be regarded as such. 
In addition to these issues, the implementation of the ACHPR into Nigerian national legislation 
has been facing various dilemmas from its onset, according to the “4th Periodic Country Report: 
2008-2010”. The progress report revealed the principal areas of concern for the African 
Commission.172 Among these are the continued lack of awareness of the Charter and the 
Commission by the Nigerian public in both rural and urban areas, as well as concerns regarding 
“the existing barriers to access to justice such as the high cost of litigation, complexity of court 
process and inaccessibility of courts due to their location in mostly urban areas, which has been 
exacerbated by the poor transportation system.”173  
Zahn174 offers a different perspective on the implementation problems within the Nigerian legal 
system. The author acknowledges that many provisions contained within the Nigerian 
constitution exemplify the wordings of the African Charter; however, the Nigerian legal system 
does not conform to the requirements embodied within the Charter. Zahn further concludes that 
the dilemma lies with the adopted practice of the legal system in Nigeria and not with the nature 
of the rights in question.  
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2.3.5 Article 7 (1) of the Banjul Charter in Accessing Legal Aid 
The main intent of the Charter was “to formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at 
solving legal problems relating to human and peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms upon 
which African states may base their legislation.”175 Article 7 (1) of the Charter focuses on fair 
trial rights, which is derived from an individual’s right to be heard. Article 7 (1) (c) establishes 
the right to legal representation: “(1) every individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard. This comprises: [...] (c) The right to defence, including the right to be defended by 
counsel of his own choice…”176  
Article 7 (1) (c) does not explicitly provide for legal aid; yet the notion that an individual has 
the right to legal representation and to choose their defence counsel implies that this provision 
would enable a fair trial. This would be derived through specific laws, guidelines, and schemes 
to ensure that the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 7 (1) is fulfilled. In addition, the 
constitutional and administrative measures that govern Article 7 is found in s. 36 of the current 
1999 Nigerian Constitution, which affirms the “right to fair trial as well as fair hearing within 
reasonable time, presumption of innocence, legal assistance and interpretation to the 
accused…”177  
The right to free legal counsel is a vital component of the right to a fair trial and the two, work 
in sequence with one another, especially when the litigants involved do not have the means to 
pay for legal representation. In addition to addressing the impediments caused by social status 
when accessing courts, Udombana178 argues that “the right to a fair trial is an aspect of the ‘due 
process of law’ principle, embodying the idea of fair play and substantial justice.” The right to 
a fair trial is a human right that consists of requisite procedural mechanisms. For instance, 
strategic rules are paramount to coordinate and maintain a balance of interests between the 
parties embroiled in litigation, particularly in the operation of judicial proceedings. During 
these proceedings, the right to legal aid to disadvantaged individuals cannot be excluded. 
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Ultimately, Article 7 preserves independence and eliminates bias of litigants within the judicial 
system.  
The directives of Article 7 (1) of the Charter suggest that equality before the courts cannot be 
realised if the option to be defended via legal aid is not available for individuals that require it. 
Hence, the right to legal representation implies a right to legal aid. The fair trial norms 
contained within Article 7 (1) embody the Charter in totality: for instance, many Articles 
contained within the Charter contain an element of the idea of fair trial, such as the right to life 
in Article 4.  
 
2.3.6 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Fair Trial Rights, Independence 
of Courts, and the Right to Legal Representation via Legal Aid 
Fair trial rights incorporate the right to legal aid. As an independent entity, the courts can make 
decisions in the interest of equal justice without interference from other arms of government. 
In addition to Article 7, Article 26 of the Charter becomes another crucial mechanism to 
guarantee a fair trial via the right to legal representation through legal aid, as well as to give 
courts the capacity to ensure that citizens are duly protected during proceedings. “State Parties 
to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall 
allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with 
the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter.”179 
According to Abdullahi,180 the Nigerian Judiciary has the mandated obligation to ensure courts 
conduct fair trials and provide free access to counsel via legal aid; however, the Nigerian 
judiciary has been accused of ethnic bias, serious corruption, ineptitude, laziness, incompetence 
and abuse of office by the Supreme Court judges.181 This is in addition to the loss of faith in 
the judicial process by the Nigerian public due to the complex practice and difficulty of 
accessing courts.182  
Hence, this section discusses case law that has been re-examined by the Commission based on 
the directives of Article 7 and 26 of the Banjul Charter. The Commission illustrated the link 
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between Article 7 (1) and Article 26 in Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria (2000).183 In 
their decision, the Commission placed a lot of emphasis on Article 7 (1) of the Charter. 
Furthermore, it was specific about states parties' obligations to guarantee the independence of 
the institutions, which gives meaning and content to the right to a fair trial.184 Thus, states are 
obliged to maintain the autonomy of the courts, the right to be heard on equal standing and 
access to legal aid.  
Constitutional Rights Project and Others v. Nigeria (2000)185 highlights the interrelation 
between the right to be heard and a fair trial. The Commission found, among other violations, 
an infringement of Article 7 (1) (a): “(1) every individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard. This comprises: (a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of 
violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, 
regulations and customs in force[.]”186 The Commission argued that the decision was reached 
because the suit was abruptly nullified by executive decree. The Commission also posited that 
the dissolution of the case in progress posed a serious threat to the protection of individual 
rights. Finally, it was argued that vulnerable individuals will be discouraged from exercising 
their right to seek redress if state parties cannot uphold the directives meant to protect their 
citizens.  
The independence of the courts is crucial to making decisions regarding access to legal aid. As 
such, the courts are key to bridging the gap created by various barriers associated with access 
to justice; however, the various military regimes in Nigeria have enacted a principle that 
restricts the jurisdiction of the judiciary, which puts independence of courts in jeopardy. In the 
case of Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria (2000),187 several persons, consisting of 
civilians and serving and ex-service military personnel, were arrested in connection with an 
alleged plot against the Federal Government of Nigeria in March 1995. A special military 
tribunal was established which prohibited the jurisdiction of Nigerian domestic courts. The 
rules and procedures of court martial were applied by the tribunal with no right to appeal. The 
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trial was held in private, and defendants had no access to counsel of their choice. They were 
not made aware of the charges against them until the trial commenced and were represented by 
military lawyers that were appointed by the federal government. Consequently, thirteen of the 
civilian suspects were tried by the tribunal, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment for 
being an accessory to treason. The sentences were later reduced to 15 years imprisonment. The 
Commission in this case reiterated its previous decisions and declared that the trial of these 
persons before a special tribunal violates Article 7 (1) (d) and Article 26. In relation to the right 
to a fair trial which implies the right to legal aid, as highlighted in this study, the Commission 
found a violation of Articles 7 (1) (a), (c) and (d) and Article 26 of the African Charter. 
In addition, in the case of Civil Liberties Organisation and Others v. Nigeria (2001),188 five 
military men and a civilian were convicted and sentenced to death by a special military tribunal 
for an alleged plot to overthrow the Nigerian military government under General Sani Abacha. 
The Commission found an infringement of Article 7 (1) (c) of the Charter because the convicted 
persons were not given the opportunity to be represented and defended by counsel of their 
choice (they were represented by junior military lawyers, who were assigned to them). 
Therefore, the Commission also found a violation of Article 7 (1) (a). There are numerous 
references to the right to counsel of one's choice and the provision of legal aid by the advocates 
as well as the Commission because the alleged crime is considered a serious offence (one that 
carries the death penalty). An unfair trial will jeopardise other crucial rights of the accused if 
the provisions under Article 7 (1) of the Charter relating to the case are not complied with. This 
case also highlights the purpose of the provision under Article 7 (1) (c), which is to ensure that 
the accused has confidence in his legal counsel.  
In Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Akamu and Others) v. Nigeria (2000),189 a case 
was filed by a Nigerian NGO on behalf of Akamu and Others, who were tried and sentenced 
to death by virtue of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act No. 1 of 1984. The 
decree creates special tribunals composed of members of the armed forces, the police and 
judges and does not provide for any judicial appeal of sentences. Considering the right of the 
accused persons to a fair trial, the Commission found a violation of Article 7 (1) (a), (c) and 
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(d) of the Charter. This ruling was reached because the severity of the penalty (death), the lack 
of impartial tribunal and the prohibition of judicial appeal. The Commission recognised that 
the violation of the right to fair trial can lead to the infringement of other protected freedoms 
under the Charter (e.g., the right to life and liberty provided for in Articles 4 and 6 respectively). 
There was no mention of the right to be defended by counsel of choice in this case by the 
authors or in the explanatory notes of the Commission. However, the latter found a violation 
of the right under Article 7 (1) (c) which exhibits the intersections between the subsections of 
Article 7 (1). 
In Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Lekwot and Others) v. Nigeria (2000)190, the 
communication 87/93 was submitted on behalf of seven persons from Nigeria who were 
sentenced to death under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Act No. 2 of 1987. “This 
decree does not provide for any judicial appeal against the decisions of the special tribunals 
and prohibits the courts from reviewing any aspect of the operation of the tribunal. […] The 
communication also alleges that the accused and their counsel were constantly harassed and 
intimidated during the trial.” This led to the withdrawal of the defence counsel from the 
proceedings, leaving the accused persons without legal representation. In the absence of a 
defence counsel, the Tribunal proceeded to “condemn the accused to death for culpable 
homicide, unlawful assembly and breach of the peace.” The Commission finds that the accused 
persons were denied the right to be heard before an impartial court and the right to be 
represented by counsel of their choice. Hence, the Commission found a violation of Article 7 
(1) (a), (c) and (d) of the Charter.  
In the case of Constitutional Rights Project and Another v. Nigeria (2000),191 Communication 
143/95 (14 December 1994) was filed by the Constitutional Rights Project, claiming that the 
government of Nigeria, through the State Security (Detention of Persons) Amendment Decree 
No. 14 of 1994, had prohibited any court in Nigeria from issuing a writ of habeas corpus. In 
addition, communication 150/96 (15 January 1996) was submitted by the Civil Liberties 
Organisation to address the implications of the (Detention of Persons) Amendment Decree No. 
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14 of 1994 on the fundamental rights of the accused persons. Seven civilians192 were detained 
under this decree, without charge and were refused the right to bring habeas corpus against 
their continued detainment. Among other things (e.g., access to medical care and their 
families), the accused persons were denied access to their lawyers. In its defence, the 
government attempts to justify Decree No. 14 with the necessity for state security. However, 
the Commission contends that the process of adopting extreme measures to curtail rights could 
create greater unrest. As such, on the matter relating to the provisions of the right to a fair trial, 
the Commission found the government in violation of Article 7 (1) (a), (c) and (d) of the African 
Charter. 
In International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v. Nigeria (2000),193 
communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 were submitted to the Commission on 
behalf of Mr Saro-Wiwa, a writer, Ogoni activist and President of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People, by International Pen, the Constitutional Rights Project, Interights 
and the Civil Liberties Organisation, respectively. This case concerned the detention and trial 
of Mr Saro-Wiwa in connection with the murder of four Ogoni leaders on 21 May 1994, plus 
other human rights violations that were suffered by Mr Saro-Wiwa’s co-defendants. He was 
charged with unlawful assembly and denied access to his lawyer. The tribunal was established 
under the Civil Disturbances Act 1987.  
The three members of the tribunal that tried the case were appointed by the military President 
of Nigeria General Abacha. Subsequently, the Constitutional Rights Project alleged that the 
trial was unfair due to the bias on the part of the tribunal members and the harassment of the 
defence counsel, who were not allowed to meet with the defendants in private and did not 
receive information on the charges. Hence, Mr Saro-Wiwa and eight co- defendants were 
sentenced to death. The commission held that the conduct of the trial and the execution of the 
victims was a clear violation of Article 7 (1)194 and Article 26 of the ACHPR. 
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In Rights International v. Nigeria (2000),195 Rights International, an NGO based in the United 
States, submitted that Nigerian soldiers arrested and tortured Mr. Charles Baridorn Wiwa at an 
unknown military detention camp between 2 and 9 January 1996. The Complainant alleged 
that Mr. Wiwa, who was a relative of Mr Saro-Wiwa, was tortured, detained unlawfully, and 
denied access to a lawyer when he was later charged with unlawful assembly under Section 70 
of the Criminal Code Laws of Eastern Nigeria of 1963. They claim it was violation of his right 
to legal representation under Article 7 (1) (c). Hence, in conclusion, the Commission held that 
Mr. Wiwa’s right to legal representation was violated when he was denied access to counsel. 
In Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria (2000),196 Mr Niran Malaolu was arrested with 
three other staff of the newspaper “Diet” by armed soldiers at the editorial offices in Lagos on 
28th December 1997. He was accused of publishing news titled “The Military Rumbles Again” 
after the announcement of alleged coup plot uncovered by the military government. Mr 
Malaolu was detained for 49 days without charge and no access to his lawyer, family, or 
medical team. He was assigned a military lawyer by the tribunal. After a secret trial on 28th 
April 1998, Niran Malaolu was found guilty by the tribunal of the charge of ‘concealment of 
treason’ and sentenced to life imprisonment. In their defence, the government of Nigeria 
contended that the trial was conducted under valid law enacted by the competent authority at 
that time. However, in addition to other infringements under the ACHPR, the Commission also 
found a violation of Articles 7 and 26. 
Also, in Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria (2000),197 the defendant, Mr Nosa Igiebor, 
was denied access to lawyers. The commission declared in its statement that Nigeria was under 
the obligation to guarantee all its citizens the right to be heard. And going by the statement of 
the defendant, to which there was no response from the Nigerian government, the commission 
concluded that there was in fact a violation of Article 7 (1) (c) of the African Charter. The 
Commission reiterated that the right to a fair trial and the right to be defended by a counsel of 
choice is a human right that cannot be violated by state parties. In addition, according to the 
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Charter, governments should employ special care with regard to those rights protected by 
constitutional or international human rights law.  
In Centre for Free Speech v. Nigeria (2000),198 the commission found that there was a violation 
of Article 7 (1) (a), (c) and (d). The commission concluded that the four convicted journalists 
“were not allowed access to their lawyers [or] given the opportunity to be represented and 
defended by lawyers of their own choice at the trial.” Furthermore, in addition to subsections 
(a) and (c), (d) affords the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or 
tribunal, and thus could also have a cumulative effect, similar to the impacts caused by non-
access to legal aid. As such, it is a vital component of the principle of equality of all before the 
law. There was also a mention of a contravention of Article 26 of the African Charter. The 
defendants were tried and convicted in secret by a “special military tribunal presided over by a 
serving military officer who is also a member of the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC)”; 
therefore, the Nigerian government failed in their duty to guarantee the independence of the 
courts in this case.  
The cases reviewed above represent the combined efforts of the African Charter and 
Commission to substantially uphold the rights of individuals involved in litigation, reiterating 
the significance of a fair trial by appropriate legal representation within domestic courts in 
Nigeria. Thus, legal aid remains a definitive factor in preserving fairness and impartiality 
before the courts. According to Ouguergouz,199 Article 7 (1) is one of the articles of the African 
Charter to which the Commission has devoted the greatest attention. The author also states that 
there are a handful of domestic cases where the Commission has ruled in favour of appellants 
based on the authority of Article 7 (1) of the Charter.200  
However, Viljoen201 contends that, in order to be applied with full force, the directives of the 
African Charter must be regarded as part of Nigerian domestic law. Hence, a policy briefing 
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on the prospects of the African human rights system concluded that the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms within the Charter renders human rights initiatives ineffective in practice.202 
 
2.4 Supplementary African Human Rights Instruments: Fair Trial Rights and Legal Aid  
According to Udombana,203 the Commission of the ACHPR has made considerable efforts to 
develop African human rights jurisprudence by interpreting the Charter through specific 
resolutions and recommendations. To ensure the legal right to a fair trial and legal aid, 
declarations such as the Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992), the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003), and 
the Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Africa 
(2006) were enacted through the African Charter as essential supplementary tools. 
 
2.4.1 The Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (Tunis Resolution) 1992 
The Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial was adopted by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in its Eleventh Ordinary Session in Tunis, 
Tunisia, from 2 to 9 March 1992. This was a mechanism to further protect fundamental human 
rights and freedoms in litigation.204 In addition, the resolution affirmed the right to adequate 
time and facilities to prepare an impending case. The resolution does not expressly make 
provision for the right to legal aid as detailed in Article 7 (1) of the African Charter; however, 
the resolution refers to Article 7 as the basis of its directives regarding legal representation and, 
as such, the right to legal aid will apply. Hence, “[i]ndividuals shall be entitled to have adequate 
time and facilities for the preparation of their defence and to communicate in confidence with 
counsel of their choice and the right to free assistance of an interpreter if they cannot speak the 
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language used in court”.205 However, its legal aid provisions are limited to individuals in 
criminal cases only.      
 
2.4.2 The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa 
(Dakar Declaration) 2003 
To strengthen the rights and duties component of the African Charter and to improve access to 
judicial remedies for African citizens, the Principles and Dakar Declaration were enacted under 
the authority of Article 45 (c) of the ACHPR.206 This directive was ratified to further expand 
the provision of legal aid and takes precedence over national legal aid laws. It also instructs 
state parties to provide legal assistance where necessary to protect the right to a fair trial.207 
The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa 
(2003)208 came into force after the adoption of the Dakar Declaration and Recommendations 
on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa by the Commission at its 26th session in November 1999. 
“Recognising the importance of the right to a fair trial and legal assistance and the need to 
strengthen the provisions of the African Charter relating to this right […] [it was] necessary to 
formulate and lay down principles and rules.”209 The Declaration also placed emphasis on the 
various ethnic and linguistic disparities within the African region to highlight the need for states 
to ensure judicial services were accessible to all citizens.210 
The Dakar Declaration broadened the scope of state obligations to include other general 
principles applicable to all legal proceedings. For instance, the issue of locus standi211 (which 
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restricts third party representation), the role of prosecutors,212 access to lawyers,213 the right to 
legal aid and assistance214 and access to judicial services215 were explicitly detailed and revised 
in the directive, giving the right to a fair trial more prominence. The right to a counsel of choice 
via legal aid in both criminal as well as civil cases216 is deeply embedded within the eligibility 
criteria of the mandates. In addition, more attention is paid to legal aid in criminal cases 
including children.217 
 
2.4.3 Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Africa 
(2006) 
Nonetheless, “concerned with the continued lack of legal aid in most parts of Africa and its 
adverse impact on the right to access to justice”, the resolution on the adoption of the Lilongwe 
Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Africa (2006) was 
approved by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 40th Ordinary 
Session, held in in 2006 in Banjul, The Gambia.218 The declaration was adopted by consensus 
at the closure of the “Conference on Legal Aid in Criminal Justice: the Role of Lawyers, Non-
Lawyers and other Service Providers in Africa”, which was held in Lilongwe, Malawi in 
November 2004.219  
Unlike the Tunis Resolution and Dakar Declaration, the Lilongwe Declaration makes specific 
reference to the right to legal aid in criminal cases only. Crucial issues that are barriers to 
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access, in conjunction with feasible counter measures, were also acknowledged and 
highlighted. This included the need to align various service providers (including the police, 
non-legal staff, NGOs, and justice advocates) in order to boost and expand the legal aid 
provision from the moment of arrest. This arrangement would also resolve matters that are 
rampant in Nigeria, such as unlawful detention without charge. However, its mandates   provide 
no clear direction to individuals with civil cases. The lack of legal protection in civil cases can 
be equally detrimental to a disadvantaged individual considering the high volume of civil cases 
that are particular to women and children (e.g., in cases of unlawful eviction, personal injury, 
divorce, child custody, child support, contract violations and property damage). Hence, 
restricting access to legal aid to individuals, whether they are engaged in civil or criminal cases, 
is a barrier that disregards the fundamental directives of equality before the courts and pledges 
of access to legal aid when needed.  
Advocates believe that human rights and access to justice are key to preserving the rights of 
citizens.220 Human rights are fundamental to enforcing the right to free legal representation in 
situations where a disadvantaged individual cannot afford legal services. However, the 
protection of human rights and the consequent right to legal aid remains insufficient. States 
recognise that the right to legal assistance is central to maintaining the right to a fair trial and 
the administration of justice. Chenwi221 contends that some African constitutions mandate 
courts to provide legal representation at the expense of the state for individuals who cannot 
afford the fees of a lawyer. She also argues that, due to the high cost of legal representation, 
disadvantaged individuals may end up being represented by inexperienced and ineffective 
lawyers; hence, the scepticism towards the term “in the interest of justice” and regarding 
whether the right to legal aid guarantees a fair trial.  
Sen222 argues that many still perceive human rights to be a mere inscription on paper. He further 
contends that human rights activists focus more on changing the world rather than 
understanding it, and therefore fail to provide equitable justifications for the protection and 
preservation of fundamental rights. This view has led this study to review the current Nigerian 
constitution as well as previous constitutions (1960-1999) to ascertain the development of legal 
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aid via fundamental rights directives.  In spite of criticisms, the Nigerian constitution has seen 
a steady growth over the years, and this is reflected in the changes223 that seek to further protect 
the rights of individuals via compliance with human rights directives especially fundamental 
rights such as legal aid. This could also be linked in part, to the mandates of the African Charter 
on Peoples and Human rights, which is the only international human rights instrument that is 
supreme when evoked against inadequate and restrictive legislation224 contained in the 
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Chapter 3: Legal Aid: Nigerian Constitutional Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the sequence of developments regarding the right to legal aid within the 
Nigerian constitutional mandates. There have been five constitutions since independence:225 
1960, 1963, 1979, 1989 and 1999. This chapter also investigates the legal aid scheme under 
the instructions of fundamental rights and the interpretative role of the courts, which is 
enshrined in all Nigerian constitutions. It will analyse how legal aid provision could be inferred 
from crucial constitutional rights until it was incorporated in Nigerian domestic law. This 
chapter will also investigate other additional directives put in place to further promote the 
protection of fundamental human rights in Nigeria. One such directive (the Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy) has been in place since the 1979 
constitution came into force and has remained in all Nigerian constitutions to date. This will 
highlight the efforts made by way of constitutional reform to further enhance the right to legal 
aid for the disadvantaged within the Nigerian legal context. 
A constitutional review will give more insight into how previous Nigerian constitutions have 
paved the way for the development of human rights in those that succeeded them. In addition, 
and most importantly, it will clarify how the fundamental right to legal aid has progressed via 
successive constitutions. It will present the role of Nigerian courts in adopting the right to legal 
aid in both criminal and civil cases via constitutional law, and how legal aid provision has 
manifested in practice in courts. An individual examination of previous and current Nigerian 
national constitutions will provide a firm foundation for further evaluation of the development 
of legal aid through the Nigerian legislative, by way of emerging constitutional structures. In 
addition, this chapter will accentuate the principles of equal justice that have evolved from 











3.2 Nigerian Constitutional Model 
According to Fombad,226 a constitution “forms the main source and basis of governmental 
rulemaking and is primarily designed to check against capricious or arbitrary rulemaking.” In 
Nigeria, the constitution is the highest law of the land and which assigns powers and 
responsibilities to a three-tier level of government, consisting of federal, state, and local 
government. Fundamental rights, such as access to legal aid, are components of the directives 
of the Nigerian constitution. The effective administration of legal aid provision depends on the 
constitution, the legislature, and the judiciary, which together ensure that the necessary laws 
are established within the constitution and interpreted according to the constitution’s intent.  
According to Nwaubani,227 the main function of the legislature is to “make, amend and repeal 
laws for the peace, order and good governance of the society”, while the judiciary is tasked to 
interpret laws in accordance with the intentions of the directives and the rights of citizens. 
Aghalino228 posits that a constitution in the Nigerian context consists of a collection of rules 
and principles that are employed and exercised within the state. Such directives dictate the way 
states are governed; hence, a constitution is a systematic template of a governmental system 
that authoritatively controls the organs of government. It is the process by which the power 
derived from the Nigerian statutory structure is allocated and utilised.229  
According to Hardin,230 the constitution is a legal institution driven by the need to achieve 
social order and justice for all individuals, especially the most vulnerable within society. It is 
a single document that gives governments the authority to empower and mandate specific 
institutions to promote social welfare. As such, norms are constantly developed to enable 
equitable resolutions. One such norm is the additional mandate from the 1979 constitution, 
which remains in the present 1999 constitution, which explicitly grants legal aid for individuals 
who fall under the indigent category. In effect, the constitution grants supplementary legal 
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capacity to the legislature and the judiciary to make laws and clarify the intentions of the 
constitution as well as uphold the principle of equality before courts. 
Hardin231 argues that a constitution has a two-dimensional mode of operation which can bring 
mutual advantage within the judicial system. For instance, the role holders follow the rules of 
their roles as defined by the specified institution via the constitution to achieve the intended 
level of social welfare. The author posits that, even though a constitution stipulates institutions 
of governments to act, it is up to the institutions in question to implement and enforce 
policies.232 Currently, the legislators and the judiciary are invested with the authority to ensure 
that disadvantaged individuals are equally protected before the courts in line with the 
constitution.  
To further preserve the fundamental rights and basic freedoms of citizens,233 commencing from 
1979, the Nigerian constitution featured a public policy directive where all levels of 
government were bestowed with the autonomy to govern their jurisdiction according to the 
constitution. Autonomy of jurisdiction within the Nigerian constitutional framework is a 
system of government whereby Nigerian individuals residing in vast, rural areas are further 
accounted for via local government administration, through the three-tier system, to ensure the 
equal distribution and allocation of intrinsic resources, such as access to legal aid. However, 
crucial rights could be at risk if the various arms of government who hold the authority to 
choose and determine areas of need do not consider legal aid to be of high priority. 
Thus, actions launched via the constitution may not always automatically amount to a shared 
advantage. In other words, the constitution may be limited in its role of mutual advantage in 
certain cases because the structure of a constitutional government can only act within the 
devolved powers of constitutionally established institutions.234 Nonetheless, Flaherty and 
Cole235 contend that it is vital to acquire a constitutional habitat for fundamental rights for its 
full impact to be felt within the judiciary. Intrinsic rights, such as free legal assistance, would 
need to be firmly embedded within the constitution to effectively endure. If not specifically 
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defined in a constitution, complications may arise in the development and implementation 
process. This is due to an unclear legally binding agreement around the rights of right holders 
and the obligations of right givers.236 By virtue of the constitution, Nigerian government 
institutions are empowered to enact and implement government policies. However, Hardin237 
contends that, due to the non-self-enforcing nature of the constitution, full provision of some 
aspects of fundamental rights may be limited. As such, in specific cases, enforcing the 
constitution may be of upmost importance in ensuring, among other crucial rights, that the 
dignity of citizens is respected and protected.  
 
3.3 Nigerian Constitutional Development (1960-1999) 
The legal system that is derived from the Nigerian constitution is based on English common 
law, Islamic Sharia law and customary law; thus, a pluralistic legal framework. The drafting of 
constitutions from the time of independence has been a pivotal source of support to the growth 
of the Nigerian legislature as an independent entity. There were four constitutions and two 
constitutional conferences prior to Nigeria’s independence.238 However, this chapter will focus 
on the protection of equal justice before the courts by virtue of the constitutions that were 
enacted after independence from British colonial rule in 1960. This chapter will also examine 
the inception and development of the provision of legal aid through domestic law in Nigeria.  
The recognition of fundamental rights has always been a feature of the Nigerian constitutions 
from independence, and this has increased in scope over the years to guarantee the freedoms 
and protection of the Nigerian people, especially those considered to be of minority groups. 
The right to legal aid is not specifically defined in the post-independence constitutions of 1960-
1979. It was only explicitly inserted into the Nigerian legal framework in the constitution of 
1989. However, in the constitutions prior to this, there are instructions within the directives 
that indirectly require the state to provide legal aid to disadvantaged individuals in the interest 
of justice by way of other fundamental avenues: for example, the right to a fair trial. The 1960 
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and 1963 constitutions purposely provide that a person whose fundamental rights have been 
contravened in any state of Nigeria can apply to the high court of that state for redress.239  
According to Rice,240 the right to legal representation is seldom referred to as an absolute right. 
Individuals would rather have to rely on inference from the systems and institutions of the state 
to secure their constitutionally protected rights. Such deductions are either based on 
constitutional guarantees of equality for all before the law, or from the legal reasoning derived 
from other similar imperative rights, such as the right to fair trial.241 Rights that provide for a 
fair trial are profoundly connected with the right to free legal representation. In many instances, 
the right to fair trial may not be conceivable if access to legal aid by a disadvantaged individual 
is denied.  
Consecutive Nigerian constitutions from 1979 to 1999 have also incorporated the directives of 
fundamental rights. For example, there is a directive which outlines the obligations of the state 
of Nigeria towards its citizens as well as what is expected of Nigerian citizens in return. This 
is to ensure a balance between rights and obligations, as instructed under the Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy on the duties of the state and private 
citizens. This directive focused on enhancing and facilitating Nigeria’s constitutional 
commitment to the protection and preservation of human rights. The constitutions between 
1960 and 1989 indirectly provided legal aid though other fundamental rights under the Nigerian 
constitution, whereas the 1979-1999 constitutions have evolved to unequivocally direct 
governments to provide legal aid for its disadvantaged citizens by all means necessary. 
In 1979, after fourteen successive years of authoritarian military government, it became a 
matter of urgency to adopt and implement a new constitutional structure which would return 
to democratic federation and disengage from the British colonial constitutional framework. 
Consequently, Nigeria embraced a more executive Presidential and State model of governance 
to reflect a diplomatic nation-building process. The aim was to ensure that the disadvantaged 
and vulnerable citizens residing in the vast, rural areas of Nigeria, who were typically members 
of minority ethnic groups, were able to access crucial resources.242 Unlike its predecessors, the 
1979 constitution was drafted via a draft committee with significant institutional changes 
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targeted at modelling democratic federation. It confirmed the authority of the federal 
government over the independent states. It also adopted the separation of the executive from 
the legislative and judicial branches of government at all levels.243  
The separation of Nigerian governmental powers places obligations on each institution and 
precludes interference of one by any other. It also allows each institution to monitor themselves 
on crucial matters of the state. Fundamental rights such as legal aid benefit from this innovation 
because it serves as a definitive constitutional modification that clarifies the role of the 
legislative in making law and the judiciary in implementing this law. Consequently, 
independence of the judiciary theoretically guarantees that the right to free legal representation 
is fully functional in the Nigerian court of law. Therefore, the 1979-1999 constitutions further 
instructed the legislators of the National Assembly, via the High Court of Nigeria, to guarantee 
the right to free legal representation for ‘indigent’ citizens of limited means through additional 
laws.  
 
3.4 1960 Nigerian Constitution (Independence Constitution)  
3.4.1 Protection of Fundamental Rights 
The preference for a more federalised system of government was crucial to further protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of all Nigerian citizens regardless of their social status by 
ensuring that all citizens were accounted for in terms of access to constitutional guarantees. 
Consequently, a federal state model was implemented, as a form of compromise to preserve 
diverse constituent interests.244 Powers invested in the constitution were mutually shared 
between interstate and local government administrations to safeguard the disadvantaged and 
facilitate a balanced and fair distribution of social welfare among vastly disparate ethnic 
groups. Prior to the validation of the 1960 constitution, the British administration set up a 
minority delegation, the Willink Commission, to consider the concerns of ethnic minorities and 
address potential conflict around the distribution of resources, the right to vote, the 
independence of the judiciary and the guarantee in the constitution for certain fundamental 
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rights.245 This Commission conclusively recommended a provision for fundamental rights in 
the Nigerian Constitution and the implementation of a Bill of Rights, instead of creating more 
States,246 (to enable a fair distribution of resources) as requested by majority of the minority 
groups during the Willink inquiry.247 
The 1960 Nigerian constitution pioneered and introduced the Bill of Rights into the system of 
government. The Bill of Rights was omitted from previous pre-independence Nigerian 
constitutions by the British colonialists. Amachree248 credits its origin to the unwritten concepts 
of the English Common Law. The incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the 1960 constitution 
arose from a need to mitigate the fears of ethnic minorities around the consequences for them 
of independence, as well as guarantee human rights protections for the Nigerian people. The 
values of fundamental rights incorporated into the 1960 constitution were a reflection of the 
principles derived from the 1953 European Convention on Human Rights249 and the need to 
recognise the freedoms and protection of the rights of vulnerable citizens. Hence, the 1960 and 
1963 Nigerian constitutions relied on the provision of fundamental rights to protect underlying 
legal entitlements such as the right to legal representation of choice before courts in criminal 
cases. Consequently, the 1960 independence constitution and successive constitutions have 
endeavoured to incorporate the protection of fundamental rights into their constitutional 
directives.250  
 
3.4.2 Fair Trial Rights via Legal Representative of Choice 
The 1960 independence constitution received its first code of fundamental rights via Chapter 
III under Sections 17 to 32. The right to legal aid was not notably acknowledged in the 1960 
Independence Constitution; however, s. 21 of the 1960 constitution provides for the right to a 
fair hearing under the notion of determination of rights. This includes other pertinent 
constituents that guarantees fairness in the court of law but is limited to criminal cases only. 
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Section 21 dealt in depth with the doctrine that incorporates the right to a fair hearing, but little 
attention was accorded to the right to legal aid. However, legal aid is a major component of the 
right to be heard251 and embodies the principle of equal justice.252  
Section 21 (1) of the 1960 Nigerian independence constitution states that: “[i]n the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing 
within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such 
manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.” Section 21 (2) reiterates the role of the 
courts in ensuring a person’s right to a fair trial in criminal cases. Section 21 (5) (b) states that: 
“[e]very person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled - to be given adequate 
time and facilities to prepare for his defence.” Section 21 (5) (c) also provides that: “[e]very 
person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled - to defend himself in person or 
by legal representatives of his own choice.” Thus, the 1960 constitution guarantees rights that 
are vital to a fair trial, including the right to be represented by any counsel of one’s own choice; 
however, according to Tobi,253 the constitution is silent on who takes the financial 
responsibility for this right.  
On the other hand, the validity of fair trial rights through legal representation of choice was 
challenged in the case of Chief Obafemi Awolowo v. The Federal Minister of Internal Affairs 
and another.254 The legal counsel for Chief Awolowo, Mr E. Gratiaen, was British and 
permitted to practice law in Nigeria; but he was prohibited from entering Nigeria under s. 13 
of the Immigration Act, 1958,255 by the Minister of Internal Affairs. The plaintiffs contended 
that it contravened s. 21 (5) (c) of the 1960 constitution which entitled him to be defended by 
any counsel of his choice. Yet, the court rejected their submission and held that the provision 
of s. 21 (5) (c) is subject to the limitation that the legal practitioner chosen must be someone 
who, if outside Nigeria, has the right to enter Nigeria and is enrolled to practice there. As 
Gratiaen had no unconditional right to enter Nigeria, he could not be present to defend Chief 
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Awolowo.256 Nonetheless, the court also held that the actions of the Minister of Internal Affairs 
were lawful in denying entry to Mr Gratiaen.257  
In Shernfe v. Commissioner of Police,258 the appellant applied to adjourn the case to secure 
legal representation and was refused by the courts. The accused conducted his own defence 
and was found guilty on all counts. On appeal, it was held that his constitutional right to counsel 
was not violated because he had not been deprived by the court to have a legal representative 
present.259 The similar case of Re Okafor, Police v. Okafor260 was decided on s. 22 (5) (c) of 
the 1963 Constitution, which entitles the accused “to defend himself in person or by legal 
representatives of his own choice.” The courts declared that where non-representation was the 
fault of the accused persons or counsel, there is no violation of constitutional guarantees. On 
appeal, Taylor CJ declared: “s. 22 (5) (c) does not put into the hands of the accused or his 
counsel the power to stultify proceedings in court by withdrawing from the case in the 
circumstances of this case." 
However, in the case of Gokpa v. Inspector-General of Police,261 the courts took a different 
view and held that the right to legal representation was of utmost importance to the injunction 
that incorporates the right to a fair trial under s. 21 of the 1960 constitution. In this case the 
appellant was brought to court without his counsel and asked for adjournment to enable his 
counsel to appear. The appellant’s application for adjournment was refused. Despite the 
absence of counsel and the non-participation of the appellant, the trial continued, and the 
defendant was found guilty and sentenced. On appeal, the court found an infringement of s. 21 
(2) of the 1960 Independence constitution. It was held that: "in any case, the court should 
endeavour to see that the accused person is given a fair chance to defend himself and with the 
aid of counsel when he is represented by one." According to the appeal court, it was sufficient 
for the defendant to show that he was denied an adjournment to allow him to acquire legal 
representation. Hence, the prosecution infringed on his right to a fair trial when the 
adjournment was denied.  
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In addition, s. 21 (5) (e) also allows for persons to “have without payment the assistance of an 
interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the offence”. Section 21 (5) 
(b), (c) and (e) provide individuals with entitlements that fall under the provision of legal aid.262 
However, the wording of the section does not indicate if the right “to be given adequate time 
and facilities” and to be represented “by legal representatives of [one’s] own choice” amounts 
to the provision of legal aid without cost to the litigant. The section and its subsections direct 
states to support individuals in criminal cases in need of assistance, because “[i]f a person 
cannot afford legal representation, this can undermine their right to a fair trial”.263 Rice264 
argues that, to uphold the principle of fairness and equality, “courts are prepared to imply a 
right to legal aid   in a particular context; most usually to uphold a constitutional right to fair 
trial.”  
Finding a right by implication plays a definitive role in situations where the liberty of an 
individual before the courts is at stake or the inability to access free legal counsel would amount 
to substantial injustice.265 Within the Nigerian context, the test for the interpretation and 
clarification of the right to a fair hearing and the right to a fair trial was laid down by Chief 
Justice Ademola in the case of Isiyaku Mohammed v. Kano Native Authority.266 Ademola 
posited that: “it is suggested that a fair hearing does not mean a fair trial […] A fair hearing 
must involve a fair trial […] the true test of a fair hearing is […] whether justice has been done 
in the case.”267 Hence, by definition, legal aid is crucial to the preservation of justice and 
fairness in courts. 
  
3.5 1963 Nigerian Constitution (Republican Constitution)  
3.5.1 Constitutional Sovereignty and Fundamental Rights 
The 1963 constitution was another major step towards gaining total constitutional sovereignty 
and was the first to substantially break from the British crown. Hence, with this constitution, 
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Nigeria formally became a federal republic. The 1963 constitution, also known as the 
Republican Constitution, is similar to the independence constitution of 1960, and so does not 
explicitly provide for the right to legal aid. However, fundamental rights and freedoms such as 
the right to fair trial remained in the 1963 constitutional structure. There were, however, 
constitutional changes with respect to the judicial administration. For instance, the Judicial 
Service Commission was abolished and the manner in which judges were appointed to the 
Supreme Court re-constructed. The president was accredited with the power to appoint judges 
of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, but only in consultation with the Prime Minister. Nwabueze268 
argues that the 1963 constitution was not fully independent of the British crown as it did not 
derive its authority from its own native authority, despite being enacted by the Nigerian local 
legislature.  
Alao269 contended that the decision to dissolve the Judicial Service Commission was misguided 
because it accorded more power to the executive over the judiciary. The author stated that the 
judiciary represented the intentions of the constitution through interpretation in courts, and 
politicians should not interfere with the appointment of judges, save for those who are 
nonpartisan or of a professional body. Consequently, the people lost confidence in the Supreme 
Court due to concerns that the judiciary had compromised on its separateness and independence 
as protector of individual liberty, rights, and privileges.270 Rights such as legal aid, which is 
not clearly specified in the constitution, may have to rely on the judge’s interpretation of other 
closely related directives of fairness that imply the right. An independent judiciary allows for 
non-interference of other arms of government so that the courts can make decisions based on 
the intentions of the constitution, the legal principles of fairness and the needs of litigants. 
Legal aid guarantees equality of arms and boosts the confidence of individuals, especially those 
who believe the system would work against them if they were to find themselves before the 
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3.5.2 Chapter III: Protection of Fundamental Rights 
The protection of fundamental rights continued to endure under Chapter III, s. 22 of the 1963 
constitution. This includes other consecutive auxiliary clauses contained within the subsections 
under s. 22 that guarantee the right to a fair trial; namely, s. 22 (5) (b), (c) and (e).271 All other 
mandates under the determination of rights, that also imply the right to free legal assistance 
under the right to fair trial, remain unchanged. Therefore, s. 22 of the 1963 constitution 
indirectly places duties on the state to grant all component rights that are affiliated with the 
right to a fair hearing, in addition to other related rights of fairness and equality before the law 
in criminal litigation in Nigeria.  
The right to legal aid is not guaranteed under fair trial rights, but nonetheless is a crucial 
component to the latter if litigants are unable to afford legal counsel. Hence, such individuals 
run a risk of having their fair trial rights infringed in its absence; therefore, the right to legal 
aid is implied from the provisions of s. 22 based on the wording and the entitlements. Flyn et 
al. 272 argue that the right to free legal representation can be construed in fulfilment of the right 
to a fair trial. However, the lack of explicit instruction can act as a barrier to securing this. Due 
to the indirect terminology of the section, the definitive right to legal aid continued to be unclear 
under the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions. 
 
3.6 1979 Nigerian Constitution  
3.6.1 The Constitutional Right to Legal Aid  
Section 42 of the 1979 constitution introduced legal aid provision into the Special Jurisdiction 
of the Courts category to further promote the principle of equality before the courts via 
fundamental rights.273 According to Akpan,274 the 1979 constitution was the first to provide 
Nigerian citizens with the best opportunity to preserve their human rights and basic freedoms. 
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It was enacted after fourteen years of military government rule to serve as the inherent focal 
point of the Second Republic. It was drafted, ratified, and promulgated under the Military 
Administration of General Obasanjo.275 In 1975, a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) 
was established to draft the impending 1979 constitution.276 The primary aim was to deliberate 
on various socio-economic and political matters,277 and devise a template for a new democratic 
era that prioritised the fundamental rights of the Nigerian people.  
After much consultation, the final legal draft was concluded and approved on 20 August 1976 
and broadcast for public scrutiny. The constitution was formally adopted on 21 September 1978 
and came into operation on 1 October 1979278 under the authority of the newly elected civilian 
presidency of Ahaji Shehu Shagari. According to Moveh,279 the 1979 constitution was widely 
criticised because it was regarded as a body of law imposed by the military government, rather 
than a document that reflected the will of the people. This is due to the belief that majority of 
the members were appointed by the incumbent military regime. Yet, a more realistic provision 
on human rights for all citizens still emerged out of this constitution.  
Nigeria chose to adopt a new constitutional structure which was a departure from the normal 
“Westminster” model, which reflected the structure of former colonial governments.280 Under 
the 1979 constitution, the American Presidential paradigm was introduced and adopted281 to 
address the matter of equal distribution of resources among the diverse demographic groups of 
Nigeria. Akpan282 posits that the 1979 constitution focused on human rights matters with more 
detail and authenticity than the preceding 1963 constitution. It provided a solid foundation for 
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democratic governance where the powers of the government were limited, and the rights and 
freedoms of the Nigerian people were prioritised, regardless of their social status.283 
 
3.6.2 Chapter II: Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy and the 
Enforcement of Rights 
The 1979 Nigerian constitution initiated the formal separation of the Legislative, Executive 
and Judicial organs of government, and included an additional directive for the protection of 
human rights under Chapter II. The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy, as contained within Chapter II, are divided into sub-sections to indicate the scope of 
constitutionally protected rights.284 They serve as a supplement to fundamental rights,285 and 
were derived from the Constitution of India, where they played a vital role in influencing state 
policies and giving direction to socio-economic planning.286  
The Objectives and Directives were unique and represented an improvement in Nigerian 
constitutional history. They were established to accentuate obligations of the state, in contrast 
to the previous 1960 and 1963 constitutions, which focused primarily on authority and rights. 
According to Duru et al.,287 the Objectives and Principles were an attempt to incorporate socio-
economic freedoms under the protection of human rights into the 1979 constitution. The 
provisions in Chapter II were also initiated to give meaning to the fundamental protections laid 
out in Chapter IV.288 The Objectives set out the template which governments must endeavour 
to model in fulfilling their constitutional obligations, while the Directive Principles indicate 
the procedure required to accomplish the intended.289 The directive emphasised the deep-seated 
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commitment of all Nigerian governmental institutions to safeguard the constitutional rights and 
freedoms of the Nigerian people.  
 
3.6.3 Chapter II: Safeguarding Fundamental Rights and State Obligations 
By reason of Chapter II of the 1979 constitution, the primary role of governmental bodies is to 
implement and enforce the fundamental rights of the Nigerian people. This chapter was omitted 
in the directives of the previous 1960 and 1963 Nigerian constitutions; therefore, the 
supplementary inclusion set the standard for guaranteeing accountability and good governance 
by all policy-making bodies. The new development became a means of fulfilling fundamental 
obligations, such as the right to legal aid, towards Nigerian citizens.  
The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles contained within the 1979 constitution 
serve as a pertinent avenue for citizens of Nigeria to claim their rights, most especially the less 
privileged and most vulnerable. It ensures that the legislative organ recognises the need for 
legal aid, while authorising policies and holding the judiciary to account, so as to uphold the 
principle of equal justice. It also confirmed that Nigerian citizens are to be held accountable 
for their own actions according to their duty to each other and the nation: “[t]he national ethic 
shall be that of discipline, self-reliance and patriotism.”290 
Okere291 posits that the main features of the Objectives and Principles within the 1979 
constitution were instituted by the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC). The drafting 
process was based primarily on Nigeria's multi-ethnic population and heterogeneous structure, 
paying attention to the positioning of individuals within the social hierarchy292 and their ability 
to access certain fundamental resources, such as free legal representation in courts. The CDC 
utilised the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy chapter to 
explicitly clarify and define the role of these “objectives and directive principles.”293 The 
Objectives and Principles, according to the CDC, were crucial to the unity and progress of the 
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Nigerian people. They were intended to bridge the gap between social disparities and empower 
institutions to provide equitable access to crucial resources for disadvantaged individuals 
before the courts. They also placed obligations on all government agencies to prioritise the 
security and welfare of all citizens under its jurisdiction.294 Oyovbaire295 contends that the 
achievement of the objectives and the application of the directives under Chapter II were at the 
discretion of the Nigerian government, despite the elaborate declaration of the advent of liberal 
democracy. The author goes further to state that structures such as the Objectives and Principles 
were instead put in place to nullify the political mishaps that Nigeria had experienced in the 
past, as well as pave way for new objectives that would uphold the rights of Nigerian citizens.  
The significance of safeguarding fundamental rights within the Nigerian legal framework was 
later affirmed in the case of Ransome Kuti v. Attorney General of Federation,296 where the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria held that such rights stand “above the ordinary laws of the land and 
which in fact [are] antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a 
civilised existence.” The Supreme Court of Nigeria was of the opinion that the directives in the 
Nigerian constitution, and the precise interpretation of these directives, were crucial to securing 
constitutional rights of citizens. It was also held that the incorporation of fundamental rights 
into the Nigerian constitution is the duty of the state. The case reiterated that the commitment 
and determination of the judiciary is definitively paramount to the protection of individual 
human rights, as it is the only institution which can ensure that these rights are “enshrined in 
the constitution so that the rights could be immutable to the extent of the non-immutability of 
the constitution itself.”297  
The Ransome Kuti case established the principle of fundamental rights, an equivalent to 
international human rights in Nigerian legal jurisprudence. It also validates the pivotal role of 
the judiciary with regards to ensuring that such constitutional rights are confirmed and 
maintained in the Nigerian courts. Eso298 contends that the socio-economic and political 
structure of Nigeria is such that the majority are poor, illiterate, and unaware of their rights. 
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Nonetheless, in the interest of democracy the courts are duty-bound to conserve individual 
fundamental rights that are enshrined in the constitution.  
 
3.6.4 The Right to Legal Aid and Governmental Constitutional Duties: Freedoms, Equality and 
Justice 
The unequivocal right to equal justice and opportunities is specified in s. 17 (1) of the 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy chapter of the constitution. 
Section 17 (1) declares that: “the State social order is founded on ideals of Freedom, Equality 
and Justice.” Section 17 (2) (a) facilitates the rights that are derived from this section: “[i]n 
furtherance of the social order - (a) every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and 
opportunities before the law.” Section 17 (1) and (2) (a) are precisely defined and reiterate the 
duty placed on the state to assist Nigerian citizens. Section 17 (3) (g) directs the state to ensure 
that: “[p]rovision is made for public assistance in deserving cases or other conditions of need”. 
However, the directives that illustrate this subsection are vague and poorly defined. The 
wording of s. 17 (3) (g) seems to acknowledge that disadvantaged individuals may need public 
assistance to acquire their inherent right to social justice; yet the scope or category of public 
assistance is not defined or clarified within the section.  
Hence, s. 17 (3) (g) instructs state governments to ensure that state policies are directed towards 
securing the social objectives that are applicable under s. 17 (1), in terms of freedoms, equality 
and justice, as well as to endeavour to provide public assistance to individuals “in deserving 
cases or other conditions of need”. Thus, the provision of public assistance is at the discretion 
of the court and will only be fulfilled if the case is deemed “deserving”. The mandate accorded 
to the state under s. 17 (3) (g) serves as a significant legal tool to protect the rights and freedoms 
of disadvantaged individuals who would suffer grossly as a result of being denied impartial 
access to courts. Hence, the directives set out in sections 17 (2) (a) and 17 (3) (g) were to ensure 
that every citizen has attainable access to legal institutions. Though not explicitly defined, both 
sections may infer a right to legal aid for individuals in civil cases if the court deems it a 






3.6.5 Limitations of Constitutional Duties under Chapter II 
Section 13 of the 1979 constitution declares that: “[i]t shall be the duty and responsibility of 
all organs of Fundamental government, and of all authorities and persons, exercising 
obligations of legislative, executive or judicial powers, to conform to, observe and apply the 
provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution.” The obligations of the state under Chapter II 
of the 1979 constitution were meticulously drafted to administer essential rights that embody 
the principles of democracy and social justice. However, the 1979 constitution also contained 
discretionary clauses that could potentially serve as a barrier to legal aid provision depending 
on its interpretation by the judiciary.  
For instance, s. 6 (6) (c) of the 1979 constitution acts as a clause that places limits on the scope 
of power that the judiciary can exercise when questioning whether “any law or any judicial 
decision is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution”.299 The non-enforceability of fundamental 
objectives as directed by s. 6 (6) (c) limits the courts’ ability to enforce rights.300 The impact 
of the non-enforceability of fundamental objectives on crucial rights such as legal aid will be 
examined further under the current 1999 constitution.  
 
3.6.6 Chapter IV: Special Jurisdiction of High Court and Legal Aid 
Chapter IV of the 1979 constitution embodies protected fundamental rights that are owed to all 
individuals regardless of their social status. The main objective of the legal aid scheme is to 
reduce the disparities created by inequality. To the same degree as the previous Nigerian 
constitutions on the fundamental right to fair trial, s. 33 (1)301 distinctively pledges the 
constitutions’ commitment to safeguard the fundamental right to fair hearing against any 
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“government or authority” within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal that is independent 
and impartial. Section 33 (6) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution duly guarantees the right to a 
fair trial. The rights that constitute s. 33 (6) (b), (c) and (e)302 are essential to the legal aid 
scheme and the protection of legal rights within the Nigerian judiciary, because they recognise 
the requirement for legal assistance by the vulnerable and less privileged and the implications 
of inaccessibility of representation. Thus, governments and affiliated agencies are directed via 
the constitution to make provisions available where necessary. However, under s. 33 (6), this 
obligation applies only to persons in criminal cases.303  
Section 42 administers the special jurisdiction of High Court and legal aid in relation to the 
fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the 1979 Constitution. Chapter IV provides guidance 
and instruction on matters relating to constitutional rights. Section 42 (1) assures the 
commitment of the Federal State of Nigeria to uphold human rights protection in line with 
international law. Furthermore, it protects the legal right of individuals to be heard in a court 
of law if such freedoms have been contravened: “[a]ny person who alleges that any of the 
provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation 
to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.”  
Furthermore, s. 42 (2) confers authority to the High Court of Nigeria to deal with matters of 
redress: “[s]ubject to the provisions of this Constitution, a High Court shall have original 
jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of this section[.]” 
Section 42 (3) grants extra jurisdiction to the Chief Justice to ensure rights and freedoms are 
duly protected through legal rules: “[t]he Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules with respect 
to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this section.” In fulfilling and 
accomplishing the obligations set out in s. 42 (1), (2) and (3), s. 42 (4) sets out role of the 
National Assembly with regard to assigning authority deemed necessary to the High Court, 
“for the purpose of enabling the court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred 
upon it by this section.” In addition, s. 42 (4) (b) directs the National Assembly to make 
provisions: 
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(i) For the rendering of financial assistance to any indigent citizen of Nigeria where his 
right under this Chapter has been infringed or with a view to enabling him to engage the 
services of a legal practitioner to prosecute his claim, and  
(ii) For ensuring that allegations of infringement of such rights are substantial and the 
requirement or need for financial or legal aid is real.304 
The explicit instructions under s. 42 (1) (b) (i) are crucial to the basic protection of individual 
legal rights via legal aid in the 1979 and subsequent Nigerian constitutions. They specify the 
category of individuals to whom a duty of constitutional protection is owed, as well as a 
detailed scope of the powers bestowed on the Chief Justice of Nigeria and the National 
Assembly via the High courts to enact and implement laws to fulfil this duty. Inherent rights 
such as legal aid derive their legitimacy from s. 42 (4) (b) of the 1979 constitution, because the 
latter presents them as imperative fundamental rights. Hence, though the instructions contained 
within s. 42 extend beyond the affirmation of the legal aid scheme, the latter is deemed a 
fundamental necessity when it comes to protecting financially disadvantaged persons before 
the courts. Thus, s. 42 establishes the right holder and the right giver as intrinsic to the 
realisation of the guaranteed rights in this section. It is also a legal order that specifically places 
obligations on the judiciary to provide legal aid by all means necessary to individuals that fall 
under the indigent category.305 However, the wording of s. 42 (4) (b) (ii) suggests the gravity 
of a case and an individual’s right to legal aid is subject to the discretion of the courts.  
Essentially, Chapter II (the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy) 
and the directives of Chapter IV (Fundamental Rights) within the 1979 constitution were 
drafted to place duties on governmental bodies and institutions that are responsible for 
upholding freedom, equality, and justice. Therefore, the chapters should together ensure that 
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3.6.7 Limitations of Section 42 (4) (b) (ii) regarding the Provision of Legal Aid 
Section 42 (4) (b) (i) directs states to render financial assistance to any indigent citizen of 
Nigeria in matters of conserving fundamental rights in the court of law; however, this directive 
is limited by the subsequent subsection. Section 42 (4) (b) (ii) reserves the power to determine 
justiciability of a case for the judiciary. The latter must determine whether the contravened 
rights of an individual before the courts are substantial and whether they require legal aid, under 
s. 42 (4) (b) (i).  
Section 42 (4) does not clearly define what is to be considered substantial or how to determine 
if the need for legal aid is genuine. This subsection may either limit or enhance the right of an 
individual to be heard before the courts if the judiciary is given full jurisdiction to determine 
the validity of a case and eligibility for legal aid. Consequently, the fulfilment of this section 
will depend on the interpretation of the judiciary, without any defined dictation by the law. The 
exceptions of this subsection therefore pose a potential contravention of constitutionally 
protected fundamental rights within itself; this is especially the case considering that all 
fundamental rights under the Nigerian constitution are considered inalienable. 
In addition to s.17 (2) (a) and (3) (g), s. 42 (4) (b) (i) illustrates the fundamental tenets of equal 
justice by recognising the right of an individual to ‘public assistance’ (though this is not 
explicitly defined in the section). It may be construed to refer to a type of welfare service put 
in place to help disadvantaged groups to procure access to pivotal resources that may otherwise 
be hampered by social disparity, to ensure equality before the courts in Nigeria. Ultimately, 
individuals are able to secure redress by virtue of this section if their fundamental right to 
impartiality before the law is being threatened.  
Clark306 argues for a “legislative motivation and purpose” model of interpretation in instances 
where a right has to be construed. The author defines legislative motivation and purpose as the 
goals moving legislators to vote for a given law. From the perspective of a law's foreseeable 
effects, the author contends that the court may have to look at the purpose of the legislation to 
infer a right, especially regarding equal protection and fundamental rights analysis. Ultimately, 
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this aims to provide predictability and doctrinal certainty. It will also clarify the reason why 
certain rights are to be considered “fundamental” for constitutional purposes.307  
For instance, the motivation behind the right to fair trial in the Nigerian national constitution(s) 
is to guarantee equal justice and freedoms to all Nigerian citizens in criminal matters. However, 
in view of this, the availability of legal aid may also be required of such legislation in the 
interest of guaranteeing equality, regardless of its tacit standing in the section on the right to 
fair trial. Chapter II and Chapter IV of the 1979 Nigerian constitution run concurrently with 
one another in terms of duties and responsibilities. The promulgation of the duties of the state 
and the inherent rights of Nigerian citizens is an indication of Nigeria’s commitment to further 
promote the human rights principle via the constitution. The 1979 Nigerian constitution 
reiterates the directives of the right to a fair trial as contained within s. 21 of both the previous 
1960 and 1963 Nigerian constitutions.  
 
3.6.8 Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979308 (FREP Rules): 
Reinforcement of Fundamental Rights and Access to Legal Aid 
The FREP Rules were an additional mechanism initiated to reinforce constitutionally 
established fundamental rights. Thus, this section examines enforcement procedures put in 
place to effect fundamental privileges such as legal aid under Nigerian domestic law. As with 
other inherent rights, legal aid is reliant on effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with the laws, rules and guidelines imposed by the constitution. The judiciary are 
an essential instrument to ensure legal aid is made available to individuals when necessary. 
Hence, such rights remain unassertive without the necessary binding implementation tools. In 
an attempt to further secure the fundamental rights of individuals, and in line with the powers 
granted to him by s. 42 (3) of Chapter IV309 of the 1979 Constitution, Chief Justice A. Fatayi-
Williams made rules for the practice and procedures of the High Court in order to implement 
the FREP Rules, commencing on 1st January 1980. The 1979 FREP Rules were the first that 
dealt with the issue of failures to enforce fundamental rights in Nigeria.  
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308Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979.  http://www.nigeria-
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Sanni310 contends that the 1979 Rules were enacted to remedy the loophole created by Section 
6 (6) (c) of the 1979 Constitution, which essentially rendered rights under Chapter II non-
justiciable by the courts. The Chief Justice promulgated the FREP Rules to assist the judiciary 
in the enforcement of the crucial fundamental rights of Chapter IV, such as the (tacit) provision 
of legal aid. According to Nwauche,311 “the 1979 rules were intended to facilitate a speedier 
and less cumbersome resolution of complaints of human rights abuse in Nigeria” through 
uncomplicated access to judicial institutions and legal assistance. However, later studies into 
the interpretation of the rules in courts of law showed that, as an interpretative measure to 
enforce fundamental rights, the 1979 Rules had become a highly technical and formal 
procedural instrument.312  
 
3.6.9 Constraints of Enforcement: 1979 FREP Rules  
The biggest challenge faced by many fundamental and human rights instruments is ensuring 
such rights are applicable and enforced in courts as the constitution intended. Hence, some 
constraints are deeply rooted in the procedure itself and would require an unambiguous 
interpretation by the judiciary. This section examines the scope of the 1979 FREP rules and the 
obstacles to the enforcement of fundamental rights. It will also inquire into the competence of 
the Rules as an enforcement mechanism of rights in Nigeria. Thus, “Order 1 Rule 2 of the 
FREP Rules provides that, any person who alleges that any one of the fundamental rights 
provided for in the Constitution and which he is entitled to has been, is being or is likely to be 
infringed, may apply to the court in the state where the infringement occurs or is likely to occur, 
for redress.” The initial concern was regarding the appropriate court for the enforcement 
process. This caused a jurisdictional division between the Federal High Court and the High 
Court of Nigeria.313 The Supreme Court of Nigeria in Bronik Motors Ltd v. Wema Bank Ltd314 
confirmed that both the Federal High Court and the State High Court had concurrent 
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jurisdiction.315 On the other hand, in Tukur v. Government of Gongola State,316 Obaseki JSC317 
of the Supreme Court of Nigeria gave an insight into the scope of jurisdiction of the Federal 
High Court in matters that are brought to its court without the appropriate authority to decide 
on such matters: “enforcement of the fundamental rights in matters outside the jurisdiction of 
the Federal High Court […] inexorably nullifies the proceedings and judgment.” In the more 
recent case of Grace Jack v. UAM,318 the Supreme Court, through Katsina-Alu JSC, maintained 
that based on Order 1 Rule 2 of the FREP Rules both the Federal High Court and the State 
High Court have simultaneous jurisdiction to hear violation of fundamental rights matters. 
Nwauche319 contends that after the enactment of the FREP Rules, there were questions 
regarding their capability to enforce fundamental rights related matters in Nigerian courts due 
to their technical and formal nature. In Din v. Attorney-General of the Federation,320 Nnaemeka 
Agu JSC affirmed that “the Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 have 
prescribed the correct and only procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights which 
arise under Chapter IV of that Constitution”. In Obikwelu v. Speaker, House of Assembly,321 
Araka CJ confirmed the advantages of proceeding under the Rules as an expeditious resolution 
to a breach of fundamental rights. In Abacha v. Fawehinmi,322 the Supreme Court asserted that 
the 1979 FREP rules has the same authority as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in the enforcement of fundamental rights. According to Sanni,323 the approach by 
Nigerian courts, which were not well versed in the enforcement of human rights, was rigid. For 
instance, the requirements of “leave of court”324 were complex and regarded as unnecessary in 
the enforcement of rights.  
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There was also the issue of limitation of action where the time allowed to bring an action was 
considered inadequate.325 In EFCC v. Ekeocha,326 the 14 days deadline was held to be 
mandatory. Applicants were made to go back and forth with various step by step application 
actions that were complicated and resulted in the unnecessary duplication of the application 
process. Consequently, many cases were abandoned.327 For individuals seeking legal aid, time 
and financial constraints due to procedural technicalities and conflicting court decisions could 
prevent potential legal aid recipients from obtaining the assistance they require. It could also 
frustrate the efforts of legal aid and pro bono lawyers. 
In addition, initially, there was uncertainty concerning the type of claims enforced under the 
FREP Rules. It was later determined that only rights that are principally provided for under 
Chapter IV of the constitution could be enforced using the Rules.328 The case of 
Alhaji Ibrahim Abdulhamid v. Talal Akar & Anor329 examined and clarified the scope of the 
1979 FREP rules in the enforcement of fundamental rights. The applicant instituted an action 
under the 1979 FREP Rules against the respondents after obtaining leave of court to do so. In 
the first instance, the trial judge found in favour of the applicant and awarded damages to that 
effect. The respondents appealed the decision, stating that the “reliefs before the High Court 
and as found by trial judge himself were for assault and battery, trespass to land, trespass to 
chattel or goods, detinue and false imprisonment [,] which are torts covered by a different 
procedure under the Rules of the High Court”; hence, the appellants cross-appealed. The Court 
of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal, holding that “out of the 
four reliefs sought by the appellant, two are for an order restraining the respondents from 
harassing and intimidating the appellant and his family as well as seizing any of his properties. 
The others were for compensation for acts of harassment and intimidation committed against 
 
325The motion on notice or summons for an order of the court to protect fundamental human rights must be 
entered for hearing within 14 days after such leave has been granted. Cited in Nwauche Enyinna (2010) ‘The 
Nigerian Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Procedure Rules 2009: A Fitting Response to Problems in the 
Enforcement of Human Rights in Nigeria?’ African Human Rights Journal p. 506. 
326(2008) 14 NWLR (Pt 1106) 161. 
327Sanni Abiola (2011) ‘Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 as a Tool for the Enforcement 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria: The need for Far-Reaching Reform’, African 
Human Rights Journal pp. 516-517. 
328See Gongola State v. Tukur [1989] 4 NWLR. It was held that the Court of Appeal was right in its judgment 
holding that the Federal High Court had jurisdiction to determine and grant the reliefs to the Respondent's in 
respect of the claimed violations of Chapter IV of the Constitution 1979. 




the appellant including the release of the seized vehicles.”330 Aloma Mariam Mukhtar JSC331 
also stated that: “a close examination of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 does not consider any of the averments in the relief set out 
above to be a fundamental right[,] not to talk of its protecting them.” 
The decision in the case of University of Ilorin v. Oluwadare332 demonstrated that the right of 
students to a fair hearing cannot be enforced under the FREP Rules 2009333 until all internal 
remedies for redress have been exhausted. The Supreme Court held that, “the right to 
studentship not being among the rights guaranteed by the 1999 Constitution, the only 
appropriate method by which the respondent could have challenged his expulsion was for him 
to have commenced the action with a writ of summons under the applicable rules of court.”334  
Sanni contends that committal proceedings under Order 6, Rule 2 of the 1979 FREP Rules335 
could delay the enforcement of crucial fundamental rights by nullifying applications. This 
order, according to the author, went against the ultimate objective of the FREP Rules, which 
was to speed up human rights applications.336 Consequently, a defendant found guilty of 
contempt of court may be committed to prison unless the defendant complies with the terms 
set out by the court.337 In Bonnie v. Gold,338 the Court of Appeal identified the fact that the 
1979 Rules were deficient in the procedure to be followed in committal proceedings for 
contempt. In his absence, the respondent was restrained by the lower Court from presenting 
himself as the Odibiado of Sobe (Traditional ruler). The respondent was expected to be bound 
by the order that was issued by the appropriate authority of the court. It was held that, if an 
appellant refuse to abide by an order, any application made in furtherance of the order will be 
declared null and void. The appellants failed to follow the rules laid down by the High Court 
(Civil Procedure) Rules, and as such the lower court was right in dismissing the said 
application. However, the judge of the lower court, in giving judgement, believed the judge of 
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the higher court erred when the first appellant, Dr Osagie Obayuwana, was committed to prison 
for contempt considering the fact that the order of the court was not personally served on him. 
Another inconvenience was the requirement of capacity to bring an action (standing/locus 
standi), contained within Order 1, Rule 2 of the FREP Rules, 1979. It was also a major obstacle 
to the enforcement procedure. The requirement meant that the application can only be made by 
the individual whose rights have been, or are likely to be, contravened. 339 Individuals that 
require legal aid via third parties (e.g., human rights and civil rights organisations or other 
NGOs) were at the risk of not being heard if the locus standi principle is strictly interpreted by 
the courts. However, some judges were able to accept applications filed on behalf of human 
right victims through other means, such as judicial activism. For instance, in Captain SA 
Asemota v. Col SL Yesufu and Another,340 the court allowed the proceedings to go ahead on its 
own initiative.  
Nwafor341 posits that the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 were in 
themselves an obstacle to the enforcement of fundamental rights. Due to the complex nature of 
the procedure, many law practitioners as well as the applicants did not have a clear 
understanding of the rules. This led to constant nullification of crucial cases by the courts for 
non-compliance with the rules of the procedure.342 Procedural challenges leading to a waste of 
time and resources are often cited as an impediment to the provision of legal aid.343 Hence, 
legal aid lawyers are discouraged from taking cases, especially if the case requires constant 
travel. Nwauche344 argues that the requirement for standing to sue was developed outside the 
framework of the 1979 Rules and that, while questions of standing were successfully raised at 
the Supreme Court, it was often to the disadvantage of the party whose rights had been violated. 
As a consequence, it undermined public interest litigation and became a barrier by denying 
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access to authentic complaints of human rights violations. The author further contends that, 
while the principle of standing was based on the limiting Section 6 (6) (c) of the 1979 
constitution, the type of claims enforceable under the FREP Rules was determined by the 
judiciary.  
Apart from the aforementioned setbacks in the 1979 FREP Rules, there were other challenges 
that worked against their implementation in Nigerian courts. For instance, poverty, illiteracy, 
the high cost of litigation, the status and scope of human rights in Nigeria, and their 
enforcement in courts.345 
  
3.7 1989 Nigerian Constitution 
3.7.1 Introduction 
The succeeding 1989 Nigerian constitution was promulgated during military rule in Nigeria. It 
was in anticipation of the transition to a Third Republic under civilian leadership, which was 
promised to the Nigerian people by the ruling military Head of State.346 By virtue of the 
Nigerian constitutional Decree of 1987, a constitutional review committee was set up to review 
the extant 1979 constitution in order to make amendments based on approved 
recommendations from the Nigerian Political Bureau.347 As with the preceding one, the 1989 
Nigerian constitution affirms the pertinent legal structure required for the implementation of 
the right to legal aid for the disadvantaged in Nigeria. This is incorporated in Article 44 of the 
1989 constitution of Nigeria.348 The rights of citizens to seek redress in any state of Nigeria are 
clearly laid out in conformity with the obligation and jurisdictions of the National Assembly, 
the Chief Justice and that of the courts. This was to ensure that the right to seek a remedy for 
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3.7.2 Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy: Chapter II of the 1989 
Nigerian Constitution 
Accordingly, the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy were 
retained and incorporated into Chapter II of the 1989 constitution. The subsections (1), (2) (a) 
and (3) (g) of Article 18 of the 1989 Nigerian constitution affirm the pledge of the state to 
guarantee social justice and equity through legal aid for the disadvantaged in Nigeria.349 The 
directives on the right to a fair trial under fundamental rights in Chapter IV were also retained 
in the 1989 constitution with no change to the initial wording of the chapter that had been 
integrated into previous post-independence constitutions. Subsections (5) (b), (c) and (e) of 
Article 35 reiterate previously specified constitutional instructions on the right to a fair trial 
and choice of defence counsel in criminal cases only.350  
 
3.8 1999 Constitution of Nigeria 
3.8.1 Introduction 
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is the fifth and current constitution 
in force. The national code of conduct was promulgated through Decree No. 24 by the Nigerian 
military government on May 5, 1999. According to the preamble of the 1999 constitution, its 
drafting and final approval was a combined effort of numerous consultations with all 
stakeholders, including the Nigerian people both home and abroad. It was agreed to utilise the 
1979 constitution as a template, with amendments where necessary, to promulgate a new 
constitution. It was also in anticipation of handing over military power to a democratically 
elected government of the Nigerian people. Like the previous constitutions, the 1999 Nigerian 
constitution incorporates definitive human right obligations that are closely related to the 
provision of legal aid. Section 17 (2) (a) of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
 
349See Chapter II; Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State of the 1989 Nigerian constitution 
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Principles of State Policy (Chapter II)351 guarantees rights by acknowledging the duties of 
states to facilitate equal protection before the law.  
According to Dada,352 “these rights which are essentially equalitarian and egalitarian in 
character are rooted on the belief that the attainment of [a] certain level of social and economic 
standard is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of the civil and political rights”; and as 
such, they require affirmative governmental action for their enjoyment.353 The scope of the 
duty authorised by the regulation that embodies the Objectives and Principles was clarified in 
Attorney-General of Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors.354 It was held 
here that the obligations and responsibilities towards the realisation of rights contained within 
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy were not exclusive to 
government officials only, but to private citizens as well. The court concluded that 
governmental institutions do not act in isolation of the public,355 and as such private individuals 
are equally accountable under the chapter. The law that was defined under this case is crucial 
to the realisation of protected rights, especially in matters of civil law.  
 
3.8.2 Chapter IV: The Fundamental Right to Fair Trial and Legal Aid 
Chapter IV of the 1999 constitution reiterates Nigeria’s pledge to protect the fundamental rights 
of the Nigerian people. Section 36 (6) of the right to fair trial recall previous constitutional 
instructions that: “(6) [e]very person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled 
to […] (b) be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) defend 
himself in person or by legal practitioners of his own choice; (e) have, without payment, the 
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the 
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3.8.3 Section 46: Special Jurisdiction of the High Court and Legal Aid 
Going further than the tacit provision of the right to legal aid contained within Chapter IV of 
the 1979 and 1989 constitutions of Nigeria, the 1999 constitution extends legal protection 
beyond the right to a fair trial to explicitly provide legal aid (“financial assistance”) under s. 
46. Hence, s. 46 (1) directs: “[a]ny person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter 
has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a 
High Court in that State for redress.” The purpose of s. 46 is to give all Nigerians access to the 
appropriate court and legal aid if necessary, for a fair chance to seek redress, regardless of their 
social status. In addition, s. 46 of the 1999 Constitution recognises that the right to legal aid is 
essential to the wellbeing of the Nigerian populace in terms of securing basic rights. Most 
importantly, it is subject to improvement if deemed to be inhibiting the realisation of crucial 
fundamental rights through the courts. 
Accordingly, s. 46 (2)357 of the 1999 constitution provides the High Court with the primary 
authority to hear and determine any submitted application before it. Section 46 (2) places a 
duty on High Courts to ensure that constitutionally guaranteed rights are duly implemented and 
enforced within its State jurisdiction. In addition, s. 46 (3) further safeguards’ fundamental 
rights via the judiciary by stating that: “the Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules with respect 
to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this section.”  
Section 46 subsections (4) (b) (i), and (ii) instruct the National Assembly via the High Court to 
enact laws for the achievability of legal aid where necessary so to enable the courts to exercise 
their jurisdiction more effectively. Hence, the National Assembly must make arrangements “(i) 
for the rendering of financial assistance to any indigent citizen of Nigeria where his right under 
this Chapter has been infringed or with a view to enabling him to engage the services of a legal 
practitioner to prosecute his claim, and (ii) for ensuring that allegations of infringement of such 
rights are substantial and the requirement or need for financial or legal aid is real.” 
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3.8.4 Constraints of the Provision of Legal Aid under Section 46 (4) (b) (ii) of the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria  
Consistent with s. 42 (4) (b) (ii) of the 1979 Nigerian constitution, the same section358 of the 
current 1999 constitution contains limiting eligibility requirements for legal aid. This is solely 
dependent on the discretion of the judiciary to consider the value of contravened rights and 
legal aid qualification. The wording of both sections presents a potential obstacle to the primary 
objective of s. 46; that is, to assign the National Assembly via the Chief Justice of Nigeria the 
authority to empower courts with the legal capacity to ensure that disadvantaged individuals 
have access to equal justice via legal aid in Nigerian courts. Thus, the scope of s. 46 (4) (b) (ii) 
is not explicitly demonstrated in the 1999 Nigerian constitution on matters of validity and 
eligibility. However, the lack of clarity that leaves discretion to the judiciary in this section 
does not coherently represent the thought and purpose behind s. 46, including the role of the 
High Courts, the Chief Justice and the National Assembly, and the provision of legal aid in 
Nigeria.  
According to Menendez,359 the validity of fundamental rights stems from its enactment and 
adoption as law via the constitution. The Nigerian constitution serves as a written authoritative 
statement affirming the protection of fundamental rights which are indisputable. It also acts as 
a template, subject to amendments by the judiciary where necessary to ensure that obligations 
such as access to legal aid are fulfilled. However, placing sole discretion on the judiciary to 
validate fundamental rights that are unquestionable may in turn weaken this protection.  
Individual fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens are guaranteed through the constitution by 
the ratifying and adopting of laws that are an integral part of the requirements of s. 46. This 
section also assisted in clarifying a major interpretive disparity, which created uncertainty in 
the Nigerian Constitutions of 1979 and earlier; namely, the definitive right to legal aid for the 
disadvantaged in Nigeria. Despite its limitations, the primary aim of Section 42 (4) (b) (ii) is 
to further protect disadvantaged individuals who are faced with litigation and unable to afford 
legal counsel by providing more clarity on the provision of legal aid in terms of the scope and 
obligations of affiliated institutions.  
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3.8.5 Scope of Legal Aid under Section 46 (b) (i) and (ii) 
Section 46 (b) (i) and (ii) extend no clear indication to suggest that such a right applies equally 
to disadvantaged individuals in both criminal and civil cases. The scope of its operation 
provides that it primarily targets individuals whose fundamental rights have been infringed 
upon. In the interest of parity before the courts, the right to legal aid contained within Section 
46 provides unambiguous validity of the duty owed. Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the 
right to legal representation under s. 46 focuses on sustaining the fundamental rights of the 
individual to whom a duty is owed regardless of the category of case before the courts. Hence, 
it has the status of an inalienable right without the need to infer, unlike the constitutions of 
1979 and earlier. However, Bamgbose360 contends that, in spite of the legal aid service provided 
by s. 46 of the current 1999 Constitution, access to justice has not been able to make its mark 
and serve as an accessible right for many citizens, particularly for the disadvantaged and 
vulnerable in Nigeria.  
 
3.8.6 Derogations from the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy: 
Implications of Section 6 (6) (c) for the Provision of legal Aid in Nigeria 
The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy contained within the 1999 
Nigerian constitution constitute a primary asset to the provision of legal aid in Nigeria. They 
serve to clarify the position of the rights giver and to whom the right in question is owed. 
Chapter II is crucial to the legal aid scheme by placing obligations on all organs of government; 
all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive, or judicial powers; and all private 
persons to conform to, observe and apply its mandates accordingly.361  
Olaiya362 posits that the primary aim of the Objectives and Principles is to encourage social 
inclusion irrespective of social ranking in society. Social status plays a major role in access to 
legal aid matters. Disadvantaged and vulnerable individuals are prone to exclusion from the 
courts because they cannot afford to pay for the services of a lawyer. Yet, the principles and 
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provisions that are paramount to this section, which seek to preserve the fundamental rights of 
indigent Nigerians, are deemed unenforceable by the courts due to a counter-provision 
contained within Section 6 (6) (c) of the 1999 constitution.363  
Section 6 (6) (c) contains a clause that excludes courts from questioning certain matters of law 
and whether a judicial decision complies with mandates contained within the Objectives and 
Directive Principles: “[t]he judicial powers […] shall not, except as otherwise provided by this 
Constitution, extend to any issue or question as to whether any act or omission by any authority 
or person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in conformity with the 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this 
Constitution[.]” This section therefore, restricts courts from enforcing the provisions of 
Chapter II of the constitution. 
In addition, s. 6 (6) (c) conflicts with the purposes of s. 17 (2) (a) and (e)364 of the Objectives 
and Principles incorporated in Chapter II. Section 17 (2) was put in place to further maintain 
social order and secure access to courts in spite of social status, as well as maintain and uphold 
the right to equal arms and opportunities before the courts of Nigeria. According to Okeke and 
Okeke,365 the intrinsic policy embedded within the Objectives and Principles portrays a 
template to follow. However, s. 6 (6) (c) of the constitution represents a barrier to 
accomplishing the intended objective of access to courts. The author went further to argue that 
a government that cannot be held liable for failing to perform its assigned constitutional duties 
and cannot be expected to bear the responsibility of its obligations due to the non-justiciable 
nature of such duty.366  
The case of Archbishop Olubunmi Okogie v. The Attorney General of Lagos State367 examined 
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in detail for the first time 
in relation to the limitations of s. 6 (6) (c). The court declared that “the Fundamental Objectives 
identify the ultimate objectives of the nation and the Directive Principles lay down the policies 
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which are expected to be pursued […] while section 13 of the Constitution makes it a duty and 
responsibility of the Judiciary […] to conform to and apply the provisions of Chapter II. Section 
6 (6) (c) of the same constitution states that no court has jurisdiction to pronounce or question 
any decision as to whether any organ of government has acted or is acting in conformity with 
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. In effect, s. 13 has not 
made Chapter II of the Constitution justiciable.”368  
Okeke369 contends that s. 6 (6) (c) of the 1999 constitution is contradictory to the intention of 
Chapter II and that of access to legal aid. This serves as an impediment to the notion of 
transparency and accountability set out in s. 13: “[i]t shall be the duty and responsibility of all 
organs of government, and of all authorities and persons, exercising legislative, executive or 
judicial powers, to conform to, observe and apply the provisions of this Chapter of this 
Constitution.” Hence, s. 13 in this context, indicates responsibility without liability.370 Section 
6 (6) (c) undermines the constitutional duty that is owed to individuals with less means to 
protect their right to equality before the law. It also requires the duty bearer to fulfil their part 
of the duty owed. However, Okeke and Okeke371 posit that there are ways to ensure that duties 
and obligations are satisfied by exploiting the mandates of the 1999 constitution itself. For 
instance, the National Assembly is empowered to make laws to fortify the provision of Chapter 
II of the constitution through legislation.  
The authors argue that the authority of the 1999 constitution would be compromised if altered 
via legislation and suggest that the constitution itself should be amended to reflect the proposed 
intention. Furthermore, pending the adjustment of the Nigerian constitution, the authors 
recommend that the judiciary should bridge the gap through constitutional interpretation372 to 
reflect the intentions of the chapter and mandate rights such as legal aid in Nigerian courts. For 
instance, in the case of Ghana Lotto Operators Association v. National Lotteries Authority,373 
it was held that a presumption of justiciability within the Directive Principles of State Policy 
was indispensable to the enforcement of fundamental human rights; and, as such, all the 
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provisions in the constitution were justiciable because they represent the most important rules 
on political governance.  
Onyekachi 374 argues “that the provisions of Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution are enforceable 
under certain well-defined parameters”. The writer posits that, if a contravention of a provision 
under Chapter II results in an infringement of fundamental rights in Chapter IV, the former 
becomes indirectly justiciable. Consequently, the enforceability of the Chapter II may be 
subject to the guarantee and protection of inalienable rights contained within Chapter IV of the 
1999 constitution.375 For instance, the right to legal aid in Nigeria under Chapter IV is a 
fundamental right that cannot exist in a vacuum. Governments, non-government institutions 
and including private citizens are required to fully conform to the protections contained within 
Chapter II of the constitution. Thus, denying a disadvantaged individual legal aid by way of s. 
6 (6) (c) will be a violation of constitutionally protected fundamental rights. The infringement 
will also extend to the right to legal counsel contained within Article 7 (1) (c) of the African 
Charter.376 Section 6 (6) (c) limits the jurisdiction of the courts when questioning organs of 
government on matters of conformity. It also stands as a barrier to achieving the objective of 
Chapter IV if fulfilment of duty is questioned before the courts.  
In A.G. Ondo v. A.G Federation,377 it was argued that the provisions of Chapter II of the 1999 
Constitution are but non-justiciable declarations, due to the influence of Section 6 (6) of the 
same constitution. The Supreme Court held that the courts do not have the jurisdiction to 
enforce any of the provisions of Chapter II until the National Assembly enacts specific laws 
for their enforcement. However, the Supreme Court also stated that, despite the non-enforced 
status of the Objectives and Directive Principles, it would be a failure of organs of government 
if there were a clear disregard of their duties and responsibilities to uphold fundamental rights. 
The Federal High Court, in the case of Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company 
Nigeria Limited and Others,378 interpreted the right to life broadly under s. 33 of the 1999 
constitution to include the right to a clean and healthy environment. It was held that gas flaring 
in the course of oil extraction violates the right to life and a healthy environment, among other 
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fundamental rights, protected under Article 24 of the African Charter,379 which are applicable 
outside Section 6 (6) (c) of the Nigerian constitution. 
In some circumstances, the Directive Principles may be made justiciable based on the legal 
principle dependent on fundamental law. For instance, the court will have to determine the 
gravity of the dispute by finding sufficient connection between the contravened rights of the 
individual in question and the perpetrated action of the other party. The African Charter also 
plays a crucial role in the determination of enshrined rights, in addition to the need for redress. 
It was observed in the case of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Aneche & 3 ors380 that “[S]ection 
6 (6) (c) of the 1999 constitution is neither total nor sacrosanct as the subsection provides 
leeway by the use of the words ‘except as otherwise provided by this constitution’.” That is, 
the constitution has created an opportunity for an additional section to fully guarantee the 
justiciability of Chapter II. 
However, Dada381 contends that regardless of the limiting clause of s. 6 (6) (c), the fundamental 
rights guaranteed under Chapter IV derive their legitimacy from major international human 
rights instruments, and are libertarian in nature, because they relate to the sanctity of the 
individual rights. Thus, justiciability of fundamental rights can be acquired from superior 
international human rights instruments that have been ratified into the Nigerian constitution as 
a means of overriding national law that does not conform to its mandates; for instance, rights 
such as the right to legal aid as implied by Article 7 (1) (c)382 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter)383 are applicable and therefore enforceable by the 
national courts of Nigeria.384 
Olaiya385 contends that the 1999 Nigerian constitution serves as a system that connects the state 
to its citizens through its duty to protect and preserve their inalienable constitutional rights. On 
the other hand, Chapter II clarifies the judiciary as the duty bearer fundamental to the welfare 
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of the Nigerian people in terms of protecting legal rights via legal aid. Section 6 (6) (c) 
according to case law386 renders Chapter II un-justiciable. Thus, it is not absolute; but it may 
be subject to judicial interpretation in relation to the rights in question, the scope of authority 
and other superior legal frameworks such as the African Charter. This is in addition to the 
intention behind the 1999 constitution regarding the obligations of the judiciary and the 
protection of rights.  
 
3.8.7 Implications of Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009387 (under 
Chapter IV of the Constitution) and Access to Legal Aid 
On 9th December 2009, via the authority of s.46 (3) and with the aim of further strengthening 
s. 46 (1)388 of the 1999 Constitution,389 the Chief Justice390 enacted rules to advance the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of all Nigerian citizens. This was the second time the FREP 
Rules were introduced as a supplement to laws enforcing fundamental rights contained within 
the 1999 Nigerian constitution. Sanni391 asserts that its main objective was to rectify the 
shortcomings in implementation of the previous FREP Rules of 1979. The cost of litigation 
and the complex and time-consuming application process have been cited as two of the major 
challenges of the 1979 enforcement rules. All of these serve as a barrier to disadvantaged 
individuals who may require access to legal aid to protect their fundamental rights before the 
courts if they do not have the means to pay for a lawyer.  
The current 2009 FREP Rules are aimed at advancing a democratic system of government by 
prioritising and enforcing constitutionally protected fundamental rights.392 The 2009 Rules 
repealed their predecessors to minimise technicalities and prioritise equality and fairness in the 
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Nigerian judicial system, as well as accelerate the application process by reducing time-
consuming procedural and enforcement requirements. Hence, the new rules increased the scope 
of the human rights principles and instruments that a judge can utilise so to expand an 
applicant’s rights and freedoms.393 For instance, access to legal aid mandates, contained within 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,394 will be applicable and enforceable when 
initiating litigation concerning a breach or potential infringement of fundamental rights395 
protected by the ACHPR (Ratification and Enforcement) Act of 1990.396 As a consequence, 
Preamble 3 (a) prompts Nigerian courts to explicitly interpret and apply the directives of 
Chapter IV of the 1999 constitution and those of the African Charter to strengthen and 
accomplish the protections intended by them.397  
In addition, Preamble 3 (d) of the 2009 FREP Rules guarantees the enforcement of fundamental 
rights for all Nigerian citizens regardless of social status: “[t]he Court shall proactively pursue 
enhanced access to justice for all classes of litigants, especially the poor, the illiterate, the 
uninformed, the vulnerable, the incarcerated, and the unrepresented.” 
 
3.8.8 Fundamental Rights: Legal Aid and the Principle of locus standi 
The concept of locus standi, where an applicant must have sufficient interest in the matter 
before a standing to sue can be approved, was a significant barrier to the protection of 
fundamental rights in Nigeria and a matter of controversy in the pre-1999 Nigerian 
Constitutions. It also prohibits third party legal representation on matters of violation of 
fundamental rights. For instance, legal aid from a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
would be placed under scrutiny if locus standi was strictly interpreted. In Nkemdilim v. 
Madukolu,398 it was held that “litigants in a matter must show that they have interests on the 
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subject matter which forms the essential part of the litigation”. According to Ogowewo,399 the 
principle of standing was formulated in the case of Adesanya400 via the application of Justice 
Bello’s test.401 Also known as the ‘civil rights’ test, Justice Bello was of the view that s. 6 (6) 
(b) of the 1979 constitution402 laid down the standing requirement.  
In the case of Senator Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Others,403 
the Supreme Court held that: “[a] party invoking the powers of the court with respect to an 
unconstitutional statute, must show, not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury from its enforcement and not 
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with the public generally.”404 Thus, 
Justice Bello’s construction of the section became a constitutional standing requirement for all 
cases405 with no exemptions. The author criticised the test and argued that the section has no 
bearing on the standing to sue and termed it a “gigantic mistake” that would effectively exclude 
prospective litigants and Nigerian NGOs from initiating legal proceedings on behalf of 
litigants.406 
In Attorney General of Kaduna State v. Hassan,407 the court held that the concept of locus 
standi is “predicated on the assumption that no court is obliged to provide a remedy for a claim 
in which the applicant has a remote, hypothetical or no interest”. However, in this case the 
court determined that “[t]he relationship of father and son ought to be sufficient to give the 
father interest to see that justice is done in the trial”. A similar perception was affirmed in 
Bendel State v. Obayuwana,408 where it was held that “the Constitution has not prescribed any 
condition precedent to be complied with before a citizen institutes an action in court”. Hence, 
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Ayoola JSC diverged from Justice Bello’s test in First African Trust Bank v. Ezegbu,409 and 
asserted that s. 6 (6) (b) of the 1979 Constitution focuses on the scope of judiciary powers in 
Nigeria, and not on individual rights to sue.  
The justification of the principle of standing was to save time by avoiding frivolous litigation 
and protect the courts from abuse of its processes.410 However, a strict interpretation of locus 
standi will isolate disadvantaged individuals who are unable to single-handedly launch an 
action through the courts due to the complexities of the process. It would also hinder 
individuals who are unable to afford the services of a lawyer for litigation representation. The 
principle of standing presented a major setback to the aims and objectives of the constitution 
and the African Charter on the protection of rights. In NNPC v. Fawehinmi,411 Ayoola JSC 
revisited the test and insisted that: “Section 6 (6) (b) [...] is not intended as a catch-all, all-
purpose provision to be pressed into service for determin[ing] questions ranging from locus 
standi to the most uncontroversial questions of jurisdiction.”412 In Owodunni v. Registered 
Trustees of Celestial Church & Ors,413 Ogundare JSC affirmed Ayoola’s viewpoint.414 
Consequently, the locus standi principle was removed from the succeeding 1999 Constitution 
to enable the “delivery of justice to a greater majority of people as well as help develop the 
Nigerian Legal System”.415 
 
3.8.8.1 Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009: Nullification of locus 
standi 
Preamble 3 (e) of the current 2009 FREP Rules invalidates the concept of locus standi by 
encouraging third party litigation on behalf of applicants seeking to protect their fundamental 
rights: “[t]he Court shall encourage and welcome public interest litigations in the human rights 
field and no human rights case may be dismissed or struck out for want of locus standi. In 
particular, human rights activists, advocates, or groups as well as any non-governmental 
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organisations, may institute human rights applications on behalf of any potential applicant.” 
Paragraph 3 (g) also affirms that: “[h]uman rights suits shall be given priority in deserving 
cases. Where there is any question as to the liberty of the applicant or any person, the case shall 
be treated as an emergency.”416 Hence, Paragraph 3 (e) of the 2009 FREP Rules re-defines the 
significance of fundamental rights protection contained within the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. 
By recognising the need for certain individuals who require legal aid to commence an action 
through third parties, it also recognises the consequences to the concept of equal justice if 
individuals are restricted from doing so.  
 
3.8.9 Initiation of Legal Proceedings: FREP Rules 2009 and Legal Aid  
The specific route to request ‘leave’ from the court to institute an action417 was not detailed in 
the current 2009 FREP Rules. However, in the case of Tofi v. Uba,418 the court held that the 
enforcement of fundamental rights could be launched through various avenues, such as a writ 
of summons, application, petition, motion, and summons. This is in contrast to the previous 
1979 FREP Rules, where it was via a mandatory, intricate application process.419 It also 
simplified the originating process, and so litigants are able to commence action with or without 
the services of a lawyer with no risk of the application being rejected on the grounds of non-
compliance with the requirements of the originating process.420 In situations where legal 
representation has been obtained, non-complex rules under Order II will encourage individuals 
who require legal assistance as well as legal aid lawyers to take the first step towards securing 
their fundamental rights. Order II Rule 4421 gives leeway to applicants that are unable to swear 
to an affidavit by allowing a third-party representative, who has knowledge of the case, to 
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swear to an affidavit on their behalf. This could be an NGO representative, a private individual 
or a legal representative. 
Order III Rule 1 of the 2009 FREP Rules422 enhances access to justice by ensuring that 
applicants are able to secure their fundamental rights without being limited by any law or 
regulation. Thus, applicants can initiate an application at any time, regardless of when the 
violation occurred.423 Order IV Rule 1 recognises that some applications may need to be 
resolved to avoid additional hardship to the liberty of the applicant, and to this end requires 
that the application be heard within seven days from when it was filed.424 Reducing the 
timeframe from the filing of an application to obtaining a resolution will cut down costs and 
time for legal aid representatives. It will also ensure that disadvantaged applicants are not 
subject to further hardship that may arise due to a prolonged application process; for example, 
inability to access legal aid for long term representation may lead to continuous detention or 
the eventual abandonment of the case. 
In addition, Order XI reiterates the commitment of Nigerian courts to the enforcement of 
fundamental rights.425 Unlike in the previous 1979 FREP Rules, Order XII of the 2009 FREP 
Rules details the procedure to be adopted in human rights hearing cases. Applicants and legal 
representatives are given prior knowledge of what to expect during the proceedings. Order XIII 
Rule 1 protects the right to be heard in human rights matters by further restricting the scope of 
locus standi. It also grants the right to be heard to any individual, regardless of whether such 
individual has interest in the matter before the courts or not.426  
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The 2009 FREP Rules indicate Nigeria’s continued commitment to enforcing fundamental 
rights matters in Nigerian courts. However, Nwauche427 contends that there are still barriers 
within the current 1999 constitution regarding its authority on locus standi,428 which are still 
considered good law because they have not been reversed. There are also questions as to 
whether the 2009 Rules have the capacity to overturn decisions of the Nigerian courts, 
especially those of the Supreme Court. The author suggests the overturning of the Adesanya 
case to erase any doubts and clarify the objectives of the 2009 FREP Rules.429  
 
3.8.10 Independence of Courts: Role of the Judiciary and Access to legal Aid 
“If people cannot access the legal process, the courts, then they may as well not exist.” -
Andrew Caplen430  
The judiciary is a crucial component of the Nigerian legal system. The right to legal aid is 
deeply rooted and dependent on the competence of the judiciary. The courts play a major role 
in ensuring that legal aid provision is duly accessed by disadvantaged individuals faced with 
litigation. The primary aim of this provision is to provide avenues of justice to individuals that 
are before it. Through the courts, the judiciary are critical to the implementation of legal aid 
and its availability to the wider public. The scope and role of the judiciary is defined according 
to the authority that establishes its powers. In Nigeria, this is ultimately derived from the 
constitution.  
Based on the principle of equal justice, the independence of the courts is crucial to the 
implementation and sustainability of legal aid. Lwabukuma431 contends that strong legal 
institutions are created and sustained through limited arbitrary powers. Courts in Nigeria are a 
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constitutionally separate governmental entity. However, Davis432 posits that in Nigeria the 
judiciary is more than often seen as an institution that serves as an intimidating apparatus of 
the ruling class. As such, it is not perceived as haven for individuals of a lower social status. 
However, by virtue of the current 1999 constitution of Nigeria, the judiciary are given further 
powers to make rules and ensure that the fundamental human rights of Nigerian citizens are 
consistently protected via its mandates in the courts.433 
According to Rosenburg,434 the courts are a unique machinery of government, capable of 
producing significant political and social change through their organisation and mode of 
operation. In spite of their implicit influence on society, courts are seldom subject to empirical 
questions that clarify their role in effecting such change. This includes matters that could 
potentially reform and modify the judiciary and/or the constraints and barriers faced by courts 
in the process of change. 435 One such matter is whether an individual with limited means 
should be mandated by the courts to either seek or be presented with counsel via legal aid 
before commencement of a case. The author implies that the lack of empirical description on 
how courts can produce change could act as an impediment to its role and, as a consequence, 
as a potential obstacle to the execution of its duties. He argues that this is especially so in 
situations where the current structure of due process and court procedures are not sufficient to 
protect an individual faced with litigation.436 For example, the courts should ensure that the 
rights of disadvantaged individuals are protected in the initial stage of litigation and guarantee 
that procedures are modelled in such a way to limit complex processes to save time and money 
in cases that may require legal aid; however, this is not always achieved.  
The role of the court is linked to how much power it has at its disposal. If a court lacks power, 
its ability to make reform will be limited. For instance, if courts are able only to play a passive 
role in reform, by merely pointing out that the action before the court is contrary to the 
mandates of the constitution, the judiciary cannot directly effect change and must depend on 
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extraneous formal process. Consequently, change, in the form of the amendment of laws, may 
take time or not occur at all.  
However, the Nigerian judiciary has more power than this. Through the constitution, courts in 
Nigeria have the power to make laws and rules as necessary to ensure that there is peace, order, 
and effective governance of the State. Hence, the constitution directs the courts via the National 
Assembly to apply an informal process of amending legislation through judicial interpretation 
to reflect the ultimate purposes of the original law. Thus, the in-depth instructions contained 
within the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, and the sections 
on powers bestowed on the judiciary to legislate in the interest of good governance, allows for 
reform of the courts by the courts in Nigeria.  
 
3.8.11 Separation of Government Powers and Independence of the Judiciary 
With regard to the role of the previous Nigerian constitutions and the protection of individual 
rights via legal aid, the 1979 Constitution was deemed a more unique constitution compared to 
the previous two of 1960 and 1963.437 Also notable was the newly introduced division of the 
executive, legislature and the judiciary into separate organs of government, a feature that was 
retained in the subsequent 1989 and the current 1999 Nigerian constitution. It was a 
revolutionary innovation employed to define and clarify the significance of each organ of 
government as separate entities within the Nigerian system of government.438 Thus, an 
independent judiciary maintains autonomy and protects its citizens on matters relating to the 
law.  
Section 4 of the 1999 constitution dictates the scope of powers of the Legislative by virtue of 
the National Assembly. Section 4 (1) states that: “[t]he legislative powers of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the Federation which shall 
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” Subsequent sub-sections lay down the 
obligation of the National Assembly to make laws for peace, order and good government.439 
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Section 4 (5)440 affirms the superiority of laws promulgated by the National Assembly of 
Nigeria, as opposed to the House of Assembly of any state of the federation, while Section 4 
(7) declares: “[t]he House of Assembly of a State shall have power to make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of the State [...]”441  
Section 5 confirms the scope of powers and limitations of the executive in Nigeria, which is 
subject to the laws made by the National Assembly.442 Section 6 (1) asserts the capacity of the 
courts with respect to the laws made by the National Assembly of Nigeria: “[t]he judicial 
powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts 
established for the Federation.” Section 6 (2) establishes the jurisdiction of the state courts, 
giving them the power to adjudicate on any matter or dispute within their home jurisdictions. 
Section 6 (5) details the courts in Nigeria which are afforded constitutional authority.  
Accordingly, Section 6 (6) is a configuration of the scope of influence held by the courts. 
Section 6 (6) (b) “shall extend, to all matters between persons, or between government or 
authority and any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the 
determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.” By virtue 
of the current 1999 constitution of Nigeria and previous constitutions alike, the judiciary via 
the courts are able to make provision for disadvantaged individuals who require legal aid in 
order to ensure that the legislation in question is compatible with the constitution. The official 
separation of the three governmental powers that was instigated in the 1979 constitution was 
to ultimately allow each organ of government to maintain a counterbalance in their separate 
activities within Nigeria. In addition, a separation of powers will uphold the rule of law which 
is central to the protection and prioritisation of rights of vulnerable individuals and crucial to 
the principle of equality before the courts.443  
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For instance, in the case of Abiola v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,444 the Supreme Court held 
that the provision of s. 33 (1) of the 1979 constitution445 explicitly provides that the 
independence and impartiality of a court is a definitive trait of the right to a fair hearing and 
crucial to the concept of social justice. According to Edeko,446 the separation of the judiciary 
from the other arms of government was of high importance for the wider public to see that 
fundamental rights were being protected, upheld, and visibly acknowledged to have been 
executed accordingly. Hence, an authoritative judiciary serves as a paramount constituent to 
the provision of legal aid. It is a way of empowering judges to take a more unbiased, active 
role in the process of enabling access to legal aid in Nigerian courts. An independent judiciary 
embodies the rule of law and is essential for the protection of constitutionally procured 
fundamental rights and improving public confidence in the judiciary.  
Anyebe447 contends that, in Nigeria, “the concept of legal justice may, to a very great extent, 
depend on the calibre of the lawyer, whose services a litigant can afford to pay for […]” Thus, 
litigants that are unable to afford legal fees are at a disadvantage, and will feel less confident 
because of the general belief that justice will only be favourable to litigants of adequate 
financial means. Vanderbilt448 argues that the trust and faith of disadvantaged individuals in 
the judiciary is crucial to its reform: “it is in the courts and not in the legislature that our citizens 
primarily feel the keen, cutting edge of the law. If they lose their respect for the work of courts 
their respect for law and order will vanish […]” 
Clark449 posits that it is crucial that legislators take the initiative to acknowledge and make 
amends to court procedures, especially in cases that may require the courts to insist on free 
legal representation for disadvantaged individuals before the case commences. This is most 
especially the case in a situation where a judge is called upon to determine the constitutional 
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validity of a certain law.450 Section 17 (1) of the Objectives and Principles chapter of the 1999 
Nigerian constitution details the duties and responsibilities of Nigerian institutions by way of 
social objectives: “[t]he State social order is founded on ideals of Freedom, Equality and 
Justice.” Accordingly, Section 17 (2) gives more insight into how freedom, equality and justice 
are to be achieved. However, Section 17 (2) (e) highlights the importance of the independence 
of the courts in attaining social order: “the independence, impartiality and integrity of courts 
of law, and easy accessibility thereto shall be secured and maintained.” Subsequent 
constitutions up until the current 1999 Constitution of Nigeria have adopted this section to 
single out the role of each organ of government by entrusting each of them with constitutional 
responsibilities and obligations. The judiciary, being the arm of the Nigerian government that 
governs the right to legal aid, is required to uphold the principle of equal justice by 
acknowledging and resolving situations that lack equality of standing.  
In Nigeria, access to legal aid matters that are brought before the court may require judicial 
intervention to ensure a balance of equal standing is maintained. Section 46 (3) of the 1999 
constitution of Nigeria is clear and directs the Chief Justice to make rules with respect to the 
practice and procedure of the High Court without interference and to meet fundamental rights 
requirements accordingly. That is, all laws, policies and procedures must conform to the 
instructions of the constitution, which obliges the courts to provide the necessary resources to 
disadvantaged individuals who are unable to pay for the services of a lawyer to protect their 
rights. This section would be expected to be applicable to all legally recognised legal systems 
in Nigeria as legal aid is requisite to equal standing. As such, some sort of intervention is 
imperative in, for instance, customary courts by the overseers, to ensure that the intention of 
the Nigerian constitution is extended to all operational courts, more so, because such courts are 











Chapter 4: Nigerian Customary Court System in practice 
“The modern formal judiciary based on state laws fails to accommodate or take cognisance of 
the African understanding of justice, rights, morality and doctrine of equity based on African 
legal conception or African legal background.”451 
4.1 Introduction 
Access to judicial institutions via legal aid is a prerequisite to the fundamental right of fairness 
and equality. These basic components, which include the right to a fair trial, are intricately 
established in the Nigerian constitution and other ratified international human rights 
instruments (e.g., the African Charter). In addition to paramount human rights components 
such as fair trial is the right to legal aid: the entitlement to legal counsel paid for by the state. 
This is solely dependent on an individual’s fundamental right to access appropriate institutions 
and be heard before the court of law.452  
Woodman453 argues that an in-depth examination of justice requires exhaustive legal study; 
however, he also cautions that, by frequently evaluating certain portions of the laws of African 
countries, the current African legal literature restricts the examination of other pivotal aspects 
of justice, such as social justice and other concepts that encourage equal opportunities to the 
less privileged in society, especially in litigation matters.454 Rawls455 referred to this concept 
as “justice as fairness”, which is primarily concerned with “the basic structure of society”. This 
“basic structure” comprises of the social institutions of society that distribute the main benefits 
and burdens of social life and, as a consequence, have a lasting effect on the lives of its 
citizens.456 Thus, Okogbule457 posits that widening the scope of legal aid operations by 
increasing the category of potential beneficiaries will further enhance access to the scheme. 
This chapter and the next (Chapter 5) explore the inherent characteristics of Nigerian customary 
legal practices: their past, present, and future role in the daily activities of its many dependants. 
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It will also examine the scope of its jurisdiction in Nigerian national legal systems, as well as 
how colonialism impacted and shaped its directives. It considers the continuing role of 
customary law as a primary source of law, and its capacity in the promotion of human rights 
via the principle of fairness. This chapter will examine the deep-rooted principles of customary 
courts as a viable source of law within the Nigerian legal system and, most importantly, as an 
efficient tool capable of expanding the legal aid scheme. The chapters will also explore the 
potential benefits of expanding legal aid, particularly in the areas where customary legal 
practices and institutions are prevalent. The study will also consider aspects of customary legal 
processes that are deemed an impediment to the realisation of justice. Furthermore, it will 
acknowledge the operation of intrinsic traditional justice via customary courts in other post-
colonial African jurisdictions, such as Ghana, Somalia, Cameroon, Uganda, and South Africa. 
This chapter aims to appraise customary courts as an effective legal tool and potential avenue 
to expand the provision of legal aid in Nigeria, especially in the vast, rural areas of the country.  
The current English common law structure in force in Nigeria is derived from the national 
constitution, international/regional human rights mandates and other supplementary treaties, 
rules and guidelines. In facilitating equality before the courts, the Nigerian judiciary continue 
to face various social as well as legal impediments to the provision of legal aid for the 
disadvantaged.458 Adekoya459 cites barriers such as lengthy delays in the adjudication of 
disputes, high costs of litigation, limited to no access to counsel and distrust in the legal system. 
In addition, high levels of poverty, unequal income, cultural norms, and practices including 
lack of education and awareness have been proven to adversely affect access to judicial 
institutions.460  
There is a general accord in legal aid literature that the restrictions affecting the expansion of 
the scheme in Nigeria are predominantly tied to ineffective legislation with restrictive clauses, 
inadequate funding, and a lack of competent legal and pro-bono personnel who are willing to 
take on legal aid cases.461 However, there are many other unexplored factors that are equally 
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crucial to the efficient administration of the legal aid scheme but have not received adequate 
attention. One of these is access to informal and traditional mechanisms of justice that are easily 
accessible and have the potential to provide speedy, cheap, and meaningful remedies to the 
poor and disadvantaged.462 According to the 2016 Global Study on Legal Aid Report,463 the 
non-availability of courts in rural and remote areas is a major impediment to accessing legal 
aid provision, especially for women.  
Customary courts evolved from native courts. This legal system was well established and 
already in operation in Nigeria before the British colonial legal system was implemented.464 
According to Murphy,465 customary courts systems have been considered as one of the 
fundamental concepts of order by legal philosophers since the time of Plato. Murphy contends 
that Aristotle, for instance, held customary law to be superior to statutory (positive) law, 
because he believed that customary law was a manifestation of natural law (universally 
accepted moral principles) and was therefore enduring.466 Smith467 cites Roman jurists, the first 
professional legal specialists during the second half of the Roman Republic (509BC - 27BC), 
who asserted that law was established by custom as well as by legislation and treated the two 
sources of equal in authority. They also declared that written law may be overridden if it is 
contrary to an established custom or due to inactivity of such written law. However, this notion 
was later reversed after the close of the Middle Ages (14th-15th Century),468 and legislation was 
exalted above custom.469 Nonetheless Bennett470 contends that customary legal systems 
continue to serve the goal of human dignity effectively.  
Customary court systems are deeply rooted in the custom and traditional practices of 
indigenous peoples. According to Holden,471 custom is the unwritten law of native people. 
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Maluleke472 considers traditional practices a “reflection of the values and beliefs held by 
members of a community for periods often spanning generations”, some of which when 
translated in the courts are beneficial to many. However, other practices are to the detriment of 
certain groups, for example women.473 Ebo474 acknowledges the enduring nature of custom and 
views it as a “form of oral history which entails a re-collection of the past, a reflection of the 
present and a measure to determine the future”. Channock475 posits that although customary 
court systems are sometimes referred to as a modified colonial creation in its ‘new form’, there 
are some legal systems where inherent customs are recognised as the principal source of law 
in the absence of any written alternative (e.g., Somalia). Hence, customary norms have played 
a significant role in the formation of a majority of the world’s dominant legal traditions.476  
Woodman477 argues that, in addition to believing customary legal practices to be inferior to 
national legislation in countries with more than one legal system, scholars continue to pay more 
attention to statutory law and judicial decision-making. Yet, in many jurisdictions, and 
particularly among indigenous peoples,478 custom is authoritative479 and regarded as a crucial 
source of legal norms. However, as Smith notes,480 the data on legal procedure in the customary 
courts of Africa are inadequate, and the efforts of western trained lawyers to examine the role 
of law in customary courts in Nigerian society are also limited. Fenrich et al.481 posit that there 
is a notable lack of contemporary knowledge on the status and role of customary legal practices 
in Africa, and this is especially so regarding rural areas where there is a large concentration of 
individuals who are inherently bound by their culture and ethnic traditions. There is thus, a gap 
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in the literature on access to legal aid via alternative judicial institutions such as customary 
courts. 
 
4.2 The Nature of Customary Court Systems in Nigeria 
Before there was any written law in Nigeria, disputes were settled through indigenous 
traditional tribunals, which were based on the interpretation and application of regional 
customs and norms through the Chief of the community.482  
Customary legal practices are universal and are present in all legal systems. Generally 
unwritten and un-codified, these laws are passed from generation to generation as a guide for 
living together in harmony. It provides internal regulation for communities, clubs, associations, 
groups of farmers and other cooperative groups,483 and it forms the basis for a universally 
binding body of international laws.484 Its scope extends to contract and tort, and family, private 
and public law.485 It plays a crucial role in indigenous land right matters and continues to 
influence other areas of formal law such as criminal law. It also serves as a crucial legal tool 
for governing international relations around trading practices486 and networks. As such, 
customary legal systems are fundamental to the principles of the legal aid scheme.  
In Nigeria, subject to the nature of the offence, tribe or religious affiliations of the offender, 
cases can be heard in a customary trial court (for customary law offences), a Sha’ria court 
(crimes against Islam) or a state court (English common law offenses). Appeal cases are 
determined in their respective appeal courts, while Appellate court appeals are determined in 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria.487 Hence, customary legal norms have legal authority prior to 
their recognition in legislation and are enforced by state law on the basis that they already have 
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the quality of law. However, state law (English common law) reserves the right to override any 
customary norm that is deemed unlawful or above their jurisdiction.488 
According to Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann,489 the customary legal practices of 
some countries, such as the xeer in Somalia, the adat in Malaysia and those of other tribes in 
the north-eastern Indian states of Nagaland and Mizoram, are able to exist and function 
alongside their national legal governance.490 Chirayath et al.491 contend that there is a lack of 
conclusive research on how the legal systems in rural areas, which are predominantly 
customary and specific to sub-regional cultural contexts, are interpreted in practice from the 
oral record. This neglect of the importance of customary practices, which regulate the way of 
life for many people (most of whom are living under the poverty line), has further exacerbated 
the lack of access to remedies. The authors contend that many governments have tried to engage 
with customary systems to different extents and with various results.492 While many African 
countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Ghana have incorporated customary legal 
systems into their national constitutions, many are still working to complete this process due 
to the complexity of diverse customary practices.  
Osasona493 argues that the lack of a functioning justice system continues to strain access to 
judicial institutions in many African countries such as Nigeria. According to Odinkalu,494 many 
African countries are struggling to provide effective and affordable access to justice via the 
legal aid scheme, which is made difficult by incessant population growth. The author argues 
that individuals who are fortunate enough to have their case heard are faced with suspicion and 
distrust.495 The outcome of litigation could depend entirely on where the person lives, whom 
they know and how much they earn, due to the quality of the court which varies depending on 
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the location. The quality of the legal system determines how favourable and reliable the 
conclusion to the case will be, and thus whether justice will be achieved or not.496 
As a consequence, communities have been compelled to develop and rely on long-established 
judicial mechanisms, to which they are now accustomed. Such communities are outside the 
formal legal system due to the limited scope of the state across the country,497 and are therefore 
forced to engage in informal and other customary systems that generally act independently 
from the state’s foremost legal system. The general concern is that access to justice must extend 
beyond gaining access to formal and informal institutions and include access to institutions 
which ensure that justice is served498 and due process is followed meticulously.  
Another major and well documented problem faced by the legal aid scheme in Nigeria includes 
the difficulty of acquiring free legal counsel499 and the rarely expeditious accessibility to courts 
for appropriate remedies.500 The undeveloped state of public-interest litigation has also been 
cited as one of the reasons for the poorly functioning legal aid system in Nigeria.501 As such, it 
has become a matter of concern for scholars.502 Currently, the justice system in Nigeria is 
struggling to provide legal aid to needy individuals.503 However, Idem504 maintains that 
customary courts can share the burden because they have regulated the lives of a large 
proportion of the far-reaching townships and villages of Nigeria since before the advent of 
formal courts. They are regarded as the functioning forum in remote areas that are capable of 
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4.3 Historical Background of Customary Courts505 in Nigeria 
Customary courts have their origin in ‘native’ indigenous courts, and prior to the arrival of the 
British colonial legal system, native courts were the principal judicial system of resolve in all 
statutory matters. According to Ngwogugu,506 customary courts were managed by untrained 
and illiterate members who were familiar with the local customs. They were selected from their 
communities and they applied a simplified mode of operation. Ajayi507 posits that the clerks to 
the native courts were persons who had acquired varying standards of literacy as court records 
were kept in English. Alongside its judicial arbitration function, customary courts also served 
as an executive as well as a legislative instrument of authority, for example in regulating local 
markets, maintenance of provincial roads508 and land acquisition transactions. 
In the Western part of Nigeria, before colonial control was effectively in place, the Supreme 
Court of Lagos had been established in 1876 as a Superior Court of Records by virtue of the 
Supreme Court of Ordinance No. 4 of 1876. All jurisdictions and powers were vested in Her 
Majesty’s High Court of Justice, in accordance with the common law doctrine in force in 
England.509 Before this time, the Supreme Court of Ordinance No. 11 of 1863, the colony of 
Lagos510 and its protectorates were authorised to operate their own native laws and customs in 
native matters through traditional rulers, provided it was not in conflict with the colonial legal 
system. Subsequent Supreme Court Ordinances maintained this position to ensure that the 
“customs and the laws of the class or tribe or nation” were held in high regard.511  
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When in operation, the right to sit at court was also subject to recognition by the protectorate 
government.512 There was also a directive requesting that matters involving non-native disputes 
were to be referred to the Governor.513 From 1898, the government of the Niger Coast 
Protectorate, with the agreement of local communities, began the creation of native courts, 
establishing them administratively with no statutory basis.514 Consequently, customary  courts 
were placed within a statutory ambit to encourage transparency and ensure activities within the 
courts were properly monitored, as well as curb distinct injustices that occurred within their 
area of authority.515 In 1900, the Crown revoked the powers and authority of the Royal Niger 
Company516 and, by virtue of the Native Courts Proclamation No. 9 of 1900, established native 
courts in the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In addition, the Native Courts Proclamation No. 
5 of 1900 introduced the first statutory native courts and the eventual administrative unit of 
Northern Nigeria.517  
According to Smith,518 the 1900 proclamation created a balance of power between the local 
rulers and the British rulers as various tribunals, and their scope of authority were being 
established. It also enabled the government representative (the Resident) of each province to 
issue warrants establishing native courts consisting of at least four persons after consultation 
and the consent of the local chiefs or Emirs of each province, subject to the approval of the 
High Commissioner. The leaders objected to the four-member court, as it was not consistent 
with the customary constitution of Islamic courts, which were traditionally managed by single 
judges.519 As a result, the subsequent Native Courts Proclamation No. 11 of 1904 (Northern 
Nigeria) amended the 1900 rule, and allowed courts comprising of only one member, so to 
incorporate the tradition of single judges in Islamic courts.520 
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The Native Courts Proclamation No. 25 of 1901 was enacted to replace that of 1900 to regulate 
the native court system. The 1901 proclamation granted civil and criminal jurisdiction to the 
established statutory native courts,521 as long as they were not repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience.522 In 1906, the 1900 Proclamation was repealed and re-enacted by 
the Native Courts Proclamation No. 1 of 1906.523 In 1906, the Native Courts Proclamation No. 
7 commenced a de-centralisation of the native court system throughout Nigeria, and established 
sub-divisions of minor courts and native courts on a statutory basis.  
With provisions similar to the Native Courts Proclamation No. 25 of 1901, both courts were 
accorded with specific commissions including the authority to preside over both civil and 
criminal cases between natives and non-natives.524 However, minor courts, also known as the 
native councils, had limited jurisdictional authority compared to native courts. 525  
The 1906 proclamation increased the jurisdiction of indigenous courts in Nigeria and 
established the basic legislative pattern for subsequent developments in the native court system 
up until 1933. Hence, four types of native courts were recognised: namely, the 
(1) Emir's courts, to be known as judicial councils;  
(2) Alkali's courts, consisting of single Moslem judges, sitting with or without other persons 
acting as judges or mere assessors;  
(3) Chief's courts (in non-Moslem areas), to be known as judicial councils; and  
(4) Multi-member courts, of the type provided for in the 1900 legislation. 526  
Court members were to be appointed by Residents with the approval of the Governor. 
However, in Moslem areas, consultation with the local Emir was necessary before 
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appointments were made. The Resident held pre-eminent authority to, either on their own 
initiative or on the application of the aggrieved party,  
(a) Suspend, reduce or otherwise modify any sentence or decision of a native court;  
(b) Order a re-hearing before a native court; or  
(c) Transfer any cause or matter, either before trial or at any stage of the proceedings, to the 
Provincial Court as well as the capacity to appoint a specific native court as a court of appeal.527 
The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern part of Nigeria in 1914, according to 
Afigbo,528 was to ensure that the British and native administration formed one accord on local 
government policy matters. Thus, under the leadership of Lord Lugard as the Governor General 
and the adoption of the indirect rule mandate, three courts emerged:  
(1) The Supreme Courts,  
(2) Provincial Courts, and  
(3) Ordinances of the Native Courts introduced to legitimise the application of English law in 
Nigeria.529  
In recognition of the indigenous laws of the land and their role in maintaining law and order 
among the natives, Lord Lugard emphasised as a matter of British policy in dealing with the 
natives that: “institutions and methods, in order to command success and promote the happiness 
and welfare of the people, must be deep rooted in their tradition and prejudice.”530 The 
statement by Lord Lugard established customary law as an operational system of law in 
Nigeria.531 However, according to Uwakah, 532at the time of amalgamation Nigerian 
communities shared little in common with one another. The diversity caused further 
complexities in the new legal system due to the varied local customs in each province.  
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The Supreme Court Ordinance No. 6 of 1914533 allowed for the operation of customary law in 
conjunction with the repugnancy clause. Native Courts Ordinance No. 8 of 1914 saw the 
competent judicial system already in force in Northern Nigeria applied to the rest of the 
protectorate.534 The Native Court Ordinance No. 14 of 1916 revised the 1914 Ordinance 
(Northern Nigeria) and was also made applicable in all Nigeria native courts.535 Consequently, 
the Native Court Ordinance of 1916 graded native courts into four categories (A, B, C and D) 
and allocated different civil and criminal jurisdictions concerning natives between them.536 The 
Native Court Ordinance No. 5 of 1918 established native courts in the protectorates by 
warrant537 via a Resident who had complete control over the operation of the courts. According 
to Betram,538 native courts were established in a systematic manner, each with extensive 
powers. However, Tibenderana539 argues that, despite the statutory recognition of customary 
law and practices by English common law, the Native Court Ordinance of 1916 indirectly gave 
the British the power to make administrative decisions through the native leaders.  
In 1933, a review of the Nigeria native court system in practice was undertaken.540 The 
resulting Protectorate Courts Ordinance No. 45 1933541 was the first legislative measure 
reserving original civil jurisdiction for the statutory native courts in Nigeria. 542 It stated that 
the High Court was not to exercise original jurisdiction in cases relating to title or land which 
were subject to the jurisdiction of a native court, except where the Governor in Council directed 
otherwise or where the case was transferred from a native court under the provisions of the 
Native Courts Ordinance No. 44 1933.543 Hence, customary legal matters were to be dealt with 
in traditional courts where members of such courts were well versed in customary law. In 
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addition, the Supreme Court Ordinance No. 23 of 1943 expanded the scope of jurisdiction of 
native courts.544 
Statutory instruments, such as the Native Courts Ordinance (cap. 142) and the Native Courts 
(Colony) Ordinance (cap. 143)545 1948,546 were empowered to administer the native law and 
custom in their respective jurisdictions as long as it was “not repugnant to natural justice or 
morality or inconsistent with any provisions of any Ordinances”, as well as to enforce such 
provisions of the Ordinances.547 However, in 1948 the Brooke Commission of Enquiry was 
appointed for the Northern, Eastern and Western Provinces of colonial Nigeria, to review the 
operation and jurisdiction of the native court system.548  
In 1954, Nigeria became a Federation and was divided into three regions (Eastern, Western 
and Northern) and a Federal Territory (Lagos).549 Subsequently, the two aforementioned Native 
Courts Ordinances550 were both amended several times before they were finally repealed and 
replaced by the Customary Courts Law in 1957, after regional self-government was 
established.551 Thereafter, the Eastern and Western Regions adopted the new title “Customary 
Court”, while the Northern Region continued use of the old title of “Native Court”.552 In the 
Northern region, the Moslem Court of Appeal established in 1956 was replaced by the Sharia 
Court of Appeal in 1960; and, in 1959, the criminal jurisdiction of Native Courts was 
repealed.553 
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With the creation of the Mid-Western Region in 1963, the Customary Courts Law of 1957 was 
applied.554 However, during the Nigeria military regime, which started in early 1966, 
customary courts in some parts of the country were reviewed and re-structured.555 In Eastern 
Nigeria, the Customary Courts Edict 1966 revoked the Customary Courts (Jurisdiction) Order 
1964. It also abolished the County Courts, revoked their warrants, and transferred all 
jurisdictional matters to the Ministry of Justice. 556 In addition, the Customary Courts (No. 2) 
Edict 1966 repealed the Customary Courts Law of 1957 and empowered the Military Governor 
to establish by warrant, customary courts of first instance, known as District Courts, and 
Customary Courts of Appeal.557 Correspondingly, the Area Courts Edict 1967 replaced the 
native court system in new states created from the former Northern Region. Hence, Section 16 
(1) of the Magistrates Court (Amendment) Edit 1971, the Customary Courts (No. 2) Edict 1966 
and all subsidiary legislation in the East Central State were repealed and jurisdiction transferred 
to the Magistrates’ Court and the High Court.558 Nwogugu559 argues that the 1971 legislation 
was enacted to end the creation of customary courts in Nigeria, the appointment of personnel 
in the East Central State and establish a new system of justice. However, it did not diminish 
the utilisation of customary courts by natives. Smith560 posits that, regardless of the proposed 
changes to the customary legal system, the operation of customary courts and the nature of 
customary law may be crucial to the modernisation and urbanisation process in Nigeria.  
 
4.4 Colonial Legal Authority and Nigerian Customary Legal Systems 
“Immediately white men came, justice vanished.” 561 
This section examines the extent of statutory limitation on the application of customary law in 
British colonies.  Including the elements that have shaped the operation of customary courts in 
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present day Nigeria: for instance, the conditions that must be fulfilled to gain judicial 
recognition of customary rulings before they are accepted, observed and enforced by state 
courts. Such requirements are still in force in many present-day post-colonial countries as the 
basis of equity and justice.  
 
4.4.1 Repugnancy Test: Nigeria 
The introduction of the English legal system into the Nigerian judiciary over a hundred years 
ago562 partly preserved customary courts, as their functions within their communities were 
compared to those of the justices of the peace in England.563 The system was part of the British 
colonial Indirect Rule mandate, which allowed the natives to remain within the jurisdiction of 
their own rules of custom,564 as long as their customs were subjected to and passed the 
repugnancy test which served as a statutory limitation on the application of customary law. 
According to Kent,565 repugnancy clauses were colonial legal devices that were exploited to 
overrule customary law based on ‘natural justice’. Thus, Section 19 of the Supreme Court 
Ordinance of 1876 provides that: “[n]othing in this ordinance shall deprive the Supreme Court 
of the right to observe and enforce the observance, or shall deprive any person of the benefit 
of any law or custom existing in the said colony and territories subject to its jurisdiction, such 
Law or Custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor 
incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any enactment of the Colonial 
Legislature.”566  
The repugnancy doctrine in Nigeria emerged from the decision in the case of Eshugbayi Eleko 
v. Officer Administrating the Government of Nigeria.567 Lord Atkin argued that the courts are 
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bound with the responsibility to define repugnancy as well as determine what custom is deemed 
applicable to the test. He also stated that “the court cannot itself transform a barbarous custom 
into a milder one. If it stands in its barbarous character, it must be rejected as repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience.” However, the principle of the repugnancy test 
was clarified and justified in the post-colonial case of Okonkwo v. Okagbue,568 where Uwais 
JSC declared that “the Repugnancy Doctrine is equivalent to the meaning of natural justice and 
embraces almost all, if not all, the concept of good conscience”.  
The semi-unified court system in Colonial British West Africa contrasted with the systems of 
other colonialists, such as the Spanish, French, and Portuguese, that gave primacy to the 
metropolitan law of the colonials over the indigenous customary system of their colonies.569 
The British colonialists operated a bifurcated system where customary courts, presided over by 
chiefs, exercised jurisdiction over natives according to customary law. Thus, metropolitan-
style courts handled disputes involving white Europeans according to metropolitan law.570 For 
most of the colonial period, there was little integration between the two systems.  
In the British colonies, appeals from the native courts were usually heard in tribunals presided 
over by colonial commissioners.571 The natives were, however, subject to customary legal 
practices on personal matters concerning marriage, succession, inheritance, testamentary 
dispositions and land tenure.572 The jurisdiction of customary law also included chieftaincy and 
other traditional matters.573 Hence, criminal law and adjudication were removed from the 
domain of customary law, to be dealt with by the colonial administration directly. In British 
West Africa, the customary or native courts were vertically integrated in the overall court 
system,574 comprising of the Magistrate Courts and a High or Supreme Court. This gave rise to 
 
568(1994) 12 SCNJ 89.  
569Ferreira, E. (1974) ‘Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: The End of an Era. The Effects of Portuguese 
Colonialism on Education, Science, Culture and Information.’ Paris, UNESCO. 
570Benton, L. A. (2002) ‘Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900.’ Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
571Elias, T.O. (1965) ‘The Evolution of Law and Government in Modern Africa.’ In H. Kuper and L. Kuper, (eds.) 
‘African Law’ pp. 184-195. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
572Ibid. 
573See Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria (1931) AC 662. 
574Elias, Taslim Olawale (1962) ‘British Colonial Law: A Comparative Study of the Interaction Between English 




dualist legal systems within the Nigeria and according Uweru575 led to conflict which arose 
from the application of the rules of equity.  
At the time of colonial rule, all appeals from the Supreme Court (SC) were heard by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council which sat in England. However, for a limited period, the West 
African Court of Appeal (WACA) lay between the SC and the Privy Council meaning that 
appeals from the SC went to WACA, and then appeals from WACA to the Privy Council.576 
The scope of customary courts was far-reaching and flexible during the colonial era of British 
West Africa. Litigants were not subject to English common law if both parties were African, 
and the subject matter was not answerable to state common law. If one of the litigants was 
African, customary law would still apply if it were considered unjust to apply English law.577  
However, Okereafoezeke578 criticised the test and stated that it served as an impediment to the 
people’s responsibility in conducting changes in customary law by giving the court power over 
it. The author declares that it is important to allow the development of customary norms by the 
ethnic group that identify with it: “ideally, therefore, a people's law should emanate from a 
broad spectrum of the people, rather than from a few. This is the distinction between customary 
law imposed from the top and that developed from popular practices. Laws that are imposed 
by a few cannot become an acceptable means of social control[.]” Hence, a change of the 
repugnancy test justice policy would avoid official imposition of "customary law" and set the 
pace for the needed changes to justice systems in Nigeria.579 Uweru580 contends that there is no 
known repugnancy case that has been decided on the basis of conflict with any other law, and 
so are rather based on the universal standard of morality on what is ‘good, just and fair.’ 
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However, Olawale581 argues that the repugnancy test was not any way a malicious strategy to 
undermine or to judge the validity of local law and custom by the standards of Western thoughts 
or Christian ethics, but by the standards of decency and humanity considered appropriate to the 
situation in question. The case of Dawodu v. Danmole582 further highlights Olawale’s position 
on the main objective of the test, which is to administer justice on matters that are governed by 
customs that are deemed archaic and unjust. For instance, on the matter of inheritance in a 
polygamous relationship in the case of Dawodu, the Privy Council upheld a Yoruba custom of 
inheritance based on the Idi-Igi system where the estate is divided in equal shares among the 
number of wives, with each child then taking an equal share of the portion allotted to their 
mother’s branch of the family. This system was contrary to the British principle of equal 
division to all children; however, the Privy Council accepted the custom with respect to its 
applicability in Nigeria. “The principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience 
applicable in a country where polygamy is generally accepted should not be readily equated 
with those applicable to a community governed by the rule of monogamy.”583 
Furthermore, Igwe584 contends that despite the criticism against the introduction and use of the 
Repugnancy doctrine in the Nigerian legal system, the doctrine has had a lasting effect and 
impact on the development of customary law by the elimination of some inherently unjust, 
inhuman, and barbarous practices. However, the author believes the clause has also contributed 
to the disposal of some unjust customary laws. In all, the repugnancy clause has helped develop 
and modernise customary legal practices in Nigeria.585 This stance was acknowledged in the 
case of Awo v. Cookey Gam,586 where the court held that “the principles of native law relied 
upon by the Plaintiffs were developed in and are applicable to a state of society vastly different 
from that now existing.” 
Hence, in the case of Agbai v. Okogbue,587 Justice Nwokedi in his judgement stated that the 
courts could contribute to the process of developing customary legal systems to fit the changing 
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times through the application of the test, because the courts have to consider its application 
under existing social environment: “customary laws are formulated from time immemorial. As 
our society advances, they are more removed from its pristine social ecology. They meet 
situations which were inconceivable at the time they took root. The doctrine of repugnancy in 
my view affords the courts the opportunity for fine-tuning customary laws to meet changed 
social conditions where necessary, more especially as there is no forum for repealing or 
amending customary laws[.]”588 
The Islamic case of Guri v. Hadejia N/A589 upholds the objective of the repugnancy test and 
the importance of the right to legal representation and a fair hearing over customs derived from 
religion, deemed incompatible to natural justice, equity, and good conscience. Thus, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a principle of Islamic Law which denied an individual accused of 
robbery the right to a fair hearing, claiming there were eyewitnesses to the incident. Most 
African countries repealed the repugnancy provisos when they obtained independence (e.g., 
South Africa);590 however, the repugnancy clause continues to be the milestone used to 
determine a legally acceptable custom in Nigeria. Thus, Section 18 (3) Evidence Act 2011 
states: “[i]n any judicial proceeding where any custom is relied upon, it shall not be enforced 
if it is contrary to public policy or is not in accordance with natural justice, equity and good 
conscience.”591 
 
4.4.2 A Question of Law or Fact? Gold Coast (Ghana) 
The Gold Coast (Ghana) before independence was faced with a major drawback when their 
native customary law was subverted in favour of the new colonial English law. According to 
Korang,592  customary law of West African countries was considered foreign when compared 
to the adopted English common law and its validity had to be proved before it could be accepted 
as a rule of law. Thus, an English judge of the Gold Coast, Smith J, held in Hughes v. Davies 
and Another593 that “[a]s native law is foreign law it must be proved as any other fact.” In 
 
588Ibid. 
589(1959) 4 FSC 44. 
590Taiwo E A. (2009) ‘Repugnancy Clause and its Impact on Customary Law: Comparing the South African and 
Nigerian Positions: Some Lessons for Nigeria.’ Journal for Juridical Science Vol. 34(1) pp. 89-115. 
591Section 18(3) Evidence Act 2011.   
592Korang Daniel (2015) ‘Ascertainment of Customary Law: A Question of Law or of Fact or Both?’ Journal of 
Law, Policy and Globalization Vol. 38, pp. 93-95. 




addition, the Privy Council set out the principle by which customary law would be established 
in Angu v. Attah,594 where the Privy Council stated that: “as is the case with all customary law, 
it has to be proved in the first instance by calling witnesses acquainted with the native customs 
until the particular customs have, by frequent proof in the courts become so notorious that the 
courts take judicial notice of them.” This would imply that if the members of the native court 
were themselves possessed of expert knowledge of the custom, no proof is needed.595 African 
jurists and nationalists such as Dr Nkrumah deemed the judgement too imperious and a 
“travesty of the local custom,” which had been made foreign in its own land of origin and 
advocated for a reversal of such scrutiny.  
However, Nii-Aponsah596 contends that the Angu v. Attah rule was necessary to balance the 
“vast variations in local and tribal customs” that existed at the time in Ghana. The author argues 
that the rule was intended to clarify the process to ensure the validity of the customary law, not 
undermine it, citing that the procedure for identifying native law should be the same as that 
concerning adopted laws that originated from foreign lands. Korang597 justifies the rule and 
argues that it was an earnest proposal by the colonialists to prove the existence of customary 
law for the benefit of sustaining it as a legitimate source of law. He further contends that the 
colonialists were fair and just in treating customary law as a question of fact, and not a question 
of law, because customary practices in Ghana differ from one community to another.  
The author further posits that it was a safety device to ensure that customary legal practices 
emanating from diverse communities were protected and maintained in the utmost interest of 
justice,598 as well as to ensure that customary courts continue to maintain relevance in any 
contemporary legal system. However, this rule was eventually abolished, and the Courts Act 
1960599 equipped the court with the discretion to consult recognised textbooks, refer to reported 
cases or to order the holding of an inquiry if it entertained any doubt as to the content or 
existence of any rule of customary law.600 Thus, s. 55 (1) of Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) states 
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that: “[a]ny question as to existence or content of a rule of customary law is a question of law 
for the court and not a question of fact.” 
In addition, the 1975 Evidence Act601 provides that all questions of law are to be decided by 
the court to ascertain the essence of customary law in relation to the existence of variations in 
local custom. Hence, s. 55 (2)602 states that: “[i]f there is doubt as to the existence or content 
of a rule of customary law relevant in any proceedings before a court, the court may adjourn 
the proceedings to enable an inquiry to be made under subsection (3) of this section after the 
court has considered submissions made by or on behalf of the parties and after the court has 
considered reported cases, textbooks and other sources that may be appropriate to the 
proceedings.”  
To further support customary court practices in Ghana, s. 55 (4) declares: “[t]he court may 
request a House of Chiefs, Divisional or Traditional Council or other body with knowledge of 
the customary law in question to state its opinion which may be laid before the inquiry in 
written form.” Korang603 argues that s. 55 (2) and s. 55 (4) of the Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) 
were put in place to fill potential gaps that may occur in the process of litigation, and that, even 
in modern times, there is still a great measure of uncertainty in the contents of native customary 
law. Therefore, the confirmation of a custom from any verifiable source that may give 
discretion to the courts to ascertain the fact of the alleged customary practice is not certain.604 
Hence, this dual system attempts to verify the existence of such customs.  
The case of Fulani and Another v. Issah605 reiterates the conflict that may arise when 
ascertaining the validity of a specific custom before the courts, and the courts’ obligation to 
scrutinise and verify the customary law in question. The case was regarding the determination 
of the true father of a child born out of wedlock according to Fulani customary law. The court 
allowed an appeal and held that: “in the proceedings such as there were before the trial court, 
it was for the court to determine the existence or otherwise of a particular customary law, 
namely, Fulani customary law or the content of a rule of such customary law, after having 
heard the parties, consulted text-books and other sources as the magistrate may consider 
 
601Section 1(1) Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323). 
602 Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459). 
603Korang Daniel (2015) ‘Ascertainment of Customary Law: A Question of Law or of Fact or Both?’ Journal of 
Law, Policy and Globalization Vol.38, pp. 93-95. 
604Ibid. 




appropriate; and it is only when the court is still in doubt after such exercise that he may hold 
an inquiry and perhaps seek the assistance of an expert on that particular system of customary 
law.” Hence, advocates of the repugnancy test believe it is imperative in the interest of justice 
that the applicable customary law is fair and just. 
 
4.4.3 Repugnancy and Incompatibility Tests: Anglophone Cameroon  
Before colonisation, the application of customary laws by customary courts in Cameroon was 
under the supervision of traditional leaders. After the defeat of Germany in World War I (which 
occupied Cameroon in 1884), French civil law and English common law were imported into 
the country. The French occupied the former Northern Cameroon (now Francophone 
Cameroon), while the British governed Southern Cameroon (now Anglophone Cameroon).606  
In Anglophone Cameroon, one of the most influential and authoritative pieces of legislation 
enacted by the British was the Southern Cameroon High Court Law (SCHL) of 1955. The 
legislation establishes the competence of the High Court and legitimises the reception and 
continuous application of adopted English laws, practices and procedures in the territory.607 
Yet, Section 27 (1) of the SCHL also expressly stipulates the recognition and enforcement of 
customary law in Anglophone Cameroon, though not in totality: “[t]he High Court shall 
observe and enforce the observance of every native law and custom which is not repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor incompatible with any law for the time being 
in force, and nothing in this law shall deprive any person of the benefit of any such native law 
or custom.”608  
In addition, under Decree No. 77/245 of 15 July 1977,609 traditional chiefs are empowered, 
where laws and regulations do not provide otherwise, to settle disputes using customary law. 
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Kiye610 states that, similarly to Nigeria and Ghana, and prior to their recognition by English 
common law, customary norms in Cameroon were also required to undertake duality tests: 
namely, the repugnancy and incompatibility tests. The author further contends that, despite the 
colonial origins of the legislation, its impact is still felt within the administration of justice in 
contemporary Cameroon, as the duality tests have created uncertainty and restricted the scope 
of customary law. Since 1960, several post-independence legislative actions in support of 
customary law have been enacted; but this support is only by implication. For instance, Article 
2 Paragraph 2 of the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon611 provides that the State: “shall recognize 
and protect traditional values that conform to democratic principles, human rights and the law.” 
The author argues that the provisions are vague because they do not state the measures that 
have been adopted or are to be adopted to protect these “traditional values” and deems it a 
replication of section 27 (1) of the SCHL of 1955 which provides no clear standards regarding 
the repugnancy test, causing uncertainty in the application of customary law by statutory 
courts.612  
According to Asiedu-Akrofi,613 the application and enforcement of the repugnancy clause in 
Cameroon is a matter only considered and determined by state courts. Thus, the repugnancy 
clause is not only applicable in accordance to natural justice, equity and good conscience, but 
also to court procedure and the degree of punishment imposed. Over time certain customary 
practices (e.g., burial practices and the performance of certain ritual rites) have been eradicated 
as a consequence of the application of this clause by state courts.614 However, this has led to a 
struggle for supremacy between divergent legal systems.615 For instance, Article 3 of the 
Judicial Organisation Ordinance, 2006,616 implicitly recognises “Customary Law Courts” as 
part of the Cameroonian judicial system. However, if there is a conflict between written law 
and custom, written law prevails;617 making its application very limited and uncertain. 
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Kiye618 asserts that the reforms adopted to accommodate customary legal practices have 
resulted in a ‘legal hybrid’ institution, consisting of one court structure in which more than one 
legal system co-exists and operates. Consequently, the amendment led to conflicts in the 
interpretation and application of the enacted national laws. It also became a challenging task to 
unify all applicable legal systems in Cameroon. Fombad619 contends that the many of the 
impediments to the harmonisation of the legal systems in Cameroon are due to differences in 
legal culture and tradition, including the foreign law imposed by the European colonialists. In 
contrast to the plausible reasoning of the repugnancy test in post-colonial countries, Hannum620 
believes that the African standard of accepted behaviour corresponded with the rights asserted 
by the West. Nhlapo621 posits that in some cases the standard of behaviour exceeded what was 
sufficiently acceptable by the West. For instance, the right to life mandate prohibiting killing 
as punishment in Africa was deemed wider in scope when compared to the West.622  
 
4.5 Divergence in Customary Legal Practices  
 Customary legal systems under colonialism were regarded as inferior and allowed only 
minimal operation alongside English law within native jurisdictions. In addition, this tolerance 
was on the condition that customary laws were “not repugnant to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience, and not inconsistent with the written colonial law”.623 As such, many post-
colonial legal systems face discrepancies when customary legal practices are considered 
contradictory to the national law in force. This disparity could serve as a barrier to the legal aid 
scheme within the customary court setting due to the uncertainty of the applicable law. 
Kiye624 explains the complexity of limitation clauses on customary legal practices. For 
instance, the repugnancy test has created a divergence in the rules of customary law in many 
legal systems. The author contends that the divergence is a consequence of the process of 
administering customary law through the duality tests. Hence, two versions of customary law 
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have evolved over the years: the lawyer’s customary law and the sociologist’s customary law. 
The author argues that, when a custom is declared repugnant and in conflict with the common 
law in force by the courts, the declaration only prevents its acceptance in the state legal 
system,625 and thus only before the state court. However, in most cases, the rule continues to 
be applicable under customary law within certain districts and may not extend to other regions. 
Even though it is not considered valid by state law, it is regarded as such by the people. 
Consequently, there is a fragmentation of the legal process and a conflict in customary rules.  
Woodman626 has carried out extensive research regarding the conflict that may occur in 
societies that run a dual legal system and argues that divergence occurs during the process of 
the establishment of customary law before the court. This is because the rules recognised by 
the court as customary law (lawyer’s customary law) do not necessarily correspond to socially 
accepted norms in society (sociologist’s customary law). The author explains further that 
divergence may also occur from mistaken findings on the content of sociologists’ customary 
law.627 When this happens, courts would sometimes have to make judgements on the content 
of customary law. Woodman asserts that there have been instances where controversial points 
of law were settled by referring to one or a few decided cases based on weak evidence, and, 
because previous judgments are considered to have binding authority, courts might disregard 
local variations in customary practice. Once a rule has been judicially recognised, it becomes 
applicable to all other ethnic groups regardless of their inherent individual customs.628  
Thus, traditional societies argue that the customary values enforced by customary courts 
embody the views and ethos of the local communities, whereas those enforced by state courts 
have undergone substantive transformation and, in most cases, are unable to correspond with 
the social practices within those communities. Woodman further declares that divergence is 
unavoidable because state law has the discretion to reject or enforce a custom but cannot 
modify an out-dated custom and apply the modified version in the real sense. In reality, the 
rejection of customary law by state courts will only be applicable to the litigants and will have 
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no bearing on its practice in communities629 where people believe they are obliged by tradition 
to observe their customs.  
Kiye630 contends that post-colonial Cameroon, for instance, is eager to reinstate the integrity 
of customary legal practices and has made efforts to eradicate archaic practices that contravene 
human rights and gender equality via legislation. For instance, in Elive Njie Francis v. Hannah 
Efeti Mangah,631 it was ruled that a female widow should inherit the property of her deceased 
husband, being his next of kin, despite the prevailing customary practice which refuses this 
right to women. This ruling was made on the grounds of the provisions of the 1996 Constitution 
of the Republic of Cameroon,632 and s. 77 (2) of the Civil Status Ordinance of 1981 (as 
subsequently amended), which provides for the right to women to inherit property.  
However, the use of legislation has failed to totally reform such discriminatory customary 
values in Cameroon. This is due to weak enforcement mechanisms and the consequent 
continued utilisation of discriminatory practices that have been declared unlawful by the 
state.633  
In Nigeria, the customary law on matters of inheritance and succession, especially among the 
Yoruba and Igbo people, is prejudicial and generally favours men over women in practice. As 
such, it is considered unfair and repugnant to state law. Oni634 believes that inconsistent 
judgements are due to the difference in the line of descent that governs inheritance rights in the 
various regions of Nigeria, as well as the irreconciled and unreformed customary and English 
common law systems that operate in Nigeria. The divergence was apparent in Mojekwu v. 
Mojekwu,635 where an intestate died without son, brother, or a father, but was survived by two 
females. His male nephews claimed entitlement to his estate in accordance with the Iri Ekpe 
 
629Ibid. 
630Kiye Mikano Emmanuel (2015) ‘Conflict between Customary Law and Human Rights in Cameroon: The Role 
of Courts in Fostering an Equitably Gendered Society.’ African Study Monographs, 36 (2) pp. 75-100. 
631 Court of Appeal of the South West Region: Suit No. CASWP/CC/12/98: unreported. Quoted in Ibid. p. 92. 
632 “…ownership shall mean the right guaranteed to every person by law to use, enjoy and dispose of property. 
No person shall be deprived thereof, save for public purposes and subject to the payment of compensation 
under conditions determined by law….” 
633Kiye Mikano Emmanuel (2015) ‘Conflict between Customary Law and Human Rights in Cameroon: The Role 
of Courts in Fostering an Equitably Gendered Society.’ African Study Monographs, 36 (2) pp. 75-100. 
634Oni Babatunde Adetunji (2014) ‘Discriminatory Property Inheritance Rights Under the Yoruba And Igbo 
Customary Law in Nigeria: The Need for Reforms.’ IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) 
Volume 19, Issue 2, Ver. IV pp. 30-43. 




tradition.636 The Court of Appeal via Tobi JCA rejected the claim on the basis the case was 
governed by Nnewi Customary Law, and that such a customary law which discriminated 
against women would not be enforced as it would be repugnant to natural justice, equity, and 
good conscience. However, on further appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the decision of the 
Court of Appeal and upheld the Iri Ekpe custom, citing the need to respect the lived realities 
of people. 
Iwobi637 notes that the established institutions that “regulate the affairs of most Nigerians are 
archetypal bastions of male power and are suffused with patriarchal instincts and inclinations”. 
Diala638 argues that the disconnection between law and practice stems from several factors, 
ranging from legal pluralism to social, economic, cultural, and historical factors, all of which 
have great implications for constitutional legitimacy. Agbede639 claims that although state law 
makes provisions for the regulation of marriages and inheritance, many Nigerians disregard 
these provisions. Consequently, what is applied in formal courts differs from what is practiced 
among the people that are compelled by them.640 
According to Temngah,641 African customary law is generally silent on discriminatory cultural 
practices which harm women’s rights, while customary courts continue to follow and apply 
them. This causes a rift between customary norms and what is fundamentally accepted by 
common law as right and just. A prevalent example is gender discrimination in the ‘dowry’ 
and ‘bride price’ practices. This used to justify certain discriminatory practices against women 
which deny them inheritance and succession rights. In Cameroon, this concept was explained 
in the dictum of Justice Inglis in Achu v. Achu,642 where it was held that, once dowry is paid, a 
woman becomes part of her husband’s estate and, if they are to divorce (after a full refund of 
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the dowry by the wife to the husband), she leaves the matrimonial home with virtually nothing 
except her private and personal belongings. In addition, Bennett643 contends that culture has 
been used by governments to initiate segregation. For instance, in South Africa, cultural 
differences encouraged discrimination among the various ethnic groups and consequently 
served as the justification for apartheid. 
Tchoukou644 notes that an analysis of case law jurisprudence in Cameroon reflects that there is 
no established rule to determine the process a court must take for the application of the 
repugnancy clause. This opinion has also been reiterated by Nigerian scholars. For instance, 
Ezejiofor645 contends that: “the courts have not developed any general theory on the basis of 
which rules of customary law are to be tested. Rather, they have adopted a liberal and flexible 
approach and have, on an ad hoc manner, invalidated or sanctioned a rule sought to be applied 
on the basis of their notion of what is fair and just.” 
Hence, the courts have adopted a discretionary approach when determining whether a 
customary law has passed or failed the repugnancy test. The wide discretion and flexibility of 
the courts has led to an increased pattern of disparity and uncertainty in application of the clause 
and in most instances a contradictory precedent. For instance, in the cases of the Estate of 
Agboruja646 (a Nigerian case) and David Tchakokam v. Keou Magdaleine647 (a Cameroonian 
case), the courts were called upon to determine whether the custom of marrying the wife of a 
deceased family member to another family member (also known as levirate marriage) was 
contrary to natural justice, equity or good conscience according to the repugnancy clause. 
In the Estate of Agboruja, the court allowed the system of levirate marriage, and held that: “the 
custom by which a man’s heir is his next male relative, whether brother, son, uncle or even 
cousin, is widespread throughout Nigeria. When there are minor children, it means that the 
father’s heir becomes their new father. This is a real relationship, and the new fathers regard 
the children as their own children. Whenever this custom prevails, native courts follow it, and 
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no doubt somewhere in this large country this is being done every day.” The court stated that: 
“there can be nothing intrinsically unfair or inequitable even in the inheritance of widows […] 
The custom is based on what might be called the economics of one kind of African social 
system.” While many human rights scholars would regard the ruling as unfair and repugnant 
to natural justice, Elias648 terms it a customary type of insurance to guard against the neglect 
of the dependants of the deceased.  
However, in the similar case of David Tchakokam v. Keou Magdaleine, the Cameroonian court 
explicitly declared the practice of levirate marriage repugnant and contrary to written law. The 
presiding judge held that: “the law will not give its blessing to a marriage that is not only 
obnoxious and repugnant to natural justice but obviously against the written law [...] Section 
27 of the SCHL649 clearly does not permit this court to enforce a marriage which is liable to be 
voided under our law.” It is important to note however that, although both cases occurred in 
separate jurisdictions, different conclusions were reached despite the similarity in the legal 
traditions of Anglophone Cameroon and Nigeria.650 
Disparity is also apparent in the female child inheritance651 case of Nanje Bokwe v. Margaret 
Akwo.652 The Kumba (Cameroon) customary court held that the female applicant was allowed 
inheritance just as the male heirs; but on appeal, it was held that a married woman was not 
allowed to inherit from her father’s estate unless expressly stated in a will.653 On the other hand, 
the ruling in Nanje contrasted with what was held in the case of Nyanja Keyi Theresia & 4 Ors 
v. Nkwingah Francis Njanga and Keyim,654 where the High Court of Fako used the repugnancy 
clause to outlaw discriminatory inheritance practices against women.655 
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Like many post-colonial African countries, Sierra Leone operates a bifurcated legal system 
where British common law coexists with the customary legal system, also known as “local 
courts”. Thus, the formal common law system operates mainly in the urban areas while the 
traditional customary system dominates the rural areas. According to Maru,656 customary 
courts which have existed for generations remain unchecked and, as such, many village and 
section chiefs adjudicate claims within their localities, issuing summons, conducting hearings, 
making judgments, and collecting fines based on the customary practice of their tribe without 
reference to applicable state law. This is in spite of the current 2011 Act which prohibits any 
unauthorised practice657 and lays down the template of operation for Sierra Leone’s dualist 
legal structure.  
In addition to complying with the national constitution, the Sierra Leone Local Courts Act 2011 
demands that customary law refrains from contradicting “enactments of parliament” or 
“principles of natural justice and equity.”658 However, in certain tribes, an underage girl can 
still be betrothed without her consent659 or women barred from inheriting family property.660 
Maru661 refers to the 2011 Act as “nominal limitations” which have minimal impact on 
discriminatory practices and are seldom if ever enforced; causing a divergence between certain 
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4.6 Colonial Customary Courts in Practice  
Harris662 opined that colonialism transformed customary law from “a subtle, adaptable, and 
situational code to a system of fixed and formal rules”. In addition, according to Patenaude,663 
the English common law system replacement presented customary courts with other obstacles. 
A major setback has been the de-valuation of customary law by the British colonialists to 
accommodate the English system of law as the dominant legal mandate in Nigeria. In addition 
to the British colonial influence, many western-trained jurists and legal scholars continue to 
denigrate customary law as mere custom or norms of behaviour,664 while customary legal 
cultures and rationalities continued to be undermined by common law directives.665 
In the course of time, supervised “tribal assessors” were proposed and indigenous elders elected 
as advisers to manage and counsel customary courts. Consequently, customary courts were 
given the authority to administer justice in the context of various offences, both civil and 
criminal, including the recommendation of the mitigation of conventional penalties666 in areas 
that were regarded as beyond their administrative reach. The intention was to keep customary 
courts functioning on a lower hierarchical ranking order with their dealings under strict 
supervision of common law mandates. 
An’Na’im667 undertook a comparative study of fifteen African legal systems and concluded 
that: “for the majority of Africans, customary law is the most important source of law [with] 
which they are likely to have first and most frequent contact.” Amidst the principal common 
law system in place, superior courts continue to acknowledge the relevance of other legal 
obligations that impact the lives of individuals brought before the courts. Therefore, in 
resolving disputes surrounding sentencing, the need to examine the relevance of customary 
legal practices when considering the gravity of the offence in question, especially in civil 
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cases,668 is often presented. However, Nwocha669 argues that the declassification of customary 
courts has continued to work against its full recognition and codification as an effective source 
of law in the Nigerian legal system.  
After Nigeria gained independence in 1960, constitutional law based on the English common 
law system continued to supersede customary law in Nigeria. Customary law is recognised to 
a certain extent in the Nigerian constitution but is still persistently struggling to find an 
enduring foothold.670 Hence, the future of customary courts has become a matter of discussion 
for many African scholars. There is a fear that customary courts, which pre-date the colonial 
legal court system and are deemed intrinsic to the norms, traditions and behaviour of the 
Nigerian people, are beginning to disappear.671 The extant literature on legal aid in Nigeria 
expresses the need for a more reformed, simplified legal process as well as an easily accessible 
court of law to help further the scope of legal aid in Nigeria; however, there is currently a lack 
of assertion regarding the utilisation of customary courts as an additional authority of law to 
expand the capacity of legal aid in Nigeria.  
Legal aid is a service put in place to provide access to justice for individuals who may not have 
the means or capabilities to procure the services of a lawyer and, as a consequence, are unable 
to gain access to court and defend their rights. The concept of legal aid is embodied to a certain 
degree by the long-standing practice of customary courts, which achieve a large portion of the 
principal motive of legal aid. This motive is to break down the prevailing barriers (financial, 
geographical, linguistic and time-related) that impede the guarantee of equality for all 
individuals before the judiciary, regardless of their social standing.672 Ubink673 maintains that 
customary court practices are not without basic flaws, but considers them easily acceptable and 
more practicable due to their geographical proximity to those most in need of legal aid; namely, 
those who are disadvantaged, who are frequently members of ethnic minorities residing in 
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remote, rural areas. The familiarity of the litigants with the location and the adjudicators 
encourages trust in the legal system. The use of the local language, as well as a simplified and 
flexible procedure, is fundamental to the practice of customary courts. Disputes are dealt with 
swiftly, eliminating the delays that could arise due to time and financial constraints in matters 
that require immediate attention. 
 
4.7 Customary Courts: The Law and Society Phenomenon  
“You can’t even begin to talk about development if citizens don’t share a sense of belonging 
and entitlement to their community justice system. Legal aid is such a fundamental necessity 
for human existence: it calls for a much greater public investment than we currently see.” 
Yahaya Al-Hassan Seini674 
The law and society phenomenon concerns the belief that law is deeply embedded within 
society and explores how law is socially and historically constructed.675 For instance, this 
phenomenon can help explain how customary rules, doctrines and institutions have impacted 
present day Nigeria. A brief appraisal of the concept of law and society illustrates how public 
values and opinions can enhance legal systems, as well as how such opinions can influence 
certain indigenous groups to seek remedies in customary courts. This section explores the role 
of customary courts through the context of law and society, and in relation to the provision of 
legal aid in Nigeria.  
The law and society approach examines law in practice through public knowledge of its 
institutions to initiate social change. Legal aid provision lies within the ambit of social change 
because it is focused on shifting the structure of institutions in society to achieve equity, for 
example in improving the equitable distribution of resources. According to Coglianese,676 
social change may be achieved through law reform as well as other non-legal means such as 
public opinion. The author argues that public values can bring social change by encouraging 
effective implementation of legislation. He also believes an effective outcome can be achieved 
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by developing a collaborative and interdependent relationship between social change, law, and 
society to push for reform in legal institutions.677 Thus, enhancing the operation and scope of 
the customary courts system through legislation in Nigeria, could pave way for essential 
provisions such as legal aid.  
Chirayath et al.678 posit that “the vast majority of human behaviour is shaped and influenced 
by informal and customary normative frameworks”, which can be understood via the law and 
society concept of how law reflects and impacts culture. According to Mather,679 law is deeply 
embedded within society, and the concept of law and society reveals how “inequalities are 
reinforced through differential access to, and competence with, legal procedures and 
institutions”. Macauley680 advocates for a departure from focusing mainly on the operation of 
legal institutions in law and society studies (i.e., the courts, lawyers, and police). The author 
asserts that in addition “we must understand people’s knowledge of and attitudes toward the 
legal system”. Friedman681 contends that every country’s legal system is driven by the issue of 
justice and equality, which interacts with the society that surrounds it. The author argues that 
the relationship between law and society has been extensively researched in specific countries 
in the West;682 however, there is less study on the comparisons between the legal systems or 
legal cultures of other societies, such as Nigeria, from the viewpoint of their impact on 
society.683 The author believes in enhancing the principle of legal practice from the isolated 
analysis of legal text such as legislation and court decisions that have been advanced through 
competent legal personnel to a deeper analysis of legal rules, doctrines and institutions that 
exist within society.684 
Hence, customary courts in Nigeria are a legal phenomenon that is moulded by the country’s 
culture, economics, and political structure, as opposed to formal authoritative norms, practices 
and legal codes. The study of law and society in relation to the concept of customary courts 
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highlights the relations between culture and individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, and opinions 
regarding the law.685 It also examines whether the incorporation of the legal aid scheme into 
an already established customary court system would expand the scope of justice in Nigeria. 
As well as encourage individuals who would normally shy away from formal courts, due to its 
foreign and complex nature, to attend a more familiar customary court of their choosing in 
contemporary Nigeria Hence, customary law plays a significant role in the operation of 
customary courts, and most especially in the lives of the individuals that are bound by them.  
 




Chapter 5: Customary Law in Contemporary Nigeria 
“Increasing recognition of customary law brings with it a need for development of functional 
interfaces between customary and positive legal regimes.”686 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter is focused on the status of customary law in present day Nigeria, as well as the 
prospects of implementing legal aid via customary courts to serve the needs of disadvantaged 
individuals (often residing in remote, rural areas). Hence, it will also appraise the validity of 
customary legal systems and the manner in which various customary law practices are 
established and interpreted in national legislation as a source of law. It will also examine the 
categories of customary courts in Nigeria, in addition to the customary legal systems of other 
African nations. This chapter considers the complex plurality of legal orders in relation to the 
Nigerian customary court system. The discussion will include the role of legal orders in 
preserving the integrity of customary legal systems via international human rights regulations. 
In addition, this chapter will propose a feasible framework to assist with the transition of legal 
aid into customary courts.      
 
5.2 Sources of Law in Nigeria 
5.2.1 English Common Law 
According to Adewoye,687 the British colonial era in the 19th century introduced a new legal 
system that served as an instrument of administrative control and reflected the laws in force in 
Britain during that period. The present common law structure in Nigeria, the country’s major 
legal system, is a by-product of this colonial legal system, and it derives its legitimacy from 
the 1999 Nigerian constitution. This is established in the 1990 Interpretation Act which 
provides for the construction and interpretation of Acts of the National Assembly and certain 
other instruments. According to Section 32 (1): “the common law of England and the doctrines 
of equity, together with the statutes of general application that were in force in England on the 
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1st day of January 1900, shall, in so far as they relate to any matter within the legislative 
competence of the Federal legislature, be in force in Nigeria.”688  
Common law is well established and codified in Nigeria, where it forms a substantial part of 
national law and supersedes both Islamic and Customary Law. According to Nwocha,689 
scholars and citizens viewed the transplanted English system as an institution intended to 
benefit only the privileged in society. A very large proportion of the Nigerian population, 
especially those residing in remote, rural areas, became alienated from the official legal system, 
as they were made to adopt and abide by a system that was divergent from their beliefs and 
customs. Thus, the author argues that the disparities between official and customary legal 
systems present a clash between legal justice (remedial process) and social justice (equal access 
to resources), as one cannot fulfil its intended administration without the other. According to 
Sadurski,690 legal justice is at the mercy of social justice. In time, individuals seeking remedies 
will lose trust that justice will be served if they are unable to access institutions they believe 
would be fair and just to their cause.  
 
5.2.2 Customary Law 
Before the advent of colonial rule in Nigeria, indigenous legal systems were customary in 
origin and type. Customary courts were utilised to regulate social relations and interpret 
customary law. Hence, customary courts and customary law are in sequence with one another. 
Traditionally, customary law is unwritten and as such there has always been a great reliance on 
the oral testimonies of chiefs, elders, and other people familiar with intrinsic customs and 
tradition691 to ensure that they are maintained, and justice is served. In the case of Alfa v. 
Arepo,692 Duffus J defined customary law as “the unwritten law or rules which are recognised 
and applied by the community as governing its transactions and code of behaviour in any 
particular matter”. 
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Customary law was also defined by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of Kharie Zaidan 
v. Fatimah Khalil Mohsen693: “[a] system of law, not being the common law (of England), and 
not being a law enacted by a competent legislature in Nigeria, but which is enforceable and 
binding within Nigeria as between parties subject to its sway.”  
The provision of legal aid is not specifically provided for under customary legal practices. This 
may be due to its unformulated nature; however, the right to legal aid is a fundamental right 
stipulated under the current 1999 Nigeria constitution to which all legal practices in Nigeria 
are duty-bound to adhere to. According to Yakubu,694 the arrival of the British colonial rule 
undermined Nigerian customary law, and the use and effect of customary laws became 
dependent on the permissive extent of English law. Indigenous customary courts were mainly 
in the southern part of Nigeria and were not allowed to preside over matters relating to crime. 
Thus, though customary courts maintained minimal authority, in mostly rural areas, they were 
quickly overshadowed by the new colonial legal order. 
Adewoye695 contends that customary law was not totally eradicated during the colonial era but 
held limited administrative power and was treated as foreign law when it came to the higher 
court. After Nigeria became independent from colonial rule in 1960, customary law practices 
continued to function as a source of law to many regions in Nigeria, especially the rural regions. 
The operation of customary law also continued alongside the adopted and superior English law 
in force. The right to legal aid was introduced into the post-colonial constitutions, but this was 
not explicitly extended to customary legal practices. The judicial recognition of customary laws 
during colonialism was crucial to their validity and practice, and this was affirmed in Eshugbayi 
Eleko v. Government of Nigeria.696 In this case, Lord Atkin held that “[i]t is the assent of the 
native community that gives a custom its validity”. However, regardless of whether a custom 
is accepted and fully adopted and recognised as having the force of law within a locality, by 
the people, it must pass the validity test based on the British concept of repugnancy.697  
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Customary courts are a vital part of the Nigerian legal system but are subject to a validity test 
if the legitimacy of a certain custom is under investigation. Legitimising customary law in 
Nigerian courts is mandatory for its adoption, and this is governed by the Evidence Act.698 
However, customary courts and area courts are not bound by the provisions of the Act, but 
rather are guided by it. Hence, the judges of these courts are expected to know the law within 
their customary jurisdictions, but proof of such custom is not required.699 In the case of Ogiugo 
v. Ogiugo,700 the Supreme Court held that, regarding matters of custom, “[t]he Customary 
Court is presumed to know the customary law of the area of its jurisdiction [.]”  
The scope of customary court powers was reiterated in the case of Okeke v. President & 
Members of Customary Court.701 It was held that: “Customary Courts have their practice and 
procedure as embodied in the Customary Courts Law and Rules of the State in the country 
where they are applicable. By virtue of the native form of customary laws, they relate to the 
traditional unwritten law of the people handed down from generation to generation. Where 
members of the Courts are familiar with the custom of a community, they can apply it without 
first requiring evidence.” Customary law in Nigeria is derived from two sources: Sharia law, 
which is also referred to as Muslim law; and Non-Muslim/Ethnic law, also known as 
indigenous customary law. Currently, customary law is recognised to a certain extent in the 
1999 Nigeria constitution and co-exists alongside national law.  
 
5.2.3 Islamic Law (Sharia)  
Like the current Nigerian common law structure, and in contrast to indigenous customary law, 
Islamic law is a predominantly written and borrowed doctrine, acquired from the religious 
beliefs of Muslim community traders in the 11th century. Its texts can be found in the Holy 
Quran, the Hadith of Prophet Muhammed, and other scholarly publications by Islamic jurists. 
By the 19th century, after the 1804 ‘Fulani Jihad’ launched by Usman Dan Fodio, the religion 
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had gained momentum and become more established in the Northern part of Nigeria, as well 
as in some parts of the South.702  
The effects of the Jihad were widespread and influenced the way of life of both Muslims and 
non-Muslims, politically, socially, culturally as well as intellectually. Northern Nigeria and 
other parts that converted to Islam were ‘Islamised’ as a result of the ‘holy war’. Muslims were 
obligated to live according to Islamic law.703 Their inherent traditional cultures and norms were 
relinquished and replaced with a Muslim perspective of history and Islamic concepts, ideas and 
values regarding society.704 Hence, the norms introduced by the Quran facilitated the 
development of the Islamic judicial institution,705 and this other type of customary law, that 
was applicable to Muslims only, gained momentum.  
By the time the colonialists arrived in 1861, Islam was firmly established as state religion in 
northern Nigeria, with Islamic law as the major legal system. Local customs were permitted, 
and non-Muslims were able to apply their own customary law within the Islamic jurisdictions, 
as Islamic law only applied to Muslims.706 However, Islamic law was not enforced in all 
Muslim territories, especially in the South of Nigeria where a Western secular system was 
imposed.707 Hence, Sharia law was applied on an informal basis alongside common law and 
indigenous customary law.708  
Lord Frederick Lugard became the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria 
in 1900 and, later, was the first Governor-General of Nigeria. Under his indirect rule, existing 
local structures were maintained to a certain level to serve as a channel to establish rules and 
regulations on behalf of the British. The colonialists endeavoured to fully replace Islamic law 
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with the common law mandates, but were faced with obstacles, especially in the Northern parts 
of Nigeria due to the strong presence of the Islamic faith.709  
Consequently, the Islamic judicial structure was retained in the north as a parallel system of 
customary and magistrates’ courts (including criminal cases via the 1904 Criminal Code).710 
In the South, the British discouraged Islamic law by establishing customary courts which were 
supported by English trained legal practitioners. As such, Muslims in the non-Islamic 
designated areas were forced to submit to indigenous customary law.711 Islamic law is subject 
to the repugnancy test, however, and it can be held to be incompatible with any other law in 
force (e.g., statutes, common law or principles of equity) according to Section 6 of 
Protectorates Court Ordinance 1933. In the case of Yinusa v. Adesubokan,712 it was held on 
appeal that a principle of Islamic Law, which restricts the quantity of property that a Muslim 
testator can give out by will, was incompatible with the 1837 Wills Act, which gives an adult 
the right to dispose of real and personal property by will upon their death. 
The 1979 Nigerian constitution saw the creation of a Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal, 
which was declared a superior court of record.713 However, led by Zamfara state in 2000, 12 
other States in Northern Nigeria have adopted the Sharia Penal System714 by restoring the 
‘hadd’ offences, which is the full application of the criminal aspect of Shari’ah and appropriate 
punishment fixed in the Quran. This drastic change in Islamic tradition has met with divergent 
views on whether this penal code was unconstitutional, especially in punishments that involved 
stoning to death and amputation.715  
 
5.3 The Concept of Customary Law  
Customary courts are operated by intrinsic laws and rules that have been developed over time 
through word of mouth and operation. Customary law does not refer to a single legal system716 
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and can be difficult to understand due its diverse origins and sources.717 Hence, it is an 
operational medium which covers civil law (e.g., social disorder, marriages, divorces, adoption, 
inheritance, and family relations), game law (i.e., hunting and fishing), land law (e.g., 
ownership rights, land use) and business law (e.g., trading practices). In Nigeria, the term 
customary law is used to refer to indigenous customary practices and Islamic law practices, 
although only the latter is written. These are two legal systems which operate simultaneously 
in the same country,718 which is prevalent in pluralistic societies such as Nigeria. Hence, while 
legal aid is a major component to guaranteeing access to courts, access cannot be assured if 
individuals are not able to access suitable courts of their choosing. According to Woodman,719 
the literature on access to judicial institutions in Africa is mainly focused on the analysis of the 
legal doctrine and certain aspects of law. However, the primary subject of social justice that 
centres on the principle of equality and the doctrine of human rights in Africa is seldom 
examined.  
Customary law is a direct derivation of customary courts, and it is driven by the beliefs, 
philosophies, and values of indigenous people. It is believed to hold the key to the 
administration of legal and social justice.720 Hart721 describes customary law as a “social rule 
that is acceptable and usable in a given social group.” Due to the un-codified nature of 
customary law, it is prone to become unstable and unpredictable; however, it is also flexible 
and able to progressively adapt to social and economic changes without losing momentum or 
integrity.722 According to Bederman,723 customary law “is no mere souvenir of bygone law; it 
is an integral and coherent part of any healthy functioning contemporary legal system”. 
However, Rouland724 argued that the functions of law are the same regardless of the type of 
legal system, especially when such law is focused on promoting social interchange, preserving 
the social order, and settling disputes. Thus, customary law is closely linked with indigenous 
peoples and, for many, it may be the only system of law they know and have easy access to.  
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Fuller725 describes customary law as a language of interaction that initially needs to be 
appraised in order to comprehend current common law and legal systems. In simple terms, 
Ryan726 states that customary law comprises of the basic rules for living together in a group. 
These rules, derived from customary law, are mechanisms to control social behaviour through 
informal or formal means. An informal process is limited to ensuring that family members or 
kin comply with the rules of the group,727 whereas a formal medium comprises of the collection 
of methods employed by a larger group, such as a tribe or community, to ensure the behaviour 
of individuals or groups complies with the rules of the larger culture or society.728 
Asiedu-Akrofi729 contends that customary law has proved very flexible and adaptable to 
changes that occur within its domain. Anyangwe730 posits that its adaptability to moving times 
helps it to embrace new demands. Osbourne CJ, in 1908, acknowledged this fact in the case of 
Lewis v. Bankole:731 “[o]ne of the most striking features of West African native law and custom 
[...] is its flexibility; it appears to have been always subject to motives of expediency, and it 
shows unquestionable adaptability to altered circumstances without entirely losing its 
character.” Joireman732 further acknowledges the flexibility of customary law and notes its 
similarity to common law which evolves in response to changing circumstances and customs. 
Such statements establish customary legal practices as a viable tool of legal aid reform which 
will continue to evolve through time. 
According to Chanock,733 customary law plays an important role in states with weak, corrupt, 
or non-existent governments. An instance was when Somalia adopted customary law as the 
basis for governance after the abolition of their government in 1991. In spite of the damning 
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reports of lawlessness broadcast by the media, Van Notten734 describes the Somali customary 
system as “an elaborate indigenous law system that is basically sound, more so than even than 
most legal systems in the world today […] but for a few exceptions, it is structured such that it 
comes very close to what in philosophy might be called ‘the natural order of human beings’.”735 
Dun736 describes it as a system where institutional structures of traditional societies are based 
on customary rather than statutory law. However, Van Notten notes significant weaknesses in 
the Somali customary system: for example, “laws affronting the dignity of women and 
impeding economic activity”.737 
A recent study in 2011 by Vargas738 on the Somali system reiterates the role customary legal 
regimes play in maintaining order. The author notes that: “Somali customary law (xeer) 
represents an integral component of the Somali way of life and continues to be the preferred 
and most used legal system in all Somali regions, applied in up to 80–90 percent of disputes 
and criminal cases.” It has been argued that customary law regulates the lives of about 80% of 
Nigerians and, as such, Nigerian courts should embrace and implement it.739 It would be 
advantageous to individuals that trust indigenous legal practices if they were to have access to 
proceedings with which they are familiar.  
In Sierra Leone, Chirayath et al. 740 state that approximately 85% of the population falls under 
the jurisdiction of customary law, defined under the present 1991 Constitution741 as “the rules 
of law which, by custom, are applicable to particular communities in Sierra Leone”. However, 
despite the widespread support of customary courts as an inclusive judicial outlet by Nigerian 
scholars, critics of customary courts (e.g., some of the Nigerian judiciary) argue that reform is 
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essential. The reform will ensure that they comply with the rules and guidelines that embody 
the central Nigerian legal system. Recommendations include codifying customary court 
practices to improve the relationship between the dominant formal and supplementary informal 
justice mechanisms in Nigeria.  
Odinkalu742 advocates firmly for the reform of customary courts and customary law in Nigeria, 
and argues that, while the customary justice system “enjoys widespread legitimacy and 
application among the majority of Africans”, somewhat contradictorily it is “inherently racial 
in origin, despotic in operation, and often discriminatory and unfair in outcome”. Hence, the 
expansion of legal aid through the customary courts system continues to be examined as a 
matter of necessity in this chapter. Chuma743 argues that access to judicial systems as a means 
of enabling the disadvantaged in society goes beyond the concept of justice but rather a process 
by which justice, in the real sense, can be attained. Without access to courts of expedience, 
there is no justice as such, customary legal practices are increasingly being identified as a 
potential human rights tool744 suited to improve access to legal institutions and in all probability 
further the scope of legal aid provision in Nigeria. Tobin, terms it a crucial outlet to 
environmental security and the protection of the resources of indigenous peoples745 due to its 
focus on the norms and customs of the natives. 
Onyango746 highlights the lack of extensive research on customary legal practices and contends 
that it is crucial to establish “research in customary legal systems in correspondence to current 
socio-economic changes and new challenges facing the enforced modern judicial systems […] 
to create [a] predictive foundation for suitable legal knowledge for the sake of best practice, 
constitutionalism and rule of law.” Being an inferior source of law, there are questions of 
authority with customary practices as they are mainly unwritten and, as such, the burden of its 
legitimacy is placed on the person invoking it. Woodland747 interjects that there is a universal 
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Justice Systems in South Africa.’ In Sage Caroline, Woodcock Michael (eds.) (2006) The World Bank Legal 
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understanding with regards to the principle of justice; however, studies are often limited to its 
application in Western societies. Hence, concepts developed are implemented as a formal legal 
instrument and not always suited to the African way of living.748  
In Nigeria, there are various scholars calling for the reform of the customary legal system 
through a focused, formal implementation of customary legal practices alongside the common 
law system.749 Through empirical research, this study aims to establish that the implementation 
of legal aid as standard practice could potentially reform and develop the customary legal 
system(s) in Nigeria.  
 
5.4 Ascertaining Customary Law  
Evidence to prove that a custom exists before it can be applied forms the basis of the adoption 
of customary law in practice. Ascertainment of customary law means custom qualifies as 
law,750 while legal aid serves as a tool to guarantee equality before the law. According to 
Allott,751 the courts are faced with difficulty when applying customary law partly from the 
multiplicity of different tribal laws. The uncertainty regarding the limits of operation of 
indigenous customary law in relation to English and Islamic law is partly due to the fluid nature 
of customary law itself; however, indigenes hold their respective customary law in high esteem 
and rely on its application in both civil and criminal matters.752 
Julian753 believes that the validity of customary law is for those that abide by it to decide. The 
author posits that the credibility of a custom is based on its acceptance by the people who are 
governed by it: “for, given that statutes themselves are binding upon us for no other reason 
than that they have been accepted by the judgment of the populace, certainly it is fitting that 
what the populace has approved without any writing shall be binding upon everyone.” 
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Akanki754 reiterates the inherent complexities of customary law and states that its unwritten 
nature and the multiplicity of Nigerian customs have resulted in a flexible and uncertain source 
of law. However, the author believes that this complexity was exacerbated during the colonial 
era. At this time, through a similar test used to establish local custom in England,755 customary 
law had to be ascertained in Nigerian formal courts; however, personnel of the courts were 
either British or British-trained and did not have a deep understanding of the rules of customary 
law. In addition, local custom in England at that time was deemed a derogation from the general 
law, and Nigerian custom was judged similarly.756 Therefore Nigerian customary law was also 
required to undergo vetting to establish its validity.  
It was later noted, however, that English local custom was in many respects different from 
African customary law, and the test of antiquity (in the case of England, that a custom should 
date from A.D. 1189)757 for its ascertainment was eventually abandoned.758 Allott759 further 
argues against the tests for its application and the method by which its rules are ascertained, 
these being acquired from the English context. In effect, modern customary law became more 
rigid through its administration by British courts and especially native courts influenced by 
English legal concepts.760  
Hence Lord Wright’s statement in Laoye v. Oyetunde761: “[t]he policy of the British 
Government in this, and in other respects is to use for purposes of the administration of the 
country the native laws and customs in so far as possible and in so far as they have not been 
varied or suspended by statutes or ordinances affecting Nigeria.” To resolve the matter of 
ascertaining customary law, the courts took the view that if it is to be viewed as law, then it 
must be regarded as foreign law and be proved as a fact. This test was laid down in Hughes v. 
Davies,762 where the court held that “as native law is foreign law it must be proved as any other 
fact.”763 
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5.4.1 Exceptions to the Ascertainment Rule  
The unreported (Gold Coast) case of Angu v. Attah764 proposed that the best approach to 
validate the rules of customary law is to call on “witnesses acquainted with the native customs 
until the particular customs have, by frequent proof in the courts, become so notorious that the 
courts take judicial notice of them”. This requirement was reiterated in the Nigerian case of 
Apoesho v. Chief Odole of Ilesha765 by Ademola CJ: “native law and custom is a question of 
fact and has to be proved.” However, Mwalimu766states that proof of customary law would 
depend entirely on the composition of the customary court and whether the presiding judge is 
well versed in the custom in question.  
Thus, the rule in Angu v. Attah was contemplated in the West African Court of Appeal 
(W.A.C.A) in the Gold Coast case of Ababio II v. Nsemfoo.767 The court considered whether 
the requirement that customary law should be proved by witnesses extended to cases before 
the native courts where the personnel presiding over the court are well acquainted with the 
custom. M’Carthy J768 of W.A.C.A held that: “[i]f the members of a Native Court are familiar 
with a custom it is certainly not obligatory upon it to require the custom to be proved through 
witnesses [.]”769 The exemption to the Angu v. Attah ascertainment rule was also applied in the 
cases of Ehigie v. Ehigie770 and Adedibu v. Adewoyin and another.771 In the latter it was held 
that: “native law and custom is a matter of evidence and not law.”772 In 
Buraimo v. Gbamgboye,773 the Supreme Court (now the High Court) held that it was 
unnecessary to bring evidence to prove particular customs which have been well established in 
the courts.774 However, in the case of Ogbero Egri v. Ededho Uperi,775 the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria criticised a High Court judge for replacing the custom in question with his own view 
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of customary law, contrary to the statutory provisions that incorporates the jurisdiction of the 
customary courts in Nigeria. 
 
5.5 Validating Customary Law in Nigeria 
According to Asiedu-Akrofi,776 there are presently two ways to establish the existence of a 
custom before the Nigerian courts: by proof and by judicial notice. These methods are 
contained within national statutory provision and identically worded in the various evidence 
enactments of individual state jurisdictions, for instance: The Customary Courts Law of Lagos 
State 2011;777 the Customary Courts Law, CAP 32, Laws of Enugu State 2004 (as Amended 
in 2011); the Customary Courts Rules 2011; and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) 
Customary Court Act 2007. 
Currently, the procedure to validate customary law is embodied in the statutory provision of 
the Nigeria Evidence Act 2011,778 and applies to all judicial proceedings in or before Courts in 
Nigeria. Section 16 of the Nigeria Evidence Act 2011 provides the criteria required for a custom 
to be admissible and adopted in any court of law. “Section 16 (1): A custom may be adopted 
as part of the law governing a particular set of admissible circumstances if it can be judicially 
noticed or can be proved to exist by evidence. 16 (2): The burden of proving a custom shall lie 
upon the person alleging its existence.” This was reflected in the case of Osamwonyi v. 
Osamwoyin,779 where the court held that under Benin native law and custom a daughter could 
not be married off to another man without her consent. The decision was based on the evidence 
that was tendered in court. Also, in Obele v. Iniya Obele and Others,780 the six obligatory 
requirements needed to contract a valid marriage in Eastern Nigeria according to custom were 
established from the evidence of the parties involved.781  
Furthermore, Section 17 of the Nigeria Evidence Act 2011 dictates the process of validating 
custom by the courts: “[a] custom may be judicially noticed when it has been adjudicated upon 
once by a superior court of record.” In the Supreme Court case of Kimdey and Others v. 
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Military Governor of Gongola State and Others,782 there were questions regarding the nature 
of customary law and the correct procedure to prove rules therein in order to enforce matters 
relating to traditional chieftaincy appointments. The Supreme Court held that: “[t]he customary 
law is a question of fact to be proved by evidence. There is undoubtedly evidence before the 
learned judge which if accepted will lead the recognition of the custom that the right to the 
Longuda Chieftaincy is shared between Bonsibe and Bokumbebe. The evidence which has 
been admitted of the donation of burial materials and the handing over of the chieftaincy are 
indicative of the existence of such a custom. Customary law has been described as a mirror of 
accepted usage […] native law and custom which the courts enforce must be ‘existing native 
law and custom and not that of the bygone days.”  
The case of Anigbogu v. Uchejigbo783 is the leading accepted authority on the superiority of 
constitutional provisions over the rules of customary law in Nigeria. The Court of Appeal stated 
that the fundamental rights in the Nigeria constitution were superior to customary law.784 
However, a different position was adopted by the Federal Court of Appeal in Kaduna when it 
sat as a Sharia Court of Appeal in Mallam Nasi and 2 Others v. Zaida Haruna785 to ascertain 
the rules of customary law on the matter. The court affirmed the position that “proof of 
customary law […] is governed by customary law” by utilising Islamic law rules to discharge 
the burden of proof concerning property in Islamic law rather than the common law Evidence 
Act.786 This case outlined that the common law principles in matters of process and procedure 
as well as those of witnesses are significantly varied under Islamic law.787  
Section 18 sets out the alternative means to ascertain a custom and the limitations to its 
validation. “(1): Where a custom cannot be established as one judicially noticed, it shall be 
proved as a fact; (2): Where the existence or the nature of a custom applicable to a given case 
is in issue, there may be given in evidence the opinions of persons [who] would be likely to 
know of its existence in accordance with section 73.”788 Section 18 (3) reaffirms the 
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repugnancy clause: “[i]n any judicial proceeding where any custom is relied upon, it shall not 
be enforced as law if it is contrary to public policy, or is not in accordance with natural justice, 
equity and good conscience.” 
 
5.6 Customary Court System in Nigeria 
Section 17 (2) (e) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 (as 
amended), “in furtherance of the social order, provides for the independence, impartiality and 
integrity of the Courts of law and easy accessibility thereto[.]”789 Thus, the legal basis for the 
exercise of judicial powers in Nigeria is derived from the Constitution of 1999. Section 6 of 
the CFRN 1999 classifies courts according to superiority of powers to maintain certainty and 
consistency in the overall judicial process.790 Section 6 (1) states that: “[t]he judicial powers of 
the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts 
established for the Federation.” Section 6 (2) affirms that: “[t]he judicial powers of a State shall 
be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts established, subject as 
provided by this Constitution, for a State.  
Section 6 (3), CFRN 1999, expresses the hierarchy of courts in Nigeria: “[t]he courts to which 
this section relates, established by this Constitution for the Federation and for the States, 
specified in subsection (5) (a) to (i)791 of this section, shall be the only superior courts of record 
in Nigeria; and save as otherwise prescribed by the National Assembly or by the House of 
Assembly of a State, each court shall have all the powers of a superior court of record.” 
Section 6 (5) (k), CFRN 1999, makes provision for individual States, through their Houses of 
Assembly, to establish customary courts, defined as: “such other court as may be authorised 
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by law to exercise jurisdiction at first instance or on appeal on matters with respect to which a 
House of Assembly may make laws.” In addition, Article 29 (7) of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) acknowledges the importance of the preservation 
of cultural values as the core component to reinforce moral ethics and regulate social life. The 
article directs individuals “[t]o preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in 
[their] relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and 
consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral wellbeing of society[.]” 
 
5.6.1 Customary Courts in Practice 
Currently, customary courts in Nigeria are divided into superior courts and courts with 
jurisdiction subordinate to the High Courts.792 According to Idem,793 Area and Customary 
Courts are courts established by individual state governments via their respective local 
government council794 to exercise summary jurisdiction over native persons only; they are to 
apply native law and custom that is predominant within their judicial districts in both civil and 
criminal matters. However, punishments imposed should not be “repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience.”795 
The repugnancy clause represents the superior English law in place and remains the basis by 
which customary practices are ascertained. Section 21 of the CFRN 1999 holds that: “[t]he 
state shall protect, preserve and promote the Nigerian cultures which enhance human dignity 
and are consistent with the fundamental objectives as provided in this chapter.” In Iaoye v. 
Oyetunde,796 Lord Wright opined that the repugnancy test is used to invalidate barbarous 
customs. For instance, in the case of Mariyama v. Sadiku Ejo,797 the Igbirra custom that states 
that a child born 10 months after a couple has divorced belonged to the divorced husband was 
declared repugnant on appeal by the High Court. However, Idem798 posits that the public prefer 
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having their matters heard and determined in a Customary or Area Court because they are 
located nearby and, hence, easily accessible. The procedures are also simpler and court costs 
are cheaper than a common law court.  
According to AjaNwachuku,799 “a customary court can still call for oral evidence to establish 
a rule of customary law, while a magistrate court or district court that has taken judicial notice 
of the existence of a rule of customary law, can apply it, without asking that it be established 
by evidence.” This is in line with Section 122 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 of Nigeria, which 
states that: “no fact of which the court shall take judicial notice […] needs to be proved.” 
However, in the Supreme Court case of Oguanuhu & Ors v. Chiegboka,800 questions regarding 
whether customary courts had to adhere to the strict rules of the Evidence Act were observed. 
It was held that: “[s]trict rules of pleadings and application of provisions of the Evidence Act 
are not observed in those Customary or Native Courts. Their decisions however must be based 
on common sense and reasonableness of their findings.”801  
 
5.6.2 Jurisdiction of Customary Courts in Nigeria  
According to Nwogugu,802 customary courts administer the customary law that is applicable to 
the area where the court and the parties to the litigation are located. In the Northern part of 
Nigeria, customary law is infused with the Moslem law of each region.803 Also referred to as 
indigenous courts, Customary Courts, Area Courts and Sharia Courts are established by the 
State Houses of Assembly and are deemed inferior courts, but still hold part authority over 
customary law jurisdictions. However, according to Section 6 (5) (f) to (i) of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution, the Sharia court of Appeal and the Customary Court of Appeal are considered 
superior courts. There are currently three types of indigenous courts in Nigeria, namely: Area 
Courts, Sharia Courts and Customary Courts: 
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Figure 5.1 - Indigenous Courts of Nigeria 
Area Courts are prevalent in the Northern part of Nigeria, including the Federal Capital 
territory (Abuja). They are made up of: 
1). Upper Area courts  
2). The Area court I  
3). The Area court II  
The Jurisdiction of the Area Courts include: 
A). All questions of Islamic personal law. 
b). Matrimonial Causes & Matters between persons married under customary law. 
c). Suits relating to custody of children under customary law. 
d). Civil actions involving debt demands and damages. 
e). Matters relating to succession to property and the Administration of Estates under 
customary law. Appeal goes to the customary court of Appeal.804 
Sharia Courts are a feature of the judicial system of the Northern States of Nigeria (e.g., in 
Zamfara State). The court is divided into 3 grades:  
 
804Nwagbara Chigozie (2014) ‘The Nature, Types and Jurisdiction of Customary Courts in The 




1). Upper Sharia court 
2). Higher Sharia court 
3). Sharia court. 
The jurisdiction of the Sharia court relates to civil proceedings in Islamic law in respect of the 
rights, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim in issue. Appeals from 
listed courts go to the Sharia Court of Appeal.805 
The Sharia Court of Appeal was established by Section 275 of the CFRN 1999 for any ‘state’ 
that requires it.806 In the FCT, the establishment of this court was made mandatory under 
Section 260, 1999 Constitution; s. 3, Sharia Court of Appeal Act, which establishes the Sharia 
Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). According to s. 260 (2) (a) (b), 
it must consist of: 
(a) A Grand Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal; and  
(b) Such number of Kadis of the Sharia Court of Appeal as may be prescribed by an Act of the 
National Assembly. 
The main purpose of the FCT Sharia Court of Appeal is to determine questions of Islamic law 
and its jurisdiction,807 as outlined in Section 262 of the 1999 Constitution. According to s. 263 
of the CFRN 1999; s. 4 of the Sharia Court of Appeal Act: “[f]or the purpose of exercising any 
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the 1999 Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly, 
the Sharia Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted if it consists of at least three Kadis of the 
Court.” Section 264, 1999 Constitution; s. 4 of the Sharia Court of Appeal Act states that: 
“[s]ubject to the provisions of any Act of the National Assembly, the Grand Kadi of the Sharia 
Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja may make rules for regulating the 
practice and procedure of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.” 
Customary Courts were established by the Customary Court Laws of the States of Southern 
Nigeria as an alternative to the Area Courts in the North. However, Customary Courts continue 
to exist in the Northern part of Nigeria. 808 Customary Courts in general have jurisdiction over 
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individuals that are subject to the customary law prevailing in the area they reside; however, 
this may vary due to the diverse mix of cultures in Nigeria. There is also a hierarchy according 
to their varying powers of punishment and subject-matter jurisdiction, with "A" courts having 
the greatest powers:  
1) Grade A Customary Court 
2) Grade B Customary Court 
3) Grade C Customary Court 
Grade A customary courts are presided over by legal practitioners; some grade B courts are 
directed by the Commissioner for Justice to be presided over by legal practitioners; and the 
remaining Grade B and Grade C courts are managed by non-legal personnel.809  
The Customary Court of Appeal was established by the 1999 Constitution under s. 280 for 
any ‘state’ of the Federation that requires it;810 but, again, this court is mandatory for the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, to determine questions of customary law via s. 265 (1) of 
the 1999 Constitution: “[t]here shall be a Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja.” The Court consists of a President of Customary Court of Appeal and a 
number of other judges of the court as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly.811 In the 
case of state jurisdiction, the President and Judges of the Customary Court of Appeal of a state 
are appointed by the State Governor on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, 
subject to the confirmation by the State House of Assembly.812 Thus, under Section 267 of the 
1999 Constitution: “[t]he Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja 
shall, in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the national 
Assembly[,] exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving 
questions of Customary law.”813 Under s. 268, “for the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction 
[…] the Customary Court of Appeal [of the FCT] shall be duly constituted if it consists of at 
least three Judges of that court.”814 As for other states, according to s. 282, they have no 
affirmed jurisdiction, but also “have both appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil 
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proceedings involving questions of Customary law […] as may be prescribed by the House of 
Assembly of the state[.]”815 
In addition, Sections 269 and 284 of the 1999 Constitution empower the President of the 
Customary Court of Appeal of any state, including the FCT, to make rules for regulating the 
practice and procedure of their respective courts. 
 
5.6.3 Customary Jurisdiction on Criminal Matters  
Customary/Area courts are created by statute which states the offences that are within their 
jurisdiction.816 Apart from capital offences, customary courts have the jurisdiction to hear and 
determine all the offences contained within the criminal code. However, they are subject to 
specific limitations when imposing punishment according to their individual customary court 
directives. For instance, the 2000 Customary Courts Law, Cap. 40, Vol. 2 Laws of Akwa Ibom 
State dictates: the jurisdiction of customary courts,817 the venue of the court to determine 
criminal cases,818 the scope of offences that can be heard and determined819 and the provision 
of punishment.820 On the other hand, in Lagos State, customary courts are not allowed to hear 
or determine certain criminal offences.821 Hence, criminal matters are not well represented in 
general across Nigeria in customary courts. This may be due to the complex nature of criminal 
matters and the limited sentencing powers of the judges, especially if the matter were to induce 
a custodial sentence or that appropriate punishment dictated by customary law may not be 
adequate. There is no clear indication of why they are not well represented however, the scope 
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5.6.4 Customary Jurisdiction on Civil Matters 
Currently, all Customary/Area Courts in Nigeria822 have unlimited jurisdiction to administer 
the civil law prevailing in their jurisdiction,823 as long as it is not repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience, or incompatible with any written law in force or contrary to public 
policy.824 However, the scope of authority varies from state to state. According to Obilade,825 
since the first statutory native courts were established by the British, there has been a clear 
understanding that the matters governed by customary law were better served by customary 
courts, and efforts were made to ensure that customary courts maintained original civil 
jurisdiction over such matters.  
For instance, jurisdiction on land matters was clarified in the case of Samson Erhaboe v. 
Godwin Onaghise.826 In this case, the Edo State Customary Court of Appeal held that Section 
20 (1) of the Bendel State Customary Court Edict 1984 (which is also applicable to Edo State) 
gives unlimited jurisdiction to area and district customary courts on matters relating to land in 
rural areas. As such, the Ugboko-Niro District Customary Court was deemed to have 
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5.7 Customary Courts and the Concept of Legal Pluralism in Nigeria 
Every society requires an effective legal framework. However, it is essential to appreciate the 
social and cultural specificity of each distinct context. The customary courts of any country are 
unique legal systems because their validity is derived from within their own borders. The 
Nigerian legal framework is peculiar, however, because it comprises of more than one 
functional legal system operating in parallel, over vast, and diverse geographical areas. This 
thesis contends that introducing legal aid into these already established and recognised 
Nigerian legal systems would guarantee that all individuals that require free legal assistance 
have access to it in their various jurisdictions. 
Chirayath et al.828 posit that many judicial sectors in developing countries are based on 
institutional transplants of legal codes of developed countries.829 The current common law 
system in Nigeria obtains its legitimacy from the British common law system. It was introduced 
during colonialism and persevered post-independence. Hence, the local, pre-existing judicial 
system was and to a certain extent still is largely disregarded. Ubink and Rooij830 argue that 
legal systems are not acquired solely from tradition, formal juridical norms, and the practice of 
law. The authors contend that culture, economics, and the political structure of a country also 
play a pivotal role in moulding its legal system. Hence, the divergent structure of the customary 
legal system in Nigeria.  
 
5.7.1 Legal Pluralism  
Legal pluralism is a concept that describes the existence of more than one legal order within a 
social field831 (defined as a single political unit governed by its own distinct rules).832 Legal 
pluralism is prevalent in many African legal systems833 due to colonialism, which imposed a 
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foreign legal framework. Having more than one legal structure in a society systematically 
divides the legal system, the people, and the government on the matter of justice. According to 
Woodman,834 legal pluralism in Africa is a consequence of the British colonial indirect rule, 
which was an institutional device that required a form of legal pluralism to operate, especially 
in the vast African nations. Consequently, social structures of many indigenous peoples were 
faced with radical changes, putting African customary law under strain.835  
A study in 1926 by Bronislaw Malinowski identified a “rich variety of social control, social 
pressure, custom, customary law, and judicial procedure within small-scale societies, [such 
that] anthropologists gradually realize[d] that colonized peoples had both indigenous law and 
European law”.836 Nigeria consists of multifarious ethnic groups and tribes, all with distinct 
cultures and customs. After the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 by the British, all indigenous 
groups became subject to a single governmental entity (Nigeria) and, as a consequence, 
relations among the disparate ethnic nationalities were re-defined. In every society, judicial 
institutions are fundamental and established as soon as a society is formulated. Studies on 
informal legal systems show that incorporating traditional legal practices into formal systems 
accommodates different religious and ethnic traditions within a single jurisdiction.837   
Presently, the Nigerian legal system is pluralistic and derived from the common law system, 
based on the English colonial legal system, and the indigenous customary judicial system,  
which comprises of Islamic law and customary law. In pluralistic systems, such as that of 
Nigeria, the application of customary law presents the question of how it is to be established, 
given that it is unwritten, informal, and diverse.838 Ehrlich839 adopts the concept of ‘living law’ 
to describe how collective norms, in addition to legal order, determine behaviour, rights and 
obligations. According to Fisher et al.,840 “there is surely no better example of living law than 
the customary law of tribal communities; and when tribal custom is given some formal degree 
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of recognition […] then its development, while formalized to an extent, remains very much 
within the descriptive framework of legal realism.” 
 
5.7.2 Drawbacks of Legal Pluralism for Customary Legal Practices 
According to Woodman,841 the main concern regarding the concept of legal pluralism is that it 
is detrimental to the rule of law, which is fundamental to securing justice. It is sometimes 
suggested that many officials and private citizens may purposely ignore the norms of state law 
in favour of an un-codified customary law. This is because customary law may provide more 
leeway or is silent on certain matters that are regarded as corrupt and illegal under national law, 
such as engaging in acts of favouritism and ethnic patronage.842 In addition, legal pluralism 
undermines the principle of equality before the law, which is another crucial feature to the 
administration of justice. This problem is caused by the various interpretations of the same 
customary norms and laws by different individuals.843   
According to Ndulo,844 legal pluralities can often act as an obstacle to human rights directives, 
especially on the matter of women’s rights. This is often the case because customary law, and 
in many cases religious forums, rely on traditional norms that may be discriminatory to women 
on marriage, inheritance, and traditional authority issues. A recent judgement in Nigeria845 
reviewed the right of a female child to inherit under Igbo customary law. The exclusion of 
women from inheritance rights was scrutinised and quashed by the Supreme Court to reform a 
customary practice that was deemed archaic and discriminatory.846 This kind of ruling becomes 
more common, particularly as human rights and the rights of women become more pronounced 
and protected under international and national legal frameworks. This case and many other 
customary law-based cases reiterate one of the most persistent and perhaps unmanageable 
problems of legal pluralism: that is, the difficulty of unifying the legal process.847 However, 
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Woodman848 states that there is empirical evidence to show that the content of customary law 
in Africa has changed significantly in land rights and inheritance matters. The author believes 
the change is due to the increased incorporation of African communities into national and 
international economies, political communities, and societies.849 Swenson850contends that legal 
pluralism, which thrives in many developing countries, has vast policy and governance 
implications. Albrecht and Kyed851 state that an estimated 80 to 90 per cent of disputes are 
handled outside the state judicial system. Thus, according to Sheleff,852 customary law comes 
to exemplify tendencies that exist in all forms of law, in other words, intrinsic aspects of the 
very essence of law. 
 
5.8 Customary Justice and Custom in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, customary law is not managed by a single legal order. It is mainly unwritten (except 
for Islamic Law) and comprises of an array of norms and traditions, which are further broken 
down by the country’s ethnic heterogeneity into diverse, individual state jurisdictions. Hence, 
customary law in Nigeria arises from a combination of complex traditions, norms, concepts, 
and legal principles that are deeply rooted and derived from each distinct tribe. Keeton853 
defines customary law as: “those rules of human action established by usage and regarded as 
legally binding to those to whom the rules are applicable, which are adopted by the courts and 
applied as sources of law, because they are generally followed by the political society, or by 
some part of it.”  
According to Woodman,854 customary legal systems are an authentic form of law that has been 
subject over time to legal development through radical change and reform. The author argues 
that the term customary does not indicate that traditional laws remain unchanged through 
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generations. It continues to adapt and evolve to reflect progressive social changes. The strain 
brought on by the necessity of legal change under British occupation has also instigated 
amendments to customary law. Hence, the colonial era and the imposition of English common 
law contributed considerably to its growth. Nonetheless, the inception of colonialism was not 
the beginning of legal development in Africa.855 
Merry856 asserts that before colonialism and the introduction of Islam, African tribes and 
villages lived as independent political entities. They operated the customary law system which 
was passed down by ancestral generations. Amidst Islamic law, customary law was also able 
to thrive as both legal systems are comparable in practice, especially in civil matters such as 
marriage, divorce, inheritance, guardianship, and child custody.857 However, the advent of 
colonialism imposed a rational and formal law that created a plurality of legal orders which 
consequently undermined the deeply rooted indigenous legal structure.  
As the colonial era progressed and legal systems were established, “customary courts” were 
created to give customary law a mode of legitimacy and a measure of status. This provided the 
colonial powers with far-reaching control over communities through traditional chiefs, whose 
role was “not only to settle disputes but also to proclaim the reach of government and the values 
of Western civilisation”.858 For instance, before and after 1906, local government districts and 
sub-districts in the South-Eastern part of Nigeria were divided into native court areas which 
consisted of a panel of traditional chiefs. The panel met at stated times in a designated venue 
to adjudicate over disputes in accordance with their traditional law and customs, and in 
compliance with the “British sense of justice and good conscience”.859  
Native courts were given the freedom to determine cases brought before them, within their 
jurisdictions; however, they were closely monitored by the British officers who established a 
direct link between the native court system and the Supreme Court.860 At the end of each month, 
cases that were heard in the native courts were brought before the Supreme Court to verify that 
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judgement was fair and reasonable. Based on the outcome of the native court judgment, the 
Supreme Court would either confirm, set aside, or vary the decision of the native court and 
allow a re-trial if required.861After independence, most African countries maintained the 
provincial legal framework and customary governance systems, and community rules were 
overruled by statutes regulating traditional leadership. According to Wicomb and Smith,862 
customary law was further downgraded to a separate legal system and was never extended to 
fit with colonial law; therefore, it was expunged from African Westernised Courts.  
In a typical African country, the great majority of the people conduct their personal activities 
in accordance with customary law, whose sources are the practices and customs of the 
people.863 Hence, “custom is a practice that by its common adoption and long, unvarying habit 
has come to have the force of law, while customary law is law consisting of customs that are 
accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct. They are practices that are so 
vital and intrinsic a part of social and economic system that they are treated as if they were 
laws.”864  
Section 258 (1) (d) of the current Nigeria Evidence Act 2011865 does not explicitly define 
customary law, but describes custom as “a rule, which in a particular district has for long usage 
obtained the force of law”. In Oyewumi v. Ogunesan,866 the Supreme Court meticulously 
defined customary law as: “[t]he living law of the indigenous people of Nigeria regulating their 
lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is not static. It is regulating in that it controls the 
lives and transactions of the community subject to it. It is said that custom is the mirror of the 
culture of the people [.]”  
In the case of Dakur v. Dapal,867 the Nigerian Court of Appeal via Edozie JCA defined custom 
as in the above act:868 “a rule which in particular district has for long usage obtained the force 
of law.” In Falowo v. Banigbe & Ors,869 and using the exact same wording, Adekeye JCA 
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defined custom according to Section 2 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 112, Laws of the 
Federation of 1990: “a rule which in a particular district has from long usage obtained the force 
of law.” In Aku v. Nenku,870 the Court of Appeal defined customary law as: “[t]he unrecorded 
tradition and history of the people, practiced from the dim past and which has ‘grown’ with the 
‘growth’ of the people to stability and eventually become an intrinsic part of their culture. It is 
a usage or practice of the people which by common adoption and acquiescence and by long 
and unvarying habit has become compulsory and has acquired the force of law with respect to 
the place or subject matter to which it relates.” 
Customary law, also known as living or folk law exists as a social fact and arises when members 
of a certain community adopt a habitual form of conduct. At this point, it becomes binding as 
a social obligation. In Nigeria, the customary courts of every state and local governmental 
province have a set of distinct laws and rules governing practice and procedure. However, they 
have not been thoroughly documented in extant literature as a viable outlet for the adaptation 
of the legal aid scheme in all parts of Nigeria.  
Ibbetson871 contends that custom as a source of law operates in two apparent ways in practice: 
sociologically and analytically. 
1) Sociologically, the values and social practices of a society will be reflected in the legal rules. 
For instance, values and practices that have their historical roots in social practice which are 
passed down from generations and continue to remain accepted as custom and a source of 
law.872  
2) As an analytical instrument, it is common for well-developed legal systems to acknowledge 
custom as a formal source of law alongside national legislation. However, the scope of custom 
as a legal system is restricted and it is only seen as a supplementary source of law. Hence, 
conflict may occur between national law and custom due to the inconsistency of some local 
practices with domestic law.873  
Furthermore, in ascertaining customary practices, the author argues that the validity of custom 
as a source of law is not necessarily determined by how long it has been in existence, though 
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this is relevant to its ratification into domestic law.874 Thus, courts are usually willing to make 
provision for custom to prevail if it is considered reasonable to do so. The justification of 
custom is often based on its acceptability and accessibility among the people governed by it. 
However, being supplementary to national law, the courts have a common disposition to reject 
a custom if they deem it inconsistent with national law.875  
Currently, Nigerian national law recognises customary practices as a source of law in Nigeria, 
but only as a low-ranking, informal authority.876 Studies on informal legal systems show that 
incorporating traditional and customary legal practices into formal systems is crucial for the 
government to accommodate different religious or ethnic traditions in a single state.877 
Chirayath et al.878 posit that a failure to acknowledge different systems of understanding may 
in itself be discriminatory and inequitable. Hence, there have been calls by various, prominent 
legal adjudicators in Nigeria for an increased jurisdiction of customary law through customary 
courts,879 thus making them a practical platform to develop and evolve without interference 
from domestic law. It is believed that customary legal systems are preferable, as they are 
indigenous to a greater majority of the Nigerian populace.880 Consequently, governments in 
Nigeria have found ways of recognising customary law through Customary Courts of Appeal, 
subject to the repugnancy clause. Unresolved matters of custom undergo thorough 
investigation to reach a judgement that is fair and just.881 
Woodman882 posits that, realistically, customary laws outrank state laws. However, they are 
unlike formal legislation, which is created by those with legislative power and is usually written 
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and enforced accordingly. Shellef883 contends that custom is generally regarded as one of the 
recognised sources of law, especially in common law, which is essentially customary practice 
incorporated into the law by judicial mandate. Onyango884 justifies the study and application 
of African customary law in current African legal systems because it is “a means towards the 
end, which is that of liberty and development.” Custom also provides an avenue for sound law 
reform in terms of constitutionalism and rule of law in the independent African States.885 
 
5.9 Jurisdictional Concerns with the Application of Law in Customary Courts  
According to Ubink and Van Rooij,886 since 2000 customary justice systems have become a 
higher priority regarding legal development projects in the African community, which aim to 
provide remedies to individuals who have limited to no access to the formal legal system. 
However, there are concerns with respect to the application of customary law in courts on 
matters that are deemed discriminatory, especially towards women and children.887 One such 
concern is how to ascertain native law and prove it before the higher courts as valid. According 
to Himonga,888 the necessity to validate customary law has hindered formal courts from playing 
a constitutional role in developing customary law it: “[t]he evolving nature of indigenous law 
and the fact that it is unwritten have resulted in the difficulty of verifying the true indigenous 
law as practiced in the community […] abuses of indigenous law tend to distort [it] and 
undermine its value.”889  
Another matter for consideration is the problem of traditional leaders presiding over courts 
when they are not well versed in common law and human rights mandates. According to 
Taiwo,890 in its original form, customary law does not recognise the modern concept of division 
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or separation of powers, and customary courts are sometimes presided over by traditional chiefs 
and elders in the community. As such they take on the role of law givers, interpreters and 
executors all at the same time. Hence, contemporary concepts of presumption of innocence, 
burden of proof and proof beyond reasonable doubt are not well grounded and executed in 
customary administration of justice.891 In Modibo v. Adamawa Native Authority,892 an appeal 
was allowed when the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment over a personal attack on one 
of the elders presiding over the case. It was held that the principle that no man can be a judge 
in his own cause applied.  
Ubink and Van Rooij893 further posit that linking state and customary administration may 
improve the functioning of customary justice systems by increasing their accountability, so 
curtailing local power abuses and human rights violations. In Nigeria, customary courts are 
granted jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases subject to any statutory restrictions (e.g., 
the severity of a criminal case). The procedure for both types of case is fairly similar; however, 
some courts are not proficient enough in the law to deal with serious criminal matters,894 and 
have been duly prohibited from sitting on such matters. Advocates of customary legal practices 
argue that, like formal courts, customary courts serve a judicial purpose which is the resolution 
of legal disputes. Thus, parties to litigation are able to appeal to magistrates’ courts if they are 
not satisfied with decision of the customary court, and from there to the High Court if 
necessary. However, an appeal does not automatically undermine the judicial nature of the 
original customary proceedings,895 as custom still forms the basis of any decision in higher 
courts.  
There have been frequent instances where customary courts, such as the Nigerian Shari'a trial 
courts, were in conflict with national legislation; for example, with regard to the individual’s 
right to due process to preserve the principle of fairness. In the case of Jalo Guri & Anor v. 
Hadejia Native Authority,896 a deeply rooted customary rule forbidding a defendant from 
 
891Ibid. p. 96. 
892See (1956) NRNLR 101. 
893Ubink Janine, Van Rooij Benjamin ‘Towards Customary Legal Empowerment.’ In Ubink Janine, McInerney 
Thomas (eds.) (2011) ‘Customary Justice: Perspectives on Legal Empowerment Legal and Governance Reform: 
Lessons Learned.’ No. 3 p. 13. 
894Ibid.  
895South African Law Commission (1999) ‘The Harmonisation of the Common Law and Indigenous Law: 
Traditional Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders.’ Discussion Paper 82 Project 90 p. 12. 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp82_prj90_tradl_1999.pdf (accessed 07/04/2019). 




defending or exonerating himself in a hiraba (highway robbery) was presented. However, this 
rule was consequently struck down on the basis that it was unfair and repugnant to natural 
justice, equity, and good conscience. Punishments imposed by these courts were also 
considered excessively inhumane (e.g., the death penalty, amputations, and floggings), 
especially when a defendant’s conviction is based on confessions alone.897 In addition, some 
deem customary courts unfair because the operators are predominately male. During the 
colonial era, customary law provided a way for older men within traditional societies to reclaim 
some of the independence and control they lost to colonisation. Through customary legal 
systems, they were, and are, able to assert control over women, younger men, and children.898 
In Nigeria, customary courts are generally run by elderly men of societal standing and this 
imbalance is widely accepted as the norm in such legal systems. However, this practice has 
seen a change in recent times as new customary court judges are being appointed to replace the 
retired, disengaged judges of which include women in some parts of the country.899 This change 
is not widely established or documented in the extant literature.  
Another jurisdictional concern is the limited recognition of customary law at the federal level. 
According to Diala,900 recognition is non-existent and vague, and it is unclear who actually 
possesses legislative capacity over customary law. For instance, s.7(5)901 of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution restricts the powers of local government councils on matters of customary legal 
systems; but it also does not mention a prospective law reform or review of customary law that 
would assign the necessary powers. Diala902 furthers argues that the administration of legal 
matters such as succession, testate or intestate, are subject to variant interpretation when 
applied in common law, despite the comprehensive coverage of such matters by customary 
rules. Hence, succession under customary law has a wider meaning and scope of application 
than the definition prescribed by Nigerian common law. The disparity between succession 
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under customary versus common law, according to MJ de Waal,903 is the lack of conferred 
status and obligations on the ‘heir’ under common law. Hence, there is a high tendency for 
conflict and confusion when common law interprets deeply rooted customary law rules.904  
Many succession laws are overridden when the distribution of an estate is governed by 
customary law, and consequently testators’ rights to dispose of their property via a will are 
restricted.905 For example, in 2013 the Supreme Court upheld the principle of primogeniture 
contained within s. 3 (1) of the Wills Law of the old Bendel State in the case of Uwaifo v. 
Uwaifo.906 It was held that the Igiogbe custom of the Bini, which gives the eldest son the right 
to inherit the family home, overrides a father’s testamentary wishes.907 Nonetheless, despite 
the challenges and conflicts that customary law exhibit in relation to the principles of fairness 
and equality, Harper908 argues that the “customary justice system may be the only or most 
strategic entry point for enhancing access to justice”.  
 
5.10 International Human Rights Standards and Customary Legal Systems 
The right to legal aid and easy access to the courts system is essentially an international human 
right. The principle that embodies the right to equal and fair treatment of individuals before the 
courts is derived from a human rights concept and extends to all legal systems. According to 
Chandra,909 the principle of human rights will be rendered meaningless if an individual, who 
is unable to pay for the services of a lawyer, is not provided with legal aid to protect their 
fundamental rights and, moreover, if individuals are not able to gain access to courts of 
convenience.910  
 
903MJ de Waal (1997) ‘The Social and Economic Foundations of the law of Succession.’ 8 Stellenbosch Law 
Review pp. 159-161. 
904Ibid. 
905 Diala Anthony C.  (2014) ‘Reform of the Customary Law of Inheritance in Nigeria: Lessons from 
South Africa.’ AHRLJ Volume 14 No. 2 p. 642 
906Uwaifo v. Uwaifo (2013) Law Pavilion Electronic Law Reports 20389 (SC) per Galadima JSC. 
907Diala Anthony C.  (2014) ‘Reform of the customary law of inheritance in Nigeria: Lessons from South Africa.’ 
AHRLJ Volume 14 No. 2 p. 642. 
908Harper Erica ‘Engaging with Customary Justice Systems.’ In Ubink Janine, McInerney Thomas (eds.) (2011) 
‘Customary Justice: Perspectives on Legal Empowerment. Legal and Governance Reform: Lessons Learned.’ No. 
3 p. 31. 
909Chandra, S. (2014) ‘Legal Aid as a Fundamental Human Rights.’ VIDHIGYA: The Journal of Legal Awareness, 9 





The concept of human rights emerged as a result of the decline in the law and development 
movement911 as a strategy of legal pressure to challenge domestic laws and force change via 
international human rights mandates.912 Human rights discourse within the domain of the 
customary law courts is significant as human rights standards offer the possibility of fairness 
in three dimensions of justice. These are the (i) structural, (ii) procedural and (iii) normative 
dimensions.913 The structural dimension of justice deals with participation and accountability, 
with specific attention paid to the protection of groups that are not firmly represented in 
customary courts: for instance, women, disadvantaged individuals, and children.914  
Procedural justice embodies the guidelines for adjudication processes, which ensure that the 
parties to a dispute receive equal treatment and the adjudicator overseeing the case decides 
solely on the basis of facts and objective rules with no bias whatsoever. Normative justice 
consists of substantive rules that are positioned to regulate the rights, duties, and 
responsibilities to safeguard the rights of vulnerable groups, such as women’s rights to inherit 
and the rights of children who are forced to marry.915  
According to Okoth-Ogendo,916 when colonialism came to an end and Nigeria was preparing 
to align itself with the international legal community as an independent state, the ‘future’ of 
customary law in Africa was discussed in series of conferences by British legal scholars. They 
determined ways to “construct a viable framework for the development of legal systems in the 
emerging states”, as they considered indigenous African customary legal systems inferior to 
their British colonial counterpart.917 However, in reality, many lives across Africa continued to 
be regulated by customary laws, as they were they were the only legal system functioning in 
remote areas where state jurisdiction was limited and, in most cases, non-existent.918  
 
911‘The late 1950’s and 1960’s saw a rise in modern efforts to promote legal reform as a development strategy. 
Initiated when former colonies became independent, the outgoing colonialists were committed to 
modernising developing countries’ substantive laws and legal institutions.’ Trebilcock, M. J., & Prado, M. M. 
(2014) ‘Advanced Introduction to Law and Development.’ Edward Elgar Publishing p. 45. 
912Cummings, Scott L. and Trubek, Louise G., (2009) ‘Globalizing Public Interest Law.’  UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 13 pp. 11-12. 
913U.N.D.P, U.N Women, U.N.I.C.E.F (2012) ‘Study on Informal Justice System: Chartering a Way for Human 
Based Engagement.’ p. 11. 
914Ibid. 
915Ibid. 
916Okoth-Ogendo HWO (2008) ‘The Nature of Land Rights under Indigenous Law in Africa’ In Claassens A.  & 
Cousins B. (eds.) Land, Power and Custom (2008) p. 9. 
917Ibid. 
918Fenrich Jeanmarie, Galizzi Paolo and Higgins Tracy E. (eds.) (2011) ‘The Future of African Customary Law’ 




Obatusin919 contends that, regardless of the international human rights treaties signed by the 
Nigerian government to advance human rights principles, the majority of Africans are denied 
access to such norms and, as such, these rights fail to have any impact in places where 
customary law is predominantly utilised. Nonetheless, the customary courts system may serve 
as a mechanism to advance human rights mandates in Nigeria by employing ‘human rights-
compatible principles’ inherent in customary law. Tarimo920 believes that integration can be 
achieved if human rights principles are more relatable to Africans in their application.  
Obatusin921 further argues that the tension between international human rights norms and 
customary practices are predominantly perceptible in matters that are centred on women. The 
treatment of women under customary practices has received much attention in international 
human rights law, especially oppressive and unequal practices.922 Unfair rules that are 
detrimental to the rights of women in Nigeria (e.g., child marriage, female circumcision, 
polygamy and divorce, child custody and inheritance) have continued as custom over time but 
are slowly being reformed to strike a balance between customary law and international human 
rights mandates.923  
According to Chirayath et al.,924 customary legal systems are constantly shifting and changing, 
and are being reinvented within the confines of their respective social structures. Thus, they 
are potential mechanisms for social change and legal aid reform. Tobin925 argues that 
customary law is still immensely important because it is an integral component of common law 
and has survived through centuries. The author further posits that the recognition of customary 
legal regimes is forcing legislators at both national and international levels to examine the 
 
919Obatusin Simisola (2018) ‘Customary Law Principles as a Tool for Human Rights Advocacy: Innovating 
Nigerian Customary Practices using Lessons from Ugandan and South African Courts.’ Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 56 (3) pp. 1-49.  
920Tarimo Aquiline (2004) ‘Human Rights, Cultural Differences and the Church in Africa.’ II Morogoro, Tanzania: 
Salvatorianum. 
921Obatusin, Simisola (2018) ‘Customary Law Principles as a Tool for Human Rights Advocacy: Innovating 
Nigerian Customary Practices using Lessons from Ugandan and South African Courts.’ Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 56 (3) pp. 1-49. 
922Ibid. 
923Ibid. 
924Chirayath Leila, Sage Caroline and Woolcock Michael (2005) ‘Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging 
with the Plurality of Justice Systems.’ Background paper for the World Development Report 2006: Equity and 
Development pp. 1-31. 
925Tobin, Brendan M. (2011) ‘Why Customary Law Matters: The Role of Customary Law in the Protection of 




underlying principles of law as it relates to socio-economic, environmental, cultural, and 
political matters.926 
 
5.10.1 Preservation of Customary Legal practices via International Instruments in Nigeria 
According to Tauli-Corpuz,927 the maintenance and preservation of customary legal institutions 
and norms is crucial to self-governance and self-determination. This is acknowledged under 
international human rights instruments as essential to guarantee indigenous peoples’ access to 
justice. The International Labour Organization (ILO)928 was the first multilateral body which 
adopted a Convention addressing indigenous peoples929 in 1957.930 Nigeria became a member 
in 1960; however, in 1989, the 1957 convention was revised, and the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention of 1989 was adopted.931 It is also known as the ILO-convention 169. The 
main objective of the 1989 convention was to enhance social protection and uphold the rights 
of independent states, 932 as well as to enable “indigenous peoples to exercise control over their 
own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their 
identities, languages and religions[.]”933 Articles 1 and 2 establish a state obligation to 
safeguard custom and its respective institutions:  
 
926Ibid. 
927‘Human rights, Indigenous Jurisdiction and Access to Justice: Towards Intercultural Dialogue and Respect.’ 
Presentation by Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples 
for the International Seminar on Investigative Techniques and Indigenous Issues Bogotá, Colombia, February 
24, 2016. 
928International Labour Organization https://www.ilo.org/global/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 18/03/19). 




930International Labour Organization Convention No. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries which was adopted in June 
26, 1957. 
931International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No.169). 
https://www.ilo.org/Search5/search.do?sitelang=en&locale=en_EN&consumercode=ILOHQ_STELLENT_PUBLIC
&searchWhat=ILO+Indigenous+and+Tribal+Peoples+Convention%2C+1989+%28No.+169%29&searchLanguage
=en (accessed 18/03/19). 
932Tauli-Corpuz Victoria ‘How the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples got Adopted.’ 
933See The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life - Comments Submitted by the International Labour 
Organisation, Day of General Discussion – ‘Right to Take Part in Cultural Life’ (Article 15(1)(a) of the Covenant), 
(UN Doc. E/C.12/40/12), 9 May 2008, para. 2(1) p. 3. 




(1) Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the 
peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples 
and to guarantee respect for their integrity.  
(2) Such action shall include measures for: […] (b) promoting the full realisation of the social, 
economic, and cultural rights of these peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, 
their customs and traditions and their institutions.  
Article 4 contains further instructions to governments to ensure the mandates of the convention 
are fulfilled: “(1) Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the 
persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned.” 
Article 5 reiterates the objectives of the convention in relation to social, cultural, religious, and 
spiritual practices and their institutions: “(b) The integrity of the values, practices and 
institutions of these peoples shall be respected.”  
Article 8 of the 1989 convention guarantees the protection of customary institutions, as long as 
they are not incompatible with the national legal system and international human rights: 
(1) In applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had 
to their customs or customary laws. 
(2) These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these 
are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with 
internationally recognised human rights. Procedures shall be established, whenever necessary, 
to resolve conflicts which may arise in the application of this principle. 
Article 9 extends the scope of customary practices via international law to include methods of 
punishment in the framework of customary legal systems:  
(1) To the extent compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognised 
human rights, the methods customarily practised by the peoples concerned for dealing with 
offences committed by their members shall be respected.  
(2) The customs of these peoples regarding penal matters shall be taken into consideration by 




Under international law, a ratified convention is a binding agreement between nations. 
However, according to s. 12 (1) of the 1999 Nigerian constitution,934 an international 
convention assumes the force of law under Nigerian national law only when it is enacted by 
the National Assembly. Hence, Article 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(ACHPR) (Banjul Charter)935 states that: “(1) All peoples shall have the right to their economic, 
social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal 
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.” Article 22 (2) place obligations on states to 
ensure that 22 (1) is fulfilled: “States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure 
the exercise of the right to development.” Cultural development was not explicitly defined in 
the Banjul Charter; however, according to Murray and Wheatley,936 culture in this context 
represents the way people address aspects of their social life through intrinsic cultural practices.  
However, despite the widespread existence of traditional and customary law in African 
countries such as Nigeria, Chirayath et al.937 contend that customary systems went through a 
period where they were almost completely neglected by the international development 
community.938 Customary practices were deemed archaic and rigid, and in terms of reform they 
are considered too complex due to their diverse nature.939 Subsequently, in 2007, the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)940 was adopted to oversee 
the protection of indigenous peoples worldwide. Article 34941 of this 2007 declaration also 
affirms fundamental rights and international support for indigenous groups. However, Nigeria 
 
934Section 12 (1)” No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law to the 
extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.” 
935‘The Banjul Charter has been ratified and domesticated as law by National assembly in Nigeria.’ 
936Murray Rachel and Wheatley Steven (2003) ‘Groups and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.’ 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1 pp. 213-236. 
937Chirayath Leila, Sage Caroline and Woolcock Michael (2005) ‘Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging 
with the Plurality of Justice Systems’. Background paper for the World Development Report 2006: Equity and 
Development. pp. 1-31.  
938For instance, “the World Bank has dramatically increased its efforts in promoting justice sector reform in 
client countries, yet none of these projects deal explicitly with traditional legal systems, despite their 
predominance in many of the countries involved.” Ibid. p. 3.  
939Ibid. 
940See 61/295. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/512/07/PDF/N0651207.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 20/03/19). 
941“Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their 
distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical 




refrained from ratifying this declaration due to concerns about its implications for the rights of 
its multiple indigenous populations.942  
The Banjul Charter, which has been ratified and domesticated as law by the National Assembly, 
has the same force of law as Nigerian statutes. The ILO convention 169 has also been ratified, 
but it has not been domesticated as law in Nigeria according to Section 12 (1) of the 1999 
Nigeria constitution. As such, the ILO convention 169 is not legally enforceable unless further 
mechanisms are enacted via national legislation to ensure that customary systems are 
preserved. Such mechanisms have been established for other international agreements, for 
example to guarantee the directives of the ILO Convention 29 of 1930 on the elimination of 
forced or compulsory labour in Nigeria. National legislation was enacted by way of Section 73 
of the Nigerian Labour Code,943 imposing a penalty of imprisonment on defaulters.944 The 
mandates contained within UNDRIP, on the other hand, are not enforceable in Nigeria due to 
their un-ratified status. Such crucial human rights instruments have no legitimate impact on 
domestic Nigerian law if they remain un-ratified. Ultimately, the rights of the majority; bound 
by customary law in Nigeria, continue to be undermined as protections are deemed 
hypothetical. As such, reform, and development of rights through the court system is hindered.  
 
5.11 Implementing Legal Aid via Customary Courts in Nigeria 
Providing legal aid to disadvantaged individuals in rural areas under the jurisdiction of 
customary legal systems can be challenging. There is a need, however, as communities are 
faced with legal issues involving crime, land, and matrimonial matters.945 Implementing legal 
aid in established customary courts could increase the scope of free legal representation. It 
could also provide access to individuals who are more comfortable and familiar with 
indigenous legal processes and settings than they are with formal English common law 
 
942See article written by Abdullahi Shuaibu and published by United Press International: ‘Ogoni: Nigeria 
Opposes Indigenous Rights Declaration.’ (2007) Unrepresented Nations and Peoples’ Organization 
https://unpo.org/article/6763 (accessed 18/03/19). 
943See section 73 Labour Act Chapter 198 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.  
944Siona Ndeh Cynthia and Bukoye Teslim O. (2015) ‘A Perspective on the ILO Convention on the Elimination of 
Forced or Compulsory Labour: The cases of Nigerian and Cameroon.’ European Scientific Journal /SPECIAL/ 
edition Vol. 1 p. 19. 






procedure. Chirayath et al.946 argue that focusing purely on access to formal systems gives the 
impression that such systems are easily accessible to everyone, which is not the case even in 
the most developed countries. In Nigeria, legal aid has been made available in many 
communities through various NGOs947 in order to defend their rights in the more superior 
courts on matters that are related to custom (e.g., land, property, inheritance and forced eviction 
matters).948 However, this is not a standard practice available to all litigants in a customary 
court setting.  
Advocates have emphasised the benefits of customary legal practices as a tool to expand the 
scope of access to courts in Nigeria. For instance, Nwocha949 argues that there is great 
“potential for customary law to contribute to both legal and social justice in a way that 
eliminates the bottlenecks that have bogged down the current legal and judicial system”. 
However, the literature does not mention the added benefits of making legal aid available to 
individuals who would prefer to be heard in customary courts.  
 
5.11.1 Proposed Framework for the Implementation of Legal Aid in Nigerian Customary 
Courts  
In terms of the practicality of implementing legal aid through customary courts in Nigeria, this 
study proposes a viable framework that would ensure that the accessibility and flexibility of 
customary courts are maintained throughout the transition. This is vital to the preservation of 
the integrity of the customary court system. In recent times, there has been keen interest from 
the Nigerian Legal Aid Council to utilise paralegals to expand the scope of legal aid, especially 
in the rural areas. They are formally recognised as legal aid providers in the current Legal Aid 
Act 2011 with no limitations to their operation.950  
 
946Ibid. p. 5. 
947Such as Community-based legal aid (CBLA) Programs. ‘CBLA programs are limited to non-legal personnel; 
and does not involve actual legal counsel representation in customary courts they are also known as 
community-based paralegal services, which comprises of basic justice services such as legal advice, 
empowerment and education.’ http://www.justempower.org/what-we-do/paralegals (accessed 10/08/19). 
948Onouha Reginald Akujobi (2008) ‘Discriminatory Property Inheritance under Customary Law in Nigeria: 
NGOs to the Rescue.’ Int'l J. Not-for-Profit L. Vol. 10 No. 2 pp. 79-93. 
949Nwocha, M. E. (2016) ‘Customary Law, Social Development and Administration of Justice in Nigeria.’ Beijing 
Law Review 7 pp. 430-442. 




The administration of paralegals has been very successful in various African countries who 
have undertaken different roles from court representation, advocacy to dispute resolution and 
prosecution e.g., South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Lesotho etc. Thus, 
paralegals are increasingly cited as crucial to improving access to legal services and a call for 
more recognition and an increased scope of operation has been launched by many African 
countries;951 Nigeria included. Hence, a pressing need to move from traditional alternative 
dispute resolution to a more formal role of casework and court appearances on behalf of 
clients952 In customary courts. The aim of this proposition is to guarantee legal aid to 
marginalised and rural communities in Nigeria.   
The proposed structure would consist of a pool of potential paralegals who are indigenes with 
deep knowledge of customary law in their area. NYSC law graduates who are posted to such 
areas for the year would provide legal advice and representation to individuals within 
customary courts as well as train the paralegals on case management, legal advice, and 
representation. NYSC law graduates have been trained in the Nigerian formal legal system and 
are aware of the customary counterpart. As such, the paralegals will be required to assist them 
with understanding the customary law of the specific area. Hence, they are not tasked with 
converting customary law to correspond with the formal legal system or suit their personal 
beliefs but to preserve it, as far as it is just and right to do so. If the client is not satisfied, there 
are options to appeal to the Customary Court of Appeal. However, there is an opportunity to 
administer community legal education through this innovation, to empower indigenes as well 
as customary court judges to review and eradicate archaic and discriminatory customary laws 
to avoid lengthy appeal court cases.    
This restructure would also be cost effective keeping in mind, that funding is one of the main 
barriers to the scheme. NYSC Law graduates are already on a monthly stipend provided by the 
federal government, as such, the only payment required would be for the paralegals who would 
be employed as civil servants on a basic grade according to their role. Additional training could 
also be sourced through NGO’s who are self-funded. 
The long-term benefits include invaluable experience for the NYSC law graduates in 
customary legal systems. The combined effort of both parties will bring a balance to the system 
i.e., not overrun by NYSC law graduates whose role would gradually become supervisory, 
 





allowing the paralegals more prominence, and conserve the informal nature of customary 
courts. This would maintain and develop customary courts by strengthening its operative 
system and granting it recognition; as a dependable legal system in Nigeria (The findings of 
this study in chapter 7 show that a considerable number of respondents do not trust the Nigerian 
customary courts system, but the majority believe legal aid should be made available in the 
interest of justice for communities bound by customary law as well as improve the 
effectiveness of the system).  
In addition, this study is not advocating for a total codification of customary law (it may be 
necessary in some areas e.g., discriminatory matters) as it may lose its flexibility which enables 
it to promptly respond and adjust to societal changes, making it easily accessible. The lack of 
rigidness is key to its uniqueness and codification could initiate an irrevocable move to replace 
customary law with formal law over time, risking the integrity of customary legal practices in 
general. Thus, this study does not seek to off-set its intrinsic structure, but to expand its scope 
of operation to benefit society more effectively through legal aid, NYSC law graduates and 
community-based paralegals. 
 
5.12 Legislative Provisions for Customary Courts in Nigeria  
This section will examine the legality of customary courts within the current 1999 constitution 
of Nigeria and other statutory instruments such as the 2011 Legal Aid Act of Nigeria. It will 
also explore the prospects of expanding legal aid provision via customary courts in Nigeria. 
According to Idem,953 the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) “has 
made adequate provisions for States through their respective Houses of Assembly to establish 
Area and Customary Courts to hear and determine matters over persons subject to native laws 
and customs in the areas of their jurisdiction”. Section 6 (1) of the 1999 Constitution states 
that: “[t]he judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts […] being courts 
established for the Federation.” Section 6 (2) describes the judicial powers of individual States, 
while s. 6 (5) (a) to (i) list the courts of Nigeria to which s. 6 (1) relates.954 Section 6 (5) (k) 
 
953Idem Udosen Jacob (2017) ‘The Judiciary and the Role of Customary Courts in Nigeria.’ Global Journal of 
Politics and Law Research Vol. 5, No.6 p. 34.  
954The Supreme Court; the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court; the National Industrial Court; High Court of 
the Federal Capital Territory; High Court of the States; Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT (Abuja); Customary 




provides judicial guarantees for people who live in a rural setting, investing powers in “such 
other court as may be authorised by law to exercise jurisdiction at first instance or on appeal 
on matters with respect to which a House of Assembly may make laws”. Hence, s. 17 (2) (e) 
allows for: “the independence, impartiality, and integrity of courts of law, and easy 
accessibility thereto[.]” 
In validating the status of customary courts within the 1999 constitution, Idem955 contends that 
majority of cases surrounding land, marriage, custody of children and matters of inheritance in 
rural areas are determined by customary courts; and, by virtue of s. 6 of the CFRN 1999 (as 
amended), the Customary and Area Courts and their judges form part of the system of Courts 
of Nigeria.956 Section 6 thus implies that the Nigerian customary courts systems are established 
by law and endure the same privilege accorded to formal courts. As discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis, s. 46 (4) guarantees the provision of legal aid, stating that: “[t]he National Assembly 
shall make provisions (i) for the rendering of financial assistance to any indigent citizen of 
Nigeria where his right under this Chapter has been infringed […] enabling him to engage the 
services of a legal practitioner to prosecute his claim[.]” In addition, the constitution also grants 
a fair hearing to individuals charged with a criminal offence “by a court or other tribunal 
established by law”.957  
The 2011 Legal Aid Act of Nigeria governs the provision of legal aid and access to justice for 
persons with inadequate resources. In fulfilment of s. 8 (1) of the 2011 Act,958  the grant of 
legal aid by the LAC extends to three broad areas, namely the Criminal Defence Service, 
Advice and Assistance in Civil matters, and legal representation in court and Community Legal 
Services. However, eligibility is subject to a merits and indigence test. In addition, s. 8 (5) (b) 
provides that legal aid shall consist of: “representation by a legal practitioner including all such 
assistance as is usually given to by a private legal practitioner before ‘any court’ subject to 
eligibility criteria.” This section affirms the availability of legal aid in any court in Nigeria, 
implying access to legal aid in customary courts as they are considered courts under domestic 
law.  
 
955Idem Udosen Jacob (2017) ‘The Judiciary and the Role of Customary Courts in Nigeria.’ Global Journal of 
Politics and Law Research Vol. 5, No. 6 p. 35. 
956Ibid. 
957See section 36(4) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 




5.13 Application of Legal Aid in Contemporary African Customary Courts 
Despite the apparent complications in Nigeria being a heterogeneous society with diverse 
cultures, languages, and laws, Nwocha959 argues that the people are more able to understand 
the customary system and to accept a settlement or determination that emanates from it. 
Gluckman,960 during a study of customary legal practices in Zululand and Rhodesia, observed 
that: “[African courts] use the same basic doctrines as our courts do. African legal systems, 
like all legal systems, are founded on principles of the reasonable man, responsibility, 
negligence, and direct, circumstantial and hearsay evidence. African judges and laymen apply 
those principles skilfully and logically to a variety of situations in order to achieve justice.”961 
Hence, many post-colonial and post-apartheid regions, such as South Africa and Uganda, have 
restructured their inherent customary courts system by increasing the scope of affordable 
access to courts in indigenous jurisdictions. These customary courts are closely targeted at the 
poor majority.962   
In South Africa, the dual system of law provides a good example of the co-existence of different 
legal systems within one geopolitical State;963 however, in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe and Uganda, legal representation is prohibited where there are traditional or 
customary courts or non-traditional community courts. For instance, in some parts of South 
Africa, legal representation in chiefs’ and headmen’s courts is prohibited. However, in the case 
of Bangindawo,964 the prohibition against legal representation in a regional authority court was 
challenged by the litigants and deemed unfair and contrary to s. 35 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996.965 Hence, the court ruled the ban on legal aid in such courts 
unconstitutional. The judge held that regional authority courts are hybrid courts and are more 
similar to customary than western-style courts, and that they operate a concurrent jurisdiction 
with magistrate’s courts. It is sometimes argued that the exclusion of lawyers from traditional 
courts is unjustified in that litigants should have the choice, if they so wish, to engage legal 
 
959Nwocha, M. E. (2016) ‘Customary Law, Social Development and Administration of Justice in Nigeria.’ Beijing 
Law Review, 7, pp. 430-442. 
960Gluckman M. (1963) ‘Custom and Conflict in Africa.’ 4th Edition Basil Blackwell Publishers Oxford.  
961Ibid. 
962Ibid.  
963Onyango Peter (2013) ‘African Customary Law: An Introduction.’ p. 22. 
964See Bangindawo and others v. Head of Nyanda Regional Authority and Another 1998 (3) BCLR 314 (Tk). 
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practitioners to represent them in these traditional courts,966 especially as such courts are 
recognised by national law as a judicial forum.  
The above case shows: there is an implied need for legal representation regardless of the court; 
in the interest of fair justice. Thus, this study utilised a socio-legal approach to explore the 
research question via the collection of first-hand data consisting of varied perceptions on legal 
aid and the customary court system in Nigeria. The data is collected, then analysed using 
specific research methods to capture personal opinions, concepts, and descriptions on topic. 
The findings of the study are then categorised through themes to determine the prospects of the 
implementing legal aid through customary courts in Nigeria.   
 
966South African Law Commission (1999) Discussion Paper 82 Project 90 The Harmonisation of the Common 
Law and Indigenous Law: Traditional Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders pp. 1-37. 













Chapter 6: Research Methodology  
6.1 Introduction 
According to Bryman,967 academics instigate research for various reasons. Typically, however, 
they do it to resolve aspects of society that elude their understanding. This might be due to a 
gap in the extant literature or an inconsistency in other studies on the topic in question. From 
such gap’s questions arise and research is the means to investigate and clarify the inquiry via 
factual evidence (i.e., empirical data). Philosophers such as David Hume (1711-76) pioneered 
the empirical research tradition and argued that all knowledge of the world originate in the 
individual’s experience. Empirical data is at its optimum capacity when a study is directly 
observed and collected in an unbiased and objective manner.968  
There is a constant demand for empirical data to strengthen social institutions and pave the way 
for further research into how they can become more effective for the individuals that require 
them. Hence, empirical research requires an insightful approach to data collection and analysis 
so to provide information for future reference and to offer solutions to the problems under 
discussion. For decades, critics have argued that researchers are rarely approached as an initial 
step to support policy mandates, and that research is most commonly sought to support a readily 
adopted policy option or as a means to delay a necessary intervention.969  
This study is grounded in socio-legal research that seeks to establish the nature and role of law 
in society. The main focus is to examine the way social factors affect an individual’s ability to 
access legal aid in Nigeria. Hence, an interdisciplinary, socio-legal approach is employed as 
the prime mode of research. Socio-legal research continues to emerge as a single discipline, 
promoting interdisciplinary studies of law.970 Over time, socio-legal research has evolved from 
being referred to as just sociology or social science to representing an interface with a context 
within which law also exists.971 
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The research design for this study comprises of an interpretive case study that is analysed 
through qualitative research methods. The qualitative research method was the preferred 
method for this study because of its adaptability and flexibility in data collection and analysis. 
It also aligns with the socio-legal focus of this study which is the need is to ask different 
questions regarding the role of law in a specific social situation e.g., access to legal aid in a 
customary court setting. This would not have been achieved with a quantitative approach. 
According to Boodhoo and Purmessur,972 qualitative research provides a more realistic feel of 
the world than quantitative numeric and statistical analysis by giving the research a non-
rehearsed, descriptive competence.  
Semi-structured telephone interviews and self-administered questionnaires were used as data 
collection methods. The justification for each of the data collection methods used in the study 
is detailed in this chapter in order to demonstrate the quality and reliability of the research. In 
addition, the sample size of 15 for both data collection methods (combined) is limited 
considering; sample adequacy in qualitative inquiry is generally measured by 
sample composition and size. However, Sandelowski973 contends, that small samples sizes are 
effective in certain studies especially, to support the intensity of case-oriented analysis which 
aims at collecting rich descriptions of a certain phenomenon such as this study. In other words, 
the more the viability of collected data from each person, the fewer participants are needed.974 
 
6.2 Methodology 
The concept of methodology in social science refers to the approach researchers employ to seek 
answers to problems identified as crucial to a research topic. This is most important for 
inquiries seeking to examine how individuals respond to social factors when accessing social 
institutions. Seumas975 defines a social institution as an organisation or a system of 
organisations utilised to sustain societies, such as government, business corporations or legal 
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systems. The manner in which a particular research topic is conducted976 will depend solely on 
the research question posed. According to Tuli,977 there are varieties of research methodologies 
and hence no single accepted methodology applicable to all questions. Wahyuni978 notes that 
research methodology and research method are distinct concepts. Methodology serves as a 
research tool that critically enquires into the claims of specific methods, while methods lend 
credence to the often more abstract assertions of a methodology.979 According to Jonker and 
Pennink,980 methodology is a map to the destination, while method is the set of specific steps 
needed to travel on the way. Hence, the former is a general approach which establishes how to 
go about studying a phenomenon981 in relation to the research question under investigation. 
According to Langbroek et al.,982 many academic legal publications lack in-depth narrative and 
discussion on the research design and methods used. Therefore, questions of validity that 
underpin research are often overlooked.  
Chilisa and Kawulich983 suggest that fundamental guidelines must be identified and established 
when developing a methodology for research. For instance:  
➢ What paradigm informs the methodology? 
➢ What theoretical framework, if any, informs the research topic? 
➢ What research approach is required based on the research question(s)? 
➢ What types and sources of data are available to help answer the research question(s)? 
➢ What are the best ways to collect data (i.e., what guides the choice of participants, the 
setting of the study and the techniques of data collection)? 
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➢ What approach is applicable to the data analysis and interpretation? 
➢ What are the ethical considerations of the study? 
➢ How valid are the standards that inform the data collection, analysis, and interpretation of 
the research findings?984 
 
The research design for this study is descriptive and interpretive and employs qualitative 
methods of analysis. This thesis relies on the traditional legal research method of using both 
primary and secondary sources of information. However, this study also seeks to conduct 
verifiable research to examine the research topic and, more importantly, answer the research 
question that has been posed. Banakar et al.985 contend that authoritative data is key to 
understanding the mentality of the other. Testable evidence serves as an ancillary factor in 
exploring the phenomenon of legal aid within the Nigerian context and identifying the interests 
of individuals, who are the main stakeholders of legal aid.  
This study aims to capture the mindset of Nigerian individuals on matters relating to access to 
free legal representation, with a focus on the adoption of customary courts as a legal tool to 
further expand the scheme. It investigates current Nigerian legal aid provision in practice by 
obtaining crucial data emanating from the perception of the respondents. This includes an in-
depth analysis of the role of international/regional human rights instruments and Nigerian 
national legislation in ensuring the fundamental right to legal aid for the disadvantaged. 
Primary sources, consisting of legal and historical documents, are utilised. This also includes 
an evaluation of other legal and non-legal tools put in place to support and advance the 
provision of legal aid for the vulnerable in Nigeria, for example the 2011 Legal Aid Act. 
There are a wide range of written works in the area of access to justice and legal aid in Nigeria. 
This study relies on secondary sources of information, such as library and academic databases 
on legal aid, human rights, and access to justice; for example, JSTOR, Hein Online, African 
Human Rights Law Journal and the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Library. Other 
appropriate socio-legal academic literature linked to the impact of law on society is utilised. 
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This study also examines the literature on African regional human rights instruments, the 
Nigerian constitution, and other national legislation affiliated with the legal aid scheme.  
Peer reviewed journals, such as the African Journal of Legal Studies, the Journal of Law and 
Society, and The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (among many others), are 
used. Institutional publications are also employed, including the Journal of African Law, the 
African Journal of Clinical Legal Education and Access to Justice, as well as government and 
non-governmental published reports, documents, and newspaper articles.  
The choice of this mode of research is justified by the gap in the extant literature, where there 
is a lack of in-depth examination of the current status of legal aid in relation to the future 
prospects of the scheme. This study investigates: the structure of legal aid; how the scheme has 
developed over time through constitutional law, rules, and guidelines; and the potential 
application of other sources of law to expand the scope of legal aid in Nigeria (e.g., customary 
courts). The method of research employed by this study also acted as a guide to identify the 
group of individuals that fall into the category that this study investigates. In addition, the 
research methods were a tool to determine the suitable sampling method, appropriate sample 
size and how data is to be collected, stored, and translated.  
 
6.3 Research Paradigms 
A research paradigm enables researchers to navigate the questions they want to pose and, as a 
consequence, identify the approaches they need.986 Various scholars have defined the term 
‘paradigm’ differently in line with their own understanding of the concept.987 For instance, 
McNaughton et al.988 posit that a research paradigm comprises of three elements: a belief about 
the nature of knowledge, a methodology and the criteria for validity. Schwandt989 construes a 
paradigm to be a system that represents the beliefs, methods, commitments, and values shared 
across a discipline and a template that guides how problems are solved. As such, identifying a 
paradigm appropriate to a particular study enables the researcher to view the society in question 
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in a particular manner.990 Kivunja and Kuyini991 posit that Thomas Kuhn (1962) pioneered the 
term paradigm to mean a philosophical way of thinking, deriving it from the Greek word 
paradeigma which means ‘pattern’. Kuhn992 argues that a paradigm is an acceptable means to 
achieve “scientific attainments that for a time give model problems and solutions for a 
community of researchers.” That is, they are a set of structures through which the researcher 
views the world by moving as close to the truth as possible.  
Kuhn named the quality of seeming true as ‘verisimilitude’, and posited that research is made 
possible by inquiries and verifications within the ruling paradigm of a discipline, which will  
evolve over time to form new paradigms.993 Hence, a paradigm implies a pattern, structure and 
framework of scientific and academic ideas, values and assumptions.994 According Guba and 
Lincoln,995 paradigms may be perceived as a set of basic beliefs that deals with the fundamental 
concepts on which a theory, system or method is based. It represents a framework that guides 
research action or investigation, as well as a view of the nature of the world and the role 
individuals play within it.  
Paradigms focus on how problems should be understood and consequently addressed. Thus, 
the beliefs held by the researcher will lead to the choice and application of the methodological 
approach, be it qualitative, quantitative, or mixed.996 Scholars of sociology classify their 
paradigm through epistemology, ontology, and research methodology.  
There is insufficient factual data on how individuals perceive legal aid in Nigeria. As such, a 
true picture of whether the provision helps individuals who need legal aid is lacking. This study 
seeks to answer the research question via the selected research method, which is to examine 
the perspective of individuals in Nigeria on access to legal aid in general, and in customary 
courts in particular. 
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6.4 Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology 
Neuman997 contends that research methodology rests on a foundation of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions and refers to them as ‘philosophical foundations.’ The author 
argues that all scientific research rests on assumptions and principles derived from both of these 
foundations, which concern how and why researchers adopts a particular approach to social 
research.998 “Ontology concerns the issue of what exists, or the fundamental nature of reality”, 
and so reality can be perceived from either a realist or a nominalist position.999 Realists see the 
world as pre-existing and not tied to human existence, while nominalists believe human 
experiences of the world are established through a scheme of interpretations and personal 
encounters. Epistemology concerns how well we know the world around us and how to produce 
knowledge and learn about reality.1000  
According to Goldkuhl,1001 ontology, epistemology and methodology are concepts that are 
entwined and work together to enable understanding of a phenomenon. Guba and Lincoln1002 
contend that research paradigms can be identified through these three concepts: 
➢ Ontology – How does one perceive a phenomenon? 
➢ Epistemology – How can one understand a phenomenon? 
➢ Methodology – How can one undertake an inquiry of a phenomenon? 
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Figure 6.1 - Research Paradigms 
Research paradigms are crucial to the concept of social reality embedded in research, such as 
understanding the motives and actions of certain individuals in society. Thus, they are also 
considered a ‘basic belief’ system because, in spite of their significance in social research, they 
are unable to give a clear picture regarding their ultimate truthfulness and as such must be 
accepted on faith.1003  
Burrell and Morgan1004 examined the role of paradigms as views of social reality and 
established another perspective. They argue that the controversy surrounding truthfulness may 
never be resolved and propose that a researcher should adopt whatever paradigm they feel will 
accord trustworthiness to their method. Hence, they propose four main paradigms which are 
based on contrasting sets of assumptions regarding the nature of social science and the nature 
of society:1005  
➢ Radical-Humanist (subjective-radical change); 
➢ Radical-Structuralist (objective-radical change);  
➢ Functionalist (objective-regulation);  
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➢ Interpretive (subjective-regulation). 
 
                             
 
Figure 6.2 - Adapted from Burrell and Morgan’s Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social 
Theory1006                                           
According to Morgan,1007 each of these four paradigms reflects a network of related schools of 
thought that embody four exclusive views of the social world. Hence, each school is different 
in approach and context, but share common fundamental assumptions within their respective 
networks about the nature of the reality that they represent.1008   
The radical-humanist paradigm is grounded in phenomena concerned with developing 
sociology of radical change from a subjectivist viewpoint.1009 According to Gunbayi and 
Sorm,1010 the radical-humanist paradigm provides a description of radical change, modes of 
domination, emancipation, deprivation, and potentiality via a subjective approach. This 
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paradigm is linked to an individual’s personal interpretation of a situation, as they relate to the 
important features of their lives.1011 As such radical humanist researchers tend to lean towards 
anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideographic ideologies which essentially focus on the values that 
guide a person or organisation to action. The concept is based on the principle that existing 
social arrangements that serve as constraints to human development should be reversed and 
reformed.1012 
The radical-structuralist paradigm is like the radical-humanist paradigm in that it is concerned 
with the liberation of social actors; however, in contrast, it has an objectivistic assumption of 
social science.1013 Similar to the purpose of the legal aid scheme, which is to ensure 
uncomplicated access to justice for disadvantaged individuals in Nigeria, the main intention of 
the radical-structuralist paradigm is to examine structural conflicts that stand as barriers to the 
current structure and advocate to right such wrongs via a radical reform. . This is achieved by 
emphasising the external constraints caused by limited resources, and geographical and cultural 
restrictions (including organisational restraints emerging from procedural changes, such as 
time limits, costs etc.).1014  
Chua1015 posits three main research paradigms – positivist, interpretivist and critical – and 
argues that all other paradigms stem from them. Another point of view suggests that there are 
just two major research paradigms: positivism and interpretivism.1016 However, according to 
Úrtenblad,1017 the functionalistic and interpretive perspectives from Burrell and Morgan’s four 
paradigms are more dominant in social science.  
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The functionalist paradigm is based upon the belief that society has a real existence and an 
inherent quality capable of creating an ordered and regulated state of affairs. Hence, Lane’s1018 
definition: “the social world exists outside of humans and so can be observed and the structural 
laws that sustain it uncovered.” The functionalist paradigm is objectivistic and rooted in 
regulation.1019 It was pioneered by French theorist Auguste Comte during the 19th century in 
an attempt to apply the methods of the natural sciences to social phenomena.1020 In the early 
20th Century, positivism was officially recognised and adopted as the leading scientific and 
technical approach by constituents of the Vienna Circle,1021 who aimed to build a scientific and 
technical worldview that rejects the application of philosophy as the basis of acquiring 
knowledge regarding the factual and natural world of realism.1022  
Comte argued that reality could be experimental as well as objective.1023 Now commonly 
known as the positivist paradigm, the functionalist paradigm assumes the existence of coherent 
human action and accepts that a researcher can comprehend human actions through ‘hypothesis 
testing’.1024 Positivist researchers frequently use methodologies such as: micro-level testing, 
confirmatory analysis, nomothetic experiments, quantitative analysis, laboratory experiments 
and deduction.1025 However, Aliyu et al. 1026 contend that positivist methodologies are not 
applicable to all research, because it lacks the complexities of the outside world (e.g., in societal 
matters). The authors believe that the outcomes of research by means of experimental and 
scientific methods run the risk of not matching the results of investigations conducted in the 
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outside world, where a much larger number of elements or factors act together.1027 Ultimately, 
it seeks to explain how the individual elements of social systems interact with one another to 
form a unified integral entity.  
According to Scotland,1028 the ontological position of positivism is one of realism: objects have 
an existence independent of the knower.1029 According to Hughes and Sharrock,1030 positivism 
explains the social world by assembling ‘objective’ realities that are peripheral and cannot be 
influenced. The viewpoint of objectivity implies that two investigators examining the same 
study will end up with similar results.1031 Hence, the functionalist viewpoint is a problem-
orientated approach, concerned with understanding society through in-depth investigation. The 
approach also seeks to provide rational explanations for social affairs and practical solutions to 
practical problems. These are sought by emphasising the importance of understanding society 
from the point of view of individuals who are engaged in the performance of the social activities 
in question. The positivist researcher identifies and explains ‘causal linkages’ of a 
phenomenon1032 ‘to discover causal relations among variables.’1033 
Cohen et al. 1034 posit that the applicability of the approach would depend mainly on the nature 
of the research, as it is a scientific paradigm aimed at verifying or contradicting an assumption. 
Investigating the causal relationship between the perspectives of individuals and the legal aid 
scheme via other sources of law in Nigeria, such as customary courts, is key to an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. As with the functionalist approach, the positivist 
epistemology is one of objectivism. That is, discovering absolute knowledge about an unbiased 
reality. As such, the researcher and the participants remain independent entities. Thus, 
positivist methodology is directed at explaining relationships by identifying causes which 
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influence outcomes.1035 According to Creswell,1036 “positivists believe that different 
researchers observing the same factual problem will generate a similar result by carefully using 
statistical tests and applying a similar research process in investigating a large sample.”  
Kolakowski1037 states that positivism embraces a four point doctrine: “(1) the rule of 
phenomenalism which asserts that there is only experience; all abstractions be they ‘matter’ or 
‘spirit’ have to be rejected; (2) the rule of nominalism which asserts that words, generalizations, 
abstractions, etc. are linguistic phenomena and do not give new insight into the world; (3) the 
separation of facts from values; and (4) the unity of the scientific method.”1038 As stated above, 
Chua1039 identifies three main research paradigms from which all others emanate: positivist, 
interpretivist and critical. According to Comstock,1040 a critical paradigm seeks to explain 
social injustice and inequities which individuals can take action to change1041 and it has been 
widely employed and discussed within the field of social science research. Hence, the three 
approaches adopt distinctively different epistemological viewpoints while generating 
competing methods of inquiry.1042  
There are suggestions, for example by Sook,1043 that the positivist and interpretivist paradigms 
are the two most basic and commonly used approaches. According to Hudson and Ozanne,1044 
the debate stems from the fact these are the two major philosophical paradigms, which are 
considered to be “summary labels that refer to general research approaches that only differ in 
beliefs [...] that turn into the different ways of conducting research”.1045 Hence, the quantitative 
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purist articulates assumptions that are consistent with the positivist paradigm, while the 
qualitative enthusiast tends towards the concept of interpretivism while rejecting the positivist 
assumption.1046 
Easterby-Smith et al.1047 note a common view on positivism that holds it is insufficient for 
understanding complex social occurrences and factual observations, because it is not realistic 
in a world created by human deeds. The positivist view is that we are “born into a world in 
which there are causal laws that explain patterns to our behaviour”.1048 Lee and Baskerville1049 
cite several difficulties with the induction and general applicability of this axiom. Quine1050 
argues that positivism is self-contradictory, due to the fact that it is not by itself a natural 
happening independent of the viewer or observer. Hence the advancement of interpretive 
thought, which sees the world as socially governed controlled1051 via the norms and values of 
a society. 
Kim1052 explains that the “truth” in the positivistic tradition is often based on probability and, 
as such, researchers are prevented from achieving their own goals of finding specific truth on 
phenomena under investigation. The author contends that positivism made significant 
contributions to humanities, social sciences, and art in the early 20th century in terms of 
technical and scientific practice.1053 However, the internal inconsistencies of positivism led 
many researchers to abandon exclusively scientific and technological approaches in favour of 
using more than one method to acquire in-depth knowledge of a phenomenon.1054 
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The last paradigm within Burrell and Morgan’s 1979 framework is the interpretivist approach, 
which is defined simply as uncovering what agents interpret their social world to be.1055 
According to Goles and Hirschheim,1056 the interpretivist paradigm seeks explanation within 
the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, and within the frame of reference of 
individual perspective. Interpretivists see society as a stable place that can be studied, but via 
the subjective perspective of each individual involved.1057 Interpretivism is also known as 
‘constructivism’,1058 due to similar anti-positivist elements. However, Creswell1059 contends 
that constructionists are more fundamental and radical in their approach and broaden their 
ontological observations to all angles of realities and truths, unlike the interpretivist approach, 
which limits its scope to social truth reality. The interpretivist paradigm was initiated in 
response to positivism,1060 and emphasises the capability of the researcher to create meaning 
from social actors’ experiences.  
According to Ernest,1061 the meaning created is profoundly affected by ‘hermeneutics and 
phenomenology’. Hermeneutics is the detailed investigation and understanding of ‘historical 
texts’, whereas phenomenology is a design oriented by the interpretivist paradigm which holds 
that the opinions and meanings of individuals regarding the world are the first step to 
comprehending it.1062 The methodologies used by interpretivist researchers are mainly: field 
experiments, exploratory analysis, idiographic experiments, induction and qualitative 
analysis.1063 These aid researchers to find explanations and give meaning to personal 
experiences of social actors. Cohen and Manion1064 consider interpretivist researchers as 
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investigators who understand “the world of human experience”. Therefore, connotations 
derived from their personal viewpoint may lead to further inquiries into social occurrences.1065 
Interpretivism is considered the most significant substitute to positivism.1066 
 
6.5 Qualitative or Quantitative Research Method?  
According to Yilmaz,1067 the two major approaches to social science research are the qualitative 
and quantitative ones, and they differ in terms of their epistemological, theoretical, and 
methodological underpinnings.1068 The author further states that the qualitative research 
method is still developing and becoming more differentiated in methodological approaches, 
while quantitative research has developed over time and, as such, has well-established 
strategies and methods.1069  
For this study, a qualitative research method is employed to examine the cause and effect of 
social relationships. In addition, it helps organise thoughts and ideas on the legal aid scheme, 
alternative viable (customary) legal systems and the barriers that are undermining the scope of 
access in Nigeria. Bryman and Burgess1070 highlight the uncertainty as to whether the 
qualitative approach is a distinct research strategy because qualitative researchers may be 
compelled to codify their analytic procedures in ways that are found in quantitative research. 
Miles’s1071 description of qualitative data as ‘an attractive nuisance’ stems from its volume and 
complexity and the implications for its analysis. Accordingly, Tuli1072 highlights that the 
quantitative approach, which originated in the natural sciences (i.e., biology, chemistry, 
physics, and geology), was largely used in social science for much of the 20th century. During 
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this period, it was focused on investigating things which could be observed and objectively 
measured in some way.1073 
However, over the last decades some researchers within the social sciences (e.g., sociology, 
anthropology) have argued that quantitative research is inadequate as a means of conducting 
research and generating knowledge. According to this view, to investigate a phenomenon there 
should be more focus on understanding the meaning of events from the perspective of the 
individual being examined.1074 The qualitative method was further influenced by Max Weber 
who pioneered the theoretical concept of “Verstehen”, an interpretative approach that focused 
on causation and a deep understanding of why individuals behave like they do within a certain 
area in society through empathetic study.1075 Denzin and Lincoln1076 contend that qualitative 
research methods are not based on a single methodology and therefore have no distinctive 
definition, theory or paradigm. This is because they comprise of a combination of methods and 
practices that are sourced externally from many different research disciplines. These include 
traditions related to positivism, post-positivism, foundationalism, post-foundationalism, post-
structuralism, post-modernism, and norms and values of the society.1077 However, in spite of 
the vague attribute of qualitative research, authors such as Hitchcock & Hughes1078 have 
endeavoured to capture the central principles that underpin qualitative research and establish a 
clear description of what it entails.  
Taylor et al.1079 define qualitative methodology as a research approach that produces 
descriptive data through the written or spoken words and actions of selected participants by 
understanding their personal experiences. Bauer et al.1080 contend that a researcher would need 
to have knowledge of qualitative distinctions between social categories before measuring and 
establishing how many people belong to one group or the other. Thus, it is crucial that this 
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a definitive outline of how individuals perceive the provision, and if they believe there is room 
for the expansion of the scope of legal aid to include the vast, rural areas of Nigeria via non-
conventional legal channels.  
Kirk and Miller1081 argue that qualitative approaches are distinct from a quantitative process 
because “technically a ‘qualitative observation’ identifies the presence or absence of 
something, in contrast to ‘quantitative observation’, which involves measuring the degree to 
which some feature, is present”. Yilmaz1082 explains that the quantitative approach is an 
acceptable means to explain phenomena according to numerical data, which are analysed by 
way of mathematically based methods (e.g., statistics). Cresswell1083 contends that qualitative 
inquiry employs different philosophical assumptions, such as: strategies of inquiry, the 
methods of data collection, and the final analysis and interpretation. Hence, the qualitative 
approach exhibits diverse perspectives ranging from social justice thinking to ideological 
perspectives. 
However, Webley1084 states that qualitative research does not depend on statistical 
quantification to explain a phenomenon but attempts to capture and identify social phenomena 
and their meanings through real life experiences. Flick1085 explains that the qualitative research 
method is not modelled on statistical measurements but is applied by purposely recruiting 
participants who are expected to answer questions spontaneously from their own perspective. 
Hence, data collection is aimed at creating a more comprehensive picture by re-establishing 
the topic under study through the use of open questions. As such, qualitative research addresses 
issues through the subjective meaning of the research question from the mindset of research 
participants. It also describes the complexity of situations raised in the study as well as 
establishing the social experiences of participants.1086 
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According to Silverman, a qualitative approach is more favoured if the study is targeted 
towards exploring people’s everyday behaviour. An in-depth investigation into how the social 
status of individuals, who fall into the disadvantaged category, affects access to legal aid in 
Nigeria will open up the scope of understanding on the subject matter.  
Thus, a qualitative method of research seeks to decipher the viewpoint of respondents, for 
example with regards to how they interact with social institutions in their environment (e.g., 
legal systems). Bryman1087 contends that a qualitative approach is broadly inductivist, 
constructivist and interpretivist. However, to carry out an investigation and reach a conclusion 
on a study topic, researchers are not mandated to utilise all three features when analysing 
collected data.1088  
Yin1089 cites five characteristics that distinguish the qualitative approach from other research 
methods: 
➢ Studying individuals in their real-life roles without being inhibited by closed-ended 
questionnaires or artificial research procedures, such as a laboratory-like setting.  
➢ Representing the views of the participants chosen for the study.  
➢ Prioritising the meanings given to real world events by the people that live in them; 
explicitly heeding to and accounting for real world contextual conditions, such as the social, 
institutional, cultural, and environmental conditions, and how they influence human 
activity.  
➢ Inference of knowledge from existing and new concepts that may further assist in 
explaining social behaviour and thinking. That is, moving beyond the mere documentation 
of an individual’s daily life to a more comprehensive study of human activity through 
different perspectives and progress to the development of new concepts.  
➢ Acknowledging the importance of varied sources of evidence to the eventual findings and, 
as a consequence, creating a medley of documentation combining all information 
available.1090 
The aim of applying a qualitative research method in this study is to open new grounds for 
explaining how real-world conditions in Nigeria influence social thinking and behaviour of 
 
1087Bryman Alan (2016) ‘Social Research Methods’ Fifth Edition’, Oxford University Press p. 374.  
1088 Ibid. 





individuals from varied backgrounds around accessing legal aid via unconventional legal 
systems. In effect, new perceptions are created through the various respondents by way of their 
individual experiences during the data collection process. This action could further lead to other 
imperative revelations on the matter surrounding the problem of access to free legal counsel, 
which has not yet been thoroughly documented in Nigeria.  
Bryne1091 argues that qualitative research is “contextually laden, subjective, and richly 
detailed”, and as such necessary for researchers to make detailed explanations and 
interpretations of data collected. However, Black1092 posits that it is also an extremely complex 
research method that involves a combined interaction of the individuals with themselves, 
family, society, and culture. Due to the nature of this study, which focuses on the subjective 
perspective of each respondent, a qualitative approach supplemented by an interpretive 
technique is employed to thoroughly investigate the research question. The aim is to inform 
how the law that governs legal aid in Nigeria is applied in practice and how everyday 
individuals perceive it.  
The ability of qualitative research to address causality has been a matter of controversy. 
However, according to Maxwell,1093 a causal explanation is a legitimate and important goal for 
qualitative research when seeking to identify cause-effect relationships. For instance, this is 
important when one or more social factors (e.g., lifestyle, religion, education, custom, wealth, 
family) influence aspects of an individual’s attitude towards other factors within their 
community, such as seeking legal assistance. Ultimately, a qualitative model identifies and 
analyses the study process, which is set in motion by a researcher to understand both the 
intention and the context of human action. It also serves as a platform to gather in-depth 
information on how social factors affect research participants1094 and expand our understanding 
of how individuals interpret occurrences that happen around them. 
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Snape and Spencer1095 argue that the qualitative research method can be employed in various 
forms, and that the choice of research method will depend on other definitive factors ranging 
from the goals of the study, the characteristics of the research participants and the audience for 
the research. Wincup1096 contends that qualitative research is primarily focused on identifying 
and recognising the role of individuals and groups in a given social construct, as well as the 
way individuals make sense of their subjective reality. That is, how they perceive the 
happenings and conditions around them, and how social factors such as customs, norms, 
responsibilities, and routines affect their day to day lives. In addition, it highlights how age, 
gender, beliefs, and ethnic origin influence the way individuals respond to social factors.1097 
For this study, a qualitative research method is a reliable means to examine the cause and effect 
of social relationships.   
Critics of the qualitative research method believe the quantitative method to be superior and 
more reliable because it is not influenced by the subjective value judgment of the researcher 
and objectively reports reality. They argue that the outcome of a qualitative approach may be 
altered by the researchers’ point of view, giving rise to flexibility which is considered to be a 
lack of structure.1098 Quantitative procedures arguably pave the way for a broader and more 
generic set of findings and they are considered a systematic method in which numerical data 
are used to quantify or measure phenomena and produce findings.1099 However, according to 
Patton,1100 the meaning attributed to the phenomenon studied is generally ignored in 
quantitative studies because participants are unable to fully partake in the study by describing 
their feelings and experiences in their own words. 
Silverman1101 advocates the qualitative method and flexibility argument, believing it crucial 
for the researcher to encourage research participants to be unbarred in their responses so to 
concretise the study in general. According to Newman et al.,1102 the debate between advocates 
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of the qualitative and quantitative approaches is deeply rooted in the various assumptions 
regarding the concept of reality and whether or not it can be measured. The disagreement also 
emerges from different opinions about how researchers can best understand a phenomenon, 
whether through objective or subjective methods.1103 Ratner1104 argues that, in spite of the 
general notion that qualitative methodology is purely subjectivist, it also has an objectivist 
strand, and believes that “to objectively comprehend peoples' psychology, the researcher must 
organise his subjectivity appropriately”. 
Regardless of the long and traditional use of the quantitative method in research, many 
researchers affirm the necessity of moving towards a more contemporary qualitative approach 
for the purposes of observing and interpreting reality from the perspective of research 
participants. This is partly due to the belief that quantitative research does not assist the 
developing and continuous inquiry of a research phenomenon.1105 Lofland1106 argues that a 
qualitative researcher aims to describe accurately a respondent’s experience and thoughts rather 
than to judge through their own lens. 
Some researchers believe that both the qualitative and quantitative methods should not be seen 
as antagonistic, but simply as a representation of different ends of a continuous spectrum.1107 
They argue that both forms of research are equally capable of being systematic and producing 
valid, dependable findings, regardless of the difference in the styles and techniques of 
research.1108 Hence, both methods can be combined. 
Bryman1109 posits that qualitative research should be regarded as a research strategy that gives 
priority to words rather than numbers in the collection and analysis of data. The author further 
argues that the qualitative research method is diverse and incorporates several other research 
methods, such as:  
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➢ Ethnography, where a researcher becomes deeply involved in the study over certain period 
of time to observe and understand a particular social group.  
➢ Qualitative interviewing, which is an expansive term referring to interview techniques that 
are usually employed in ethnography or participant observation.  
➢ Focus groups, which according to Kitzinger1110 are a form of group interview that generate 
data by exploiting communications between research participants. As a consequence, they 
help participants explore and clarify their views by interacting with one another in ways 
that would not be easily achievable in a one-to-one interview. 
➢ Language-based approaches in data collection. For instance, discourse analysis, which is 
the study of naturally occurring language in any social context to understand human 
experience,1111 and conversation analysis, which is an inductive, micro-analytic and 
predominantly qualitative method for studying verbal and non-verbal human social 
interactions.1112  
➢ The collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents.1113  
The legal aid scheme in Nigeria has been well documented in access to justice literature; 
however, the latter currently lacks substantial empirical evidence that depicts other definitive, 
limiting factors from the perspective of the typical individual. There is also a gap in the 
literature on the discounted technicalities in the legal system, the potential contribution from 
other viable legal systems in Nigeria and the enduring impact on individuals who are in need 
of the service. A qualitative research methodology will encourage a deeper understanding of 
complex recipient and legal aid personnel relations within the Nigerian legal aid setting. It will 
also encourage future studies into theoretical perspectives that may offer doctrinal paradigms 
for explaining how society influences individuals. In addition, the limitations attributed to the 
quantitative research method suggest that a qualitative one is well suited in this research, 
because the primary aim of study is to interpret and understand specific groups from their 
personal experiences and perception (i.e., individuals who may at one point need the services 
of free legal counsel). This study also seeks to explain causality1114 in other matters relating to 
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barriers to the expansion of legal aid in Nigeria that arose through the process of empirical 
research. 
 
6.5.1 Interpretivist Qualitative Research 
The concept of interpretivism has been described by various scholars. However, the majority 
of the definitions remain constant and place emphasis on the viewpoint of research respondents. 
This perspective stems from the meaningful nature of their character and participation in both 
social and cultural life.1115 Butler1116 identifies other variations of interpretivism, for example, 
conservative, constructivist, critical and deconstructionist. Hence, the meanings of each 
category are shaped by the intention of the researcher.1117 This study focuses on the 
constructivist tradition, because it is deemed central to interpretivism and shares a common 
interest with the interpretivists’ emphasis on understanding the world through personal 
experiences of social actors. This is in line with the “interpretivists’ belief that reality is 
constructed by social actors and people’s perceptions of it”.1118 
Qualitative research is generally linked with interpretivism1119 because scholars believe it 
increases the value of qualitative data when understanding a phenomenon.1120 It also adopts the 
school of thought that affirms that an individual’s knowledge of reality is a social construction 
by human actors.1121 However, Myers and Avison1122 are of the view that the term “qualitative 
is not a synonym for interpretive”. They acknowledge that a researcher’s decision to utilise a 
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qualitative method via an interpretive approach would depend on the researcher’s underlying 
philosophical assumptions of the topic under investigation.1123  
According to Willis et al.,1124 individuals are influenced by their subjective perception of their 
environment; thus, their behaviour is relatively connected to the happenings in their 
surroundings. The interpretivist approach aims to acknowledge and understand the existence 
of subjective meanings in the social world.1125 Generally, subjectivity is linked with the concept 
of bias; however, in social sciences the meaning ascribed to subjectivity is highly dependent 
upon the researcher’s epistemological and ontological assumptions. Thus, the focus is on 
human subjects rather than the objects. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea1126 claim that interpretivist 
researchers discover reality through participants’ views, which emerge from the participants’ 
background and experiences. Hence, interpretivists look for meanings and motives behind 
people’s actions such as behaviour and interactions with others in the society,1127 and seek to 
understand cultures by studying their ideas, thinking and the meanings important to them.1128 
The approach is favoured by qualitative researchers because it allows a researcher to be 
immersed in the day to day lives of participants as it appears to the researcher.  
Interpretivism is consistent with the thought that the paradigm is not an attempt to pre-define 
independent and dependent variables, but an effort to understand a phenomenon through the 
interpretation that people assign to it.1129 Willis1130 argues that the goal of interpretivism is to 
encourage subjectivity because they believe qualitative approaches produces valuable reports 
necessary for researchers to fully understand contexts. Bourdieu argues that an attempt to strip 
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away context to achieve objectivity could inadvertently undermine the research, the analysis, 
and the eventual findings.1131  
Interpretivists are known to maintain a subjective stance because they believe “different people 
and different groups have different perceptions of the world”,1132 hence giving the researcher 
the opportunity to capture all experiences before drawing a conclusion. As such, researchers 
are able to increase their scope of inquiry from what has occurred to see how it has occurred.1133 
Understanding the reality of people from their own experiences underpins the reasoning of an 
interpretivist paradigm and, as a consequence, recorded experiences are used by researchers to 
establish and build a coherent understanding of the subject matter.1134  
In contrast to the ideas of the positivist paradigm, “all interpretive traditions emerge from a 
scholarly position that takes human interpretation as the starting point for developing 
knowledge about the social world”.1135 Thanh and Thanh1136 acknowledge that the interpretivist 
approach in not a dominant paradigm but is favoured because it can accommodate multiple 
perspectives and varied versions of truths. According to Smith and Heshusius,1137 an 
interpretive approach seeks to understand values, beliefs, and meanings of social phenomena 
by an in-depth examination of human activities and experiences.  
Burrell and Morgan1138 contend that the interpretivist paradigm is a direct product of the 
German idealist tradition of social thought from the mid-eighteenth century, and its foundations 
were established in the work of Immanuel Kant. They argue that interpretivism emulates a 
social philosophy which emphasises the spiritual nature of the social world. The concept’s 
reach was initially limited and remained so for a while, but was later revived in the late 1890’s 
when theorists such as Duthey, Weber, Huserl and Shutz further elaborated the concept and 
made numerous contributions towards establishing it as a framework for social analysis.1139 
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The renewed interpretive thought placed more emphasis on how we order, classify, structure 
and interpret our world, and how we act upon these interpretations as a consequence.1140 
Morgan1141 contends that qualitative research is deeply rooted in the speculative assumptions 
of the interpretative paradigm, which is founded on the belief that social reality  is formed and 
maintained via an individual’s view and experience of the world they live in.  
Black1142 states that the strength and power of the interpretivist approach lies in its ability to 
address the complexity and meaning of situations. An individual’s perspective will present a 
factual viewpoint of the current status of the legal aid scheme, as well as customary court 
practices in Nigeria. Willis1143 posits that interpretivists are anti-foundationalists, who maintain 
there is no single correct route or particular accepted method to knowledge. Reeves and 
Hedberg1144 note that the “interpretivist” paradigm stresses the need to put analysis in context. 
Hence, it is an appropriate blueprint to identify and explore a phenomenon through the 
respondents own cultural context.  
According to Guba,1145 there are in general many other paradigms that are utilised to guide 
actions in different schools of thought. For instance, legal systems are guided by the rules of 
an adversarial paradigm, a proof system which is a justification for seeking the truth and for 
the utmost importance of the concept of access to justice in courts. However, the use of the 
interpretivist paradigm to analyse this study arises from the fact that an in-depth fact-finding 
inquiry is required and crucial to understand and interpret the phenomenon of legal aid as it is 
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6.5.2 Qualitative Legal Research  
Generally, qualitative research methods are identified more with the social sciences than with 
the discipline of law. Hence, legal research is not considered social science research.1146 In 
addition, authors differentiate between academic legal research carried out by academics and 
students and legal research conducted for other legal professionals, legal practice, and 
government and non-government agencies. They acknowledge the good quality of legal 
research produced by non-legal agencies.1147 Many common law practitioners undertake 
qualitative legal research on a regular basis, for example in the case-based method of 
establishing the law through analysis of precedent, using documents as source material.1148  
Qualitative legal research has been used in various case studies to ascertain people’s perception 
of law and justice through their own reality. An example is the study of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms and their relationship with legal systems (see Davis et al.’s1149 study of 
the family mediation legal aid pilot in England and Wales, 2000, and Dingwall and 
Greatbatch’s observation of family mediation sessions, 1991).1150 Another example is the study 
of legal aid and access to justice matters (see Moorhead et al.’s 1151 study of legal aid models 
and quality of legal service delivery, 2000)1152 to further understand legitimate perspectives 
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6.6 Empirical legal scholarship  
Legal research is deemed empirical as long as it based on the analysis of legal texts and 
doctrine.1153 According to Bell,1154 the definition of empirical legal research remains unclear. 
The concept of empirical research is most commonly linked with methods and methodologies 
drawn from the social sciences. However, according to Monahan and Walker,1155 the last 20 
years of legal research via empirical methods have continued to play an important role in the 
in-depth study of law and as a means to address the imbalance between ‘formal law’ and 
‘practical reality’.1156 Prior to that time, legal scholarship relied heavily on a normative analysis 
of the law, also known as ‘black letter law’.1157 For a long time, the assumption was that law is 
an independent discipline and could exist independently. However, Posner1158 argues against 
this hypothesis and maintains that legal knowledge alone is not sufficient to provide solutions 
to legal problems. Griffiths1159 argues that adopting new methodological approaches to law 
would present a clear understanding of how individuals access specific resources. Traditionally 
empirical legal scholarship has followed two broad traditions. The first is black letter law, 
which is directed towards law itself as an internal, self-sustaining set of principles accessible 
through court judgements and statutes, with little reference to the world outside the law.1160  
The second is law in context, which emerged in the late 1960’s and has since increased the 
scope of legal studies. With this latter approach, the initial focus is accorded to matters relating 
to the problems of society and not the law.1161 In this context, law becomes a controversial 
concept because it is deemed the agent of social problems, and while the application of law 
may provide a full or partial solution to a problem it may not be the preferred choice.1162 In 
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addition, Holmes1163 insists that law is a tool for achieving social ends and to understand law 
requires an understanding of social conditions. Hence, Posner1164 suggests utilising methods in 
other disciplines of scientific and humanistic research to increase knowledge of the legal 
system. The laws, guidelines and procedures on legal aid are extensive in Nigeria; however, 
this is not reflected in practice or in the extant literature due to the lack of sufficient empirical 
data.  
According to Coutin and Fortin,1165 the rise of empirical legal scholarship suggests that there 
is a renewed interest in the application of social science methodologies and methods to 
understand the concept of law in relation to society. The initial focus was directed towards 
quantitative studies; however, as legal materials from other legal systems across the world 
become accessible,1166 empirical research methods are increasingly being utilised as a primary 
template to address a variety of legal questions infused into the research process to examine 
the topic in detail.1167 Post1168 distinguishes between empirical legal scholarship and the 
practice of law to highlight the importance of legal scholarship. The author argues that the 
practice of law has no enduring effect on the advancement of legal scholarship due to relentless 
institutional difficulties that might obstruct the growth of serious external scholarship. He also 
contends that, traditionally, law schools have not possessed basic institutional mechanisms, nor 
have they established standards to measure achievement in the area of legal scholarship. Hence, 
major legal publications are guided by law students who are unable to apply scholarly 
standards, particularly new and debatable ones. 
Akin to one of the intended outcomes of this study, Eisenburg1169 contends that empirical legal 
scholarship is a pivotal tool to inform litigants, policymakers, and society as a whole about 
how the legal system works. He also argues that, generally, law schools pay little attention to 
training lawyers in how to accurately assess the state of the legal system and the legal system's 
performance, which is left to other independent advocates and researchers in other disciplines. 
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This drawback according to Eisenburg has created a gap in the advancement of legal research 
and led to a compelled reliance on non-lawyers, who do not have a comprehensive 
understanding of legal doctrine or the state of the law.1170 However, traditional disciplines like 
anthropology, philosophy, political science, and sociology are able to overcome difficulties 
regarding maintaining standards. This is due to the models being built on a more stringent 
structural foundation, grounded in scholarly evaluation and peer review mechanisms to ensure 
these standards are enforced accordingly.1171 
Epstein and King1172 acknowledge that law scholars have been conducting empirical research 
over the past two decades via quantitative or qualitative data; but they argue that they have 
proceeded with the method with little attention to the various advancements in empirical 
analysis. The authors also raise an important issue with regards to the quality of the legal 
research being produced and argue that many legal academics lack experience in empirical 
legal research and so there is a need for “legally sophisticated empirical analysts”. 1173 As such, 
the methodology of empirical analysis that is well defined in other traditional academic fields 
is virtually non-existent in the law reviews. As a consequence, studies produce less accurate 
information about the empirical world than they claim. Hence, the primary motive of empirical 
legal studies is to advocate legal reform, while another motive is solely to add to the extant 
academic knowledge.1174  
Scholars have used various definitions to identify empirical legal scholarship. In a broader 
sense, Epstein and King define ‘empirical evidence’ as evidence about the world based on 
experience and observation which could also translate into an investigation of the subject 
matter. They state that research is deemed empirical when it is based on “data, which is just a 
term for facts about the world […] As long as the facts have something to do with the world, 
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Diamond and Muellar1176 posit that in legal studies the production of original research is less 
common, despite persistent calls for more empirical legal scholarship. However, scholars have 
recently indicated that empirical legal scholarship is becoming a standard approach in the legal 
sphere. Several institutions have launched programs or initiatives devoted to empirical legal 
studies with the aim of encouraging and supporting empirical research: for example, the 
Harvard Law School, the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (JELS) and, in the UK, the 
Nuffield Foundation, which sponsored an “Inquiry on Empirical Research in Law” which has 
attracted considerable interest.  
According to Eisenburg,1177 empirical scholarship has covered both criminal and civil law. For 
instance, a professor and colleagues at Columbia University, New York, produced a report 
highlighting the rate of error in the capital punishment system due to incompetent defence 
lawyers, uncoorporative police officers and prosecutors who withheld evidence. In civil cases, 
empirical scholarship has also helped uncover matters relating to a decline in civil trial, 
procedural constraints, court fees and award limitations.1178  
However, advocates of factual inquiry in legal research contend that a constant review of 
methodology is required to reflect the regular change in legal principles and the way it impacts 
society, because empirical studies can inform policy-makers and the general public on a broad 
range of legal concerns.1179 Hence, the principal focus of this study is to collect subjective data 
on the understanding of the legal aid scheme and its potential alliance with customary courts 
in Nigeria through the perception of specific individuals, as well as to form a valid academic 
conclusion based solely on the evidence collected.   
 
6.7 The Interdisciplinary Research Method  
Interdisciplinary studies are a fast-growing academic field that became fully established by the 
mid-1990. However, the meaning of the method of study is still being debated by its 
 
1176Diamond Shari Seidman and Mueller Pam (2010) ‘Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews.’ The Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 6 pp. 581-99. 
1177Eisenburg Theodore (2004) ‘Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?’ 41 San Diego Law. Review pp. 1741-1742.  
1178Ibid. 




practitioners and critics.1180 Aboelela et al.1181 define the interdisciplinary research method as: 
“any study or group of studies undertaken by scholars from two or more distinct scientific 
disciplines […] based on a conceptual model that links or integrates theoretical frameworks 
from those disciplines; uses study design, methodology […] perspectives and skills of the 
involved disciplines throughout phases of the research process.” 1182   
The methodological approach of this study will be appraised from a socio-legal perspective to 
further understand the workings of law through social experiences. This chapter will not 
exclusively assess the legal principle of the legal aid scheme but will rather assess it as a social 
structure aimed at providing access to free legal counsel to individuals who may need it to 
defend their rights in court. Tobi and Kampen1183 posit that an in-depth study of the relationship 
between humans and their environment cannot be limited to one field of study but requires 
knowledge, ideas and research methodology from different disciplines. Thus, the socio-legal 
model in this research aims to increase knowledge on the reality of law as perceived by society. 
 
6.7.1 Socio-Legal Approach 
Guibentif1184 describes socio-legal science as a sub-discipline of sociology that depicts law as 
a social phenomenon.1185 Fitzpatrick1186 contends that the identity of socio-legal studies 
remains undetermined, as there are unresolved questions as to whether it is social, legal or a 
combination of both. However, it is deeply rooted and accepted internationally as a valid field 
of legal inquiry that utilises sociology as a tool for data collection.1187 This study adopts a socio-
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legal approach to epitomise the collective thoughts and knowledge of respondents on the matter 
of expanding the scope of legal aid through customary courts in Nigeria. 
A socio-legal study is conceptually distinguished from other positivistic approaches because 
the research method is focused on how one understands the law as well as how law relates to a 
social situation.1188 It also shares a main characteristic of ‘sociology of law’, a research 
discipline with distinct research traditions, which like socio-legal studies is focused on the 
societal perspective on the concept of law through the use of sociological methodologies.1189 
According to Parker,1190 a socio-legal approach has a wide scope and, as well as sociology, it 
covers disciplinary approaches such as anthropology, political science, psychology and history. 
A common attribute with all associated disciplines is that they seek law from the ‘outside’. 
That is, they endeavour to “explain legal phenomenon […] in terms of their social setting”.1191 
Banakar and Travers1192 posit that, while other disciplinary approaches have numerous 
methods texts and handbooks, there is a lack of guidance on how to research law and legal 
processes from a variety of social scientific standpoints.  
However, Friedman1193 argues that legal institutions are conscious of social processes and, as 
such, are responsible for monitoring and regulating the pace of social change. Friedman further 
stated that the socio-legal approach to law dates from the late 19th to the early 20th century 
through the writings of Henry Maine and Max Weber. The approach rests upon two concepts: 
firstly, that legal systems are essentially man-made objects and, secondly, that law varies in 
time and space according to the culture in which it is embedded.1194 
The term socio-legal has been of established use in the United States of America since the early 
part of the twentieth century. In 1972 a group of academic lawyers and social scientists from 
the United Kingdom adopted the concept. This later became the Socio-Legal Studies 
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Association (SLSA) in 1990.1195 Fitzpatrick1196 contends that, despite the increasing scope of 
socio-legal research and teaching, there has been limited input with regards to the critical 
analysis of what constitutes the ‘socio’ of socio-legal studies. The author argues that the law 
aspect serves as a necessary ‘supplement’ which intervenes in society to correct irregularities 
and inadequacies of society but believes that “whilst society depends on law for its possibility, 
law has to remain apart from it, resisting reduction in terms of society”.1197 
According to Suchman and Herz,1198 since the mid-1990’s various scholars have made 
considerable efforts to conjugate the study of law with the study of sociology. The link between 
the study of law and social science has a long and varied history which has been well-
documented in numerous publications by scholars such as Tomlins1199 and Garth and 
Sterling.1200 Suchman and Herz posit that: “the relationship between law and empirical social 
science dates back at least to the days of Durkheim (1893), Weber (1978) and Malinowski 
(1959), and has continued forward into the current-day projects of the interdisciplinary law-
and-society movement and of such disciplinary social science subfields as judicial politics, law 
and economics, the social-psychology of law, the sociology of law, legal history, and legal 
anthropology.”1201   
Travers1202 believes the field of socio-legal studies is theoretically and methodologically 
underdeveloped from the perspective of mainstream sociology, as compared to more developed 
sub-fields such as the sociology of education or of organisations. Cotterrell1203 argues that 
socio-legal research has not modified the most basic patterns of legal thinking. However, 
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according to Blandy,1204 it is an essential and reliable mechanism to research the legal and 
social norms developed by people and their association with one another. 
 
6.8 Triangulation in Research  
Triangulation is a process of verification that increases validity by incorporating several 
viewpoints and methods. It also refers to a practice used by researchers to confirm a finding by 
using other independent methods agree with it or, at least, do not challenge it.1205 Triangulation 
is an accepted practice in social research and its origins can be traced back to Campbell and 
Fiskel (1959), who developed the idea of “multiple operationism”.1206 This technique was later 
developed by Web (1966) and elaborated further by Denzin (1970) beyond the traditional scope 
of research methods and designs.1207 Denzin1208 in the early years of study defined triangulation 
as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon”. However, in 
another study (1970) the same author categorised triangulation into three major groups, based 
on the various methodologies and methods utilised by the researcher:1209 
➢ The investigator triangulation uses multiple researchers to investigate the same problem, to 
instigate a different perception of the inquiry and help strengthen the integrity of the 
findings.  
➢ Data triangulation: focuses on the participants and uses different sources of data or research 
instruments, such as interviews, questionnaires, focus group discussion or participant 
observation. Data triangulation may also involve using different participants to enhance the 
quality of the data by using multiple sources.  
➢ Methodological triangulation: utilises different research methods, i.e., mixed methods, a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research.1210  
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The choice of all three, two or a just one triangulation method will depend on the 
methodological approach adopted by the researcher. This study utilises the data triangulation 
technique to validate research objectives. 
 
6.8.1 Data Triangulation  
The social sciences are typically aimed at discovering new or old realities, as well as the 
analysis of categories, correlation, and causal explanations, and investigating the natural laws 
which govern them.1211 In recent years, the use of multiple methods to examine the same 
dimension of a research problem has become more received by scholars and researchers. It is 
considered a vehicle for cross validation based on the principle that multiple viewpoints allow 
for greater accuracy.1212 Chamberlain et al.1213 advocate for the incorporation of multiple 
methods in research. They indicate that its application encourages creativity and extends the 
scope and depth of data for further interpretation and analysis. 
Data triangulation addresses the issue of internal validity by using more than one method of 
data collection to obtain corroborating evidence1214 and answer a research question.1215 The 
justification of data triangulation is that potential inadequacies of using one technique of data 
collection are adequately managed by adopting other credible approaches and, as a result, the 
researcher takes advantage of their distinct strengths.1216 Social scientists such as Denzin, 
Lincoln and Guba1217 suggest that validation, justification and credibility in social science 
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research become possible through the gathering of corroborating findings from respondents on 
the same topic, using diverse approaches. They argue for the difficulty to grasp reality 
completely by a single technique of data collection and suggest triangulation to clarify the 
complexity of social certainties.1218 Harvey and Macdonald1219 posit that data reliability is 
credible if researchers using the same research method are able to reach the same findings. 
Consequently, triangulation becomes a powerful tool to strengthen the qualitative research 
design.1220 Thus, research is fully developed and well analysed, with a well-grounded level of 




Figure 6.3 - Methodological Triangulation Adopted 
 
In line with the three major classifications of triangulation methods proposed by Denzin, this 
study employs the ‘data triangulation’ technique to obtain crucial information from two 
different sources within the qualitative research methodology. This included semi-structured 
telephone interviews and self-administered questionnaires. The participant selection differed, 
but the questions posed through both approaches remained the same. The mode of data 
collection also differed slightly as one was delivered and received electronically via the web, 
and the other was conducted over the phone with the use of a digital recorder to collect data. 
This procedure boosts the capacity of respondents and allows the research to focus on the 
quality and potency of the responses of research participants, who are the focal point of this 
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study. It will ultimately enhance the credibility of collected data and further certify the validity 
of the eventual research findings.  
 
6.9 Sampling in Qualitative Research  
Qualitative research usually aims to reflect the diversity within a given population,1222 rather 
than reaching a conclusion via an expansive pool of statistical data to validate study. It is 
primarily naturalistic, interpretive, and inductive, and attempts to make sense of the meaning 
people attach to their experiences in relation to a phenomenon.1223 According to Denzin and 
Lincoln,1224 sampling is crucial to all empirical inquiry. However, Bernard1225 contends that it 
is not possible to collect data from every individual within a community to get conclusive 
findings; therefore, researchers collect a sample, which is a percentage and portion of a given 
populace.1226 According to Marshal,1227 sampling interacts with a subset of a population and 
selection will depend on the research objectives as well as the size and diversity of the study’s 
population. 
Cohen et al.1228 contend that the quality of research may not depend solely on the suitability of 
the methodology utilised, but also on the suitability of the sampling strategy that is to be 
followed. The sampling process is a vital component of qualitative study and gives more 
meaning to the subject under investigation. In fieldwork research, sampling refers to an 
intended selection of individuals, units, or settings to be studied. According to Palys,1229 there 
are two types of sampling techniques: random and non-random sampling. Unlike quantitative 
methods, of which the focus is random sampling, qualitative studies are able to employ many 
other methods depending on topic and suitability. These include purposive sampling, 
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convenience sampling and snowball sampling.1230 This study employs the purposive and 
snowballing sampling methods to ensure a multi-dimensional base of participants. 
 
6.9.1 Homogenous/Purposive Approach 
A qualitative method enables the researcher to sample broadly and deeply enough so that all 
the important aspects and variations of the theme under scrutiny are acquired through the 
sample.1231 Purposive sampling according to Palys1232 is one of the most common sampling 
strategies within qualitative research. It involves grouping participants according to the study’s 
pre-selected criteria relevant to the research question.1233 This study applies the 
homogenous/purposive sampling method in choosing suitable participants due to the non-
probability1234 of the peculiarities that are core to the principal focus of this study. Homogenous 
sampling is widely used to target specific groups, which in this study are groups who may 
become potential recipients of free legal representation in Nigeria (e.g., working class, low-
income bracket). Palinkas et al.1235 posit that purposive sampling is broadly used for the 
identification and selection of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest, 
which is deeply rooted in what a researcher wants their study to “understand, predict, explain, 
or describe”.1236 This is in-line with the traditional aim of the qualitative research method and 
the focus of this research, which is to achieve an in-depth understanding of the subject matter 
through the perception of selected respondents.  
Homogenous, also known as purposive, sampling is a non-random method that does not need 
fundamental theories or a set number of participants. The researcher decides what the study 
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will investigate and chooses respondents accordingly.1237 Thus, homogeneous sampling blends 
people of similar backgrounds and experiences together and is often chosen when the in-depth 
examination of a research question is particular to a specific group of interest.1238 As a 
consequence, it reduces variation in results and ultimately simplifies analysis.1239 It also allows 
the researcher to gain access to a wide range of targeted individuals who are relevant to the 
research question.1240  
This study targeted individuals who reside in Nigeria and who may have had direct or indirect 
contact with the provision of legal aid or customary court practices in Nigeria. They are more 
than likely to have similar backgrounds and, as such, share similar experiences on subject 
matter regardless of their jurisdictions. A call for participants was posted on social media 
(Facebook, in public mode) to recruit volunteers for the intended study. Respondents were 
selected based on the criteria detailed on the poster (See Appendix 1). The poster also asked 
those tagged in the post for assistance with recruiting other respondents who fitted the criteria 
required, via the snowball technique.  
 
6.9.2 Snowball Approach  
Vogt1241 defines snowball sampling as a procedure for obtaining research participants. This is 
a technique where a respondent provides the investigator with the name of another subject, who 
in turn provides the name of a third, and so on. Snowball sampling is a technique derived from 
a qualitative research method which comprises of a small group of individuals who have been 
sampled by the researcher. The sampled participants then go on to propose other individuals 
who may have had relevant experience with the subject matter.1242 It is also a feasible strategy 
available for instances where potential sample participants are hard to reach. Atkinson and 
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Flint1243 posit that the strategy is mostly utilised to combat difficulties connected with sampling 
concealed populations and with populations' lack of interest in the research objectives. 
Consequently, this method of respondent selection will facilitate a diverse mix of participants 
with potentially similar experiences in different locations.  
A general mistrust of the researcher and indifference to or lack of understanding of research 
itself may act as obstacles to acquiring suitable respondents. Researchers may have to utilise 
snowball sampling to gain access to participants that are a decisive aspect of the study. In some 
cases, it may be difficult to find adequate individuals willing to participate. For instance, 
Benson1244 describes how, during fieldwork research, it became hard to find her desired 
participants, who were British expatriates living in France. However, after interviewing one 
family, they introduced her to their friends and acquaintances with similar backgrounds that 
were willing to participate due to the recommendation by the first participant.  
Atkinson and Flint1245 apply snowball sampling for two main reasons: firstly, it offers practical 
advantages to research which are intended to be principally explorative, qualitative and 
descriptive;1246 secondly, it is a formal methodology for drawing inferences about the 
perception of a population.1247 Snowball sampling has been identified as indispensable to this 
study because it eliminates the danger that the participants available may not be of any 
relevance to the research questions under investigation. For instance, individuals who do not 
reside in Nigeria or have no knowledge of the operations of the legal systems in Nigeria would 
not be of great benefit to the study, because they may not have up-to-date information on the 
research topic. In the absence of the snowball strategy, research that aims to target a certain 
group of participants could take more time and cost more than planned. The snowballing 
method also eliminates the potential of bias from respondents. Respondents sourced via this 
method would not have had any previous contact with the researcher.  
Therefore, the researcher is not likely to influence their responses to the questions under 
investigation. This technique will also ensure that access to individuals who fit the criteria is 
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prioritised for interview. In this study, the majority of respondents were acquired through this 
method due to their interest and experience in the subject matter.  
 
6.10 Ethical Considerations  
Every research study raises ethical considerations, especially if human participants are part of 
the study. This section of the research will consider the ethical considerations applicable, and 
the steps taken to minimise harm to all participants involved. Halai1248 posits that ethical 
concerns in qualitative research are imperative and involve various rules that researchers 
should unequivocally comply with. This is to ensure that the general wellbeing of respondents 
is not put at any risk as a result their participation in the study. As a rule, universities set out 
rules and guidelines for researching in an ethically acceptable manner and researchers are under 
obligation to seek and obtain permission from ethics committees before any fieldwork is 
commenced. This study adheres to all ethical practices, including approval from the university 
research ethics committee to undertake research (See Appendix 2).  
Qualitative research requires informed and voluntary consent from human participants. After 
providing selected participants with details such as how the data is to be stored and the purpose 
of research,1249 informed consent must be obtained from all respondents on an understanding 
that participation is voluntary.1250 All participants of this study were given a consent form to 
complete before the research commenced. This explained the purpose of the study, time, 
procedures, and rights of the participants to withdraw from the research, and contacts of the 
relevant people or organisations if a wellbeing issue emerged (See Appendix 3). This system 
is compulsory and put in place to guard against researchers coercing participants.1251  
Participants should also be made aware of the proposed conditions for anonymity and 
confidentiality. The details remained within the study team and were anonymous, and their 
identities are not directly linkable to their comments.1252 Before the study, respondents were 
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informed of their right to anonymity and how their responses will remain confidential unless 
disclosure is forced due to reasons of public interest. Storing data securely is another significant 
factor requiring ethical consideration. According to Palys and Atchinson,1253 the security of 
digital data that is gathered interactively via the Internet is a valid concern. An example is data 
collected through web interviews that in one way or another are computer-assisted through 
various messaging or networking programs. Storage of data is detailed in the ethical application 
and approval is an indication that the university is satisfied with the mode of storage and 
disposal proposed by researcher.  
 
6.11 Primary Data Collection  
According Etikan et al.,1254 data collection is vital in any research because the data   represents 
a better understanding of the study. Hence, sampling is significant to ensure the appropriate 
respondents are selected. 
Social scientists use various data collection strategies within a qualitative method, such as in-
depth interviews, questionnaires or focus groups.1255 Data can be collected either in the form 
of primary or secondary data.1256 This study builds its fact-finding strategy on primary data 
obtained from interviewees purposively sampled by the researcher to collect information for 
the study. Secondary data, on the other hand, which comprises of possible previous empirical 
studies and analysis about legal aid by previous researchers, is not used in this study. This is a 
safeguarding strategy to avoid any clash in the quality requirement and methodological criteria 
of current research.1257  
Primary data will give an insight into the status of the subject area by providing up to date 
subjective perceptions from actual social actors. Primary data collection has evolved through 
technology advancements. Contemporary digital technologies offer the data-gathering process 
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the ability to optimise research time by increasing comfort, maximising efficiency and 
minimising error.1258 For instance, the tape recorder has always been an essential tool for 
qualitative researchers, as is the contemporary digital recorder, which is more discrete and less 
distracting than its analogue predecessor.1259 Instantaneous communication platforms such as 
email and other social media network messaging have made the circulation of information 
much easier and more time efficient. However, to collect the required empirical data, responses 
were transmitted through digital and social network technologies and were utilised as the main 
source of information.  
 
6.11.1 Semi-Structured Telephone Interviews  
There are various methods for collecting qualitative data. Each is an important tool, ranging 
from in-depth interviews, observing interactions, analysis of (social and non-social) media and 
focus groups. In-depth interviews are one of the essential data collecting methods in qualitative 
research, and it involves spoken communication between the researcher and the subject.1260 It 
is frequently used in survey designs and exploratory and descriptive studies,1261 and has been 
cited as the most appropriate data source for studies aimed at examining the perception of 
respondents on their experience for a very detailed coverage on a subject matter. The 
importance of interviews, for instance in this study, to gather first-hand understanding of how 
the legal aid scheme in Nigeria operates in practice from an individual viewpoint is seldom 
mentioned in the extant literature on legal aid.   
For this study, three telephone interviews were conducted. According to Edwards and 
Holland,1262 interviews are the most widely used technique adopted in qualitative research. The 
authors contend that the concept of interviewing as a tool of data collection for research means 
moving away from our daily understanding and knowledge of its traditional qualities. In the 
context of research, it becomes a qualitative, scientific method of inquiry and an investigative 
tool in social science.1263 This method of investigation intensifies the capacity for 
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understanding individual perspectives and obtains factual confirmation on the subject matter 
based on participants' individual experience of it. Patton1264 stated that the importance of 
interviews in qualitative research is to “to find out what is in and on someone else’s mind”; the 
perception of a lived experience.1265 Thus, “every word people use in telling their stories is a 
microcosm of their consciousness”.1266 As such, complex experiences on subject matter are 
best addressed in in-depth interviews because of the depth of focus and the opportunity for 
clarification and detailed understanding.1267 According to Nuunkoosing,1268 interviews can 
either be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. All approaches can be delivered via face-
to-face or through electronic media including email, telephone, and Skype. Structured 
interviews give precise guided questions and are usually swift and easy to conduct.1269 Semi-
structured interviews give the interviewee the chance to elaborate on and clarify specific issues 
through the use of open-ended questions. Zhang and Wildermuth1270 argue for a semi-
structured approach when researchers are “working within an interpretive research paradigm 
in which one will assume that reality is socially constructed by the participants in the setting 
of interest”.  
Considering the nature of this inquiry, this study conducted semi-structured interviews via 
telephone with three selected participants. The features of a telephone interview have been 
proven to be identical and in no way limiting with regards to the data output if compared to 
face-to-face interviews.1271 Each telephone call was recorded digitally with a voice recorder, 
transcribed, and then analysed. The investigation was tailored to capture answers generated 
from the research question, which are open-ended and exploratory in nature.1272 This line of 
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inquiry was employed to capture unbiased information on the subject matter of legal aid in 
relation to customary courts in Nigeria.  
Opdenakker1273 highlights the limitations of semi-structured interviews and states that the 
technique may become almost impracticable for some researchers because it takes a lot of 
effort, time, and expense. Another challenge is the researcher’s ability to focus the study and 
knowing when the length and pace of the conversation is going off topic.1274 Analysing data 
from semi-structured interviews requires adequate time and effort due to its bulk, and this is 
also considered to be a drawback to research.1275 During semi-structured interviews, the main 
questions are followed up with other supplementary questions intended to further scrutinise 
and probe participants with regards to their experiences and perspectives. The technique’s main 
objective is to generate in-depth data, causing the process of analysis and interpretation of data 
to become challenging.  
Bryman1276 affirms the downside of interviews in qualitative research but insists that they are 
more flexible than any other qualitative method and an effective way to keep the study tightly 
focused on the target topic. Edwards and Holland1277 also contend that it is crucial that the use 
of a method such as semi-structured interviews should be derived from the research topic, the 
research questions, and the theoretical framework within which the researcher is investigating. 
Alsaawi1278 notes that many researchers favour semi-structured interviews because the 
questions are pre-planned prior to the interview and afford the freedom to be more flexible, 
giving the interviewee the chance to elaborate and explain particular issues through the use of 
open-ended questions.1279 In accordance with the objectives of this study, Miller and 
Glassner1280 explain that the scope of qualitative interviews provide the researcher with “access 
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to social worlds [and] what happens within them [as well as] how individuals make sense of 
themselves, their experiences and their place within these social worlds.”  
For this study, three semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted. The research 
question and ethical issues were discussed, and respondents gave their consent verbally after 
the details of participation were read and explained. Each interview lasted 30-40 minutes. The 
verbal evidence was recorded with a voice recorder. 
 
6.11.2 Justification of Telephone Interviews  
Telephone interviews have been criticised by traditionalists who consider it to be an inferior 
method for data collection because it lacks the face-to-face element, which is necessary to build 
and maintain a friendly connection with participants.1281 However, in a comparative study of 
qualitative face-to-face and telephone interviews, Sturges and Hanrahan1282 concluded that the 
telephone provided data of comparable quantity and quality to face-to-face interviews. The 
study found no difference in the number of responses or depth of these responses across both 
interview models.  
Another comparative study conducted by Vogl1283 found no significant difference in the 
duration of the conversation, number of responses, the number of pauses or the need for 
clarification in both interview techniques. Telephone interviews are cost and time effective 
because they provide a rich base of participants. This is vital to capture the thoughts and 
experiences acquired through the multiple diversity of inherent norms and cultural traditions 
in Nigeria. The reasoning behind the adoption of this method was to gain further knowledge 
into the nature and structure of the legal aid scheme, as well as make an original contribution 
to the current literature that examines relations between legislation, legal institutions, legal aid 
providers and its recipients. This contribution consists of providing understanding of the legal 
aid process from a potential claimant’s perspective and highlighting the significance of the 
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provision to those who cannot afford the services of a lawyer. Also explored are the potential 
benefits and obstacles of granting legal aid in customary courts.  
The data collected through this method is vital to determine whether there are any links between 
the provision of legal aid, the (insufficient) scope of access and the perception of potential 
recipients to the legal aid scheme. For instance, individuals may be simply unaware of the 
scheme, there may not be enough legal aid lawyers to cover the vast Nigerian population, or 
the laws may not be effective enough. Another potential barrier to the legal aid scheme in 
Nigeria may be a matter of general distrust in the judicial system, or social norms based on 
culture and religion. Equally, there may be other unexplored factors which play a role in 
deterring potential recipients from access. Finally, this study reveals whether respondents 
believe customary courts can narrow the gap caused by insufficient access to legal institutions. 
 
6.11.3 Self-Administered Questionnaires 
Questionnaires are a research tool consisting of a mixture of open-ended and close-ended 
questions aimed at collecting information from respondents. Sudman et al.1284 contend that 
there are limits to the length of semi-structured interviews before fatigue takes its toll and, as 
such, self-administered questionnaires are an alternative source of obtaining information where 
time and travel costs are reduced considerably.  
The potential advantages of using social network sites as sources of data collection are well 
documented by scholars such as Boyd and Ellison, 2008;1285 DeBruyn and Lilien, 2004; 1286 
and Zimmer, 2010.1287 However, their potential as a viable outlet for participant recruitment is 
not widely known,1288 as such social networking sites can be extremely useful in acquiring 
samples even, and sometimes particularly, among marginalised, stigmatised or otherwise 
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socially isolated persons who have sought to connect with others in virtual space1289 due to the 
web’s capacity for global reach. 
For instance, Atchison1290 developed recruitment strategies by utilising network 
communications technologies, such as text messaging, online discussion boards and social 
networking sites (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), that are designed explicitly for the rapid 
circulation of information among and between members of distinct social networks. One such 
strategy involved wording the advertisement in a way designed to attract keen participants.1291 
The questionnaire is the medium of communication between the researcher and the 
respondents, where the researcher articulates the questions through the questionnaire and the 
answers are conveyed back to the researcher.1292 Hence there is no direct communication with 
the researcher and respondent.   
McGuirk and O'Neill1293 contend that questionnaires have numerous strengths and can 
overcome potential limitations when collecting qualitative data. Firstly, they provide insights 
into social trends, processes, values, attitudes, and interpretations. Secondly, they are practical 
research tools that are cost-effective, especially when conducted online,1294 able to initiate 
extensive research over a geographically disparate population. Thirdly, they are flexible and 
may be combined with other forms of qualitative research such as interviews and focus groups 
for more in-depth results.  
Questionnaires can be a powerful research method if conducted meticulously. This process 
allows respondents the time to consider and develop their responses,1295 without interference 
from the researcher. According to De Vaus,1296 creating a unique questionnaire would require 
effective organisational strategies, critical review, and reflection to help identify an appropriate 
participant group and how to table the relevant key questions. Researchers must also have a 
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strategy in place to ascertain how the responses are to be analysed. The justification of 
launching an online questionnaire should be based on the objectives of the study to ensure the 
worth of the data collected. The content must also relate to the broader research question and 
the researcher must have reasonable knowledge of relevant processes, concepts, and 
relationships regarding the subject matter to formulate an efficient questionnaire.1297 Thus, the 
research question of this study is directly linked to the chosen method of research. The 
questionnaire has also been meticulously tailored to obtain a variety of different perspectives 
from different regions in Nigeria without interference from the researcher.  
It is also essential to identify the key concepts being investigated and tailor the questions in 
accordance with the social and cultural norms and expectations of the participant group.1298 
This is to ensure that the researcher is sensitive to the respondents’ ethnic, religious and cultural 
beliefs and that those beliefs are not challenged via the questions.1299 Another crucial factor is 
ensuring that selected participants understand the questions and have the knowledge to answer 
them.1300 The text must be simple, clear, unbiased and well communicated to respondents.  
This study utilises open-ended and close-ended lines of inquiry to yield in-depth responses to 
match the aspiration of qualitative research and understand how meaning is attached to process 
and practice. However, emphasis is placed on open-ended questions because they are less 
structured and allows respondents to narrate their understandings, experiences, and opinions in 
their own words.1301 According to Cloke et al.,1302 open questions can yield valuable and 
unanticipated insights, and they can open intriguing lines of intensive inquiry in situations 
where a person-to-person approach is not possible, including how wider processes operate in a 
setting. However, Bryman1303 argues that “open questions can be effort intensive for 
respondents to answer and time-consuming to code”. For this research, 12 self-administered 
 
1297McGuirk, P. M. & O'Neill, P. (2016) ‘Using questionnaires in Qualitative Human Geography’, In I. Hay (eds.), 
Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography pp. 246-273. Don Mills, Canada: Oxford University Press. 
1298Madge, C. (2007) ‘Developing a Geographers’ Agenda for Online Research Ethics’, Progress in Human 
Geography, 31(5), pp. 654-674.  
1299Papadopoulos I. (2002) ‘A Model for the Development of Culturally Competent Researchers’, Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 37:258-64. 
1300Babbie, E. (1992) ‘The practice of Social Research’ New York: Macmillan 
1301McGuirk, P. M. & O'Neill, P. (2016) ‘Using Questionnaires in Qualitative Human Geography’ In I. Hay (eds.), 
Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography pp. 246-273. Don Mills, Canada: Oxford University Press. 
1302Cloke, P., Cook, I., Crang, P., Goodwin, M., Painter, J. & Philo, C. (2004) ‘Practising Human Geography’ 
London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 






online questionnaires were received via email by the respondents who were required to read 
the attached information and sign the consent form (See Appendix 4). The focus of study and 
the relevant ethical issues were detailed in the information sent to respondents to consider 
before they took part in the inquiry.  
 
6.12 Qualitative Data Analysis and Interpretation  
Research methods are as crucial to the validity of the study as they are to the process of data 
analysis. Newman and Benz1304 posit that the research outcomes are of no value or detrimental 
to the truth value of research if the method utilised lacks legitimacy.  
In the social sciences, scholars have devised various ways to analysing qualitative data. For 
instance, Creswell1305 proposed five approaches for qualitative study, namely: narrative 
research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study. Denzin and 
Lincoln1306 name six research strategies: case study, ethnography, grounded theory, life and 
narrative approaches, participatory research, and clinical research. Wertz et al.1307 establish five 
social science methods: phenomenology, grounded theory, discourse analysis, narrative 
research, and intuitive inquiry. Hence, text data may be presented in verbal, print or electronic 
form and are generally obtained through open-ended survey questions, interviews or focus 
groups.1308According to Cohen et al.,1309 “qualitative data analysis involves organising, 
accounting for and explaining the data”. The authors contend that the purpose of the research 
must be established from the onset to determine the kind of analysis that is to be undertaken, 
and the appropriate setting. Establishing the purpose of a study will maintain focus and guide 
research via the research question.  
 
1304Newman Isadore Newman, Benz Carolyn R. (2009) ‘Qualitative-quantitative Research Methodology’: 
Exploring the Interactive Continuum pp. 27-28. 
1305Creswell, John W. (2013) ‘Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design’: Choosing Among Five Approaches. 
Third Edition. Washington DC: Sage. 
1306Cited by Merriam, S. B. (2009) ‘Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation’ (2nd Edition) 
San Francisco: Wiley Imprint p. 20. 
1307Wertz F.J., Charmaz K., McMullen L.M., Josselson R., Anderson R., McSpadden E. (2011) ‘Five Ways of Doing 
Qualitative Analysis’: Phenomenological Psychology, Grounded Theory, Discourse Analysis, Narrative Research, 
and Intuitive Inquiry New York: The Guilford Press. 
1308Kondracki, N. L., & Wellman, N. S. (2002) ‘Content Analysis: Review of Methods and their Applications in 
Nutrition Education’, Journal of Nutrition Education and Behaviour, 34, pp. 224-230 
1309Cohen Louis, Maion Lawrence & Morrison Keith (2007) ‘Research Methods in Education’ Sixth Edition: 




Husserl1310 acknowledges that the researcher cannot impose the meanings for the respondents, 
because they are the absolute sources of their own existence and experiences. Thus, remaining 
unbiased throughout the data collection process is central to the eventual analysis. Hence, this 
study follows a phenomenologist approach that only focuses on understanding and then 
describing the response of the participants with zero intervention from the researcher.  
Throughout analysis, researchers attempt to gain a deeper understanding of what they have 
studied and to continually refine their interpretations.1311 According to Wolcott,1312 
interpretation follows data analysis to make sense of the phenomenon beyond the inquiry stage. 
The author suggests that for researchers to organise and present their findings effectively they 
must identify each distinct stage of the investigative process.  
 
6.12.1 Content Analysis  
Qualitative content analysis is one of numerous research methods used to analyse text data and 
is regarded by researchers as a flexible method of inquiry.1313 In general, it focuses on the 
characteristics of language as a means of communication with attention to the content of the 
text.1314 Weber1315 contends that the chosen content analysis approach will depend on the 
researcher’s theoretical and substantive interests and the phenomenon being studied. Hsieh and 
Shannon1316 cite content analysis as one of the widely used qualitative research techniques and 
define it “as a means of subjectively interpreting the content of textual data through the 
systematic organisation process of coding and classifying themes or patterns”.1317 
 
1310Husserl E. (1970) ‘Logical Investigation’, New York: Humanities Press.  
1311Basit Tehmina (2003) ‘Manual or Electronic?’, The Role of Coding in Qualitative Data Analysis, Educational 
Research, 45:2, pp. 143-154.  
1312Wolcott Harry F. (1994) ‘Transforming Qualitative Data Description, Analysis and Interpretation’, Sage 
Publications. 
1313Cavanagh, S. (1997) ‘Content Analysis: Concepts, Methods and Applications’, Nurse Researcher, 4(3), pp. 5-
16. 
1314Tesch, R. (1990) ‘Qualitative Research’: Analysis Types and Software Tools. Bristol, PA: Falmer.  
1315Weber, R. P. (1990) ‘Basic Content Analysis’ Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
1316Hsieh Hsiu-Fang and Shannon Sarah E. (2005) ‘Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis’, 
Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 15 No. 9 pp. 1277-1288. 




Dating back to the 18th century in Scandinavia,1318 content analysis was initially utilised in 
both qualitative and quantitative studies,1319 and was subsequently used primarily as a 
quantitative research method with text data coded and described using statistics. Morgan1320 
described content analysis as the quantitative analysis of qualitative data. However, recently it 
has become more recognised by researchers as a suitable method of qualitative analysis.1321 
Downe-Wamboldt1322 posits that the primary objective of content analysis is “to provide 
knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study”. 
According to Shannon and Hsieh,1323 content analysis shows three distinct approaches – the 
conventional/inductive, directed/deductive, and summative – which are used to interpret 
meaning from the content of text data. In conventional content analysis, coding categories are 
derived directly from the text data (induction). It is usually suitable when existing theories or 
research literature on a phenomenon are inadequate, and there are gaps to be filled.1324 
Mayring1325 acknowledges that conventional content analysis permits investigations to be 
specific to the respondent’s comments. A directed approach starts with a theory or relevant 
research findings as a guide (deduction). The structure of a directed approach analysis is based 
on the preceding knowledge with specific focus on theory testing.1326 A summative content 
analysis involves counting and comparisons, derived from keywords or content. The aim of 
this approach is to understand the contextual use of the words or content.1327 However, the 
 
1318Rosengren, K. E. (1981) ‘Advances in Scandinavia Content Analysis’: An Introduction. In K. E. Rosengren 
(ed.), Advances in Content Analysis Beverly Hills, CA: Sage pp. 9-19. 
1319Berelson, B. (1952) ‘Content Analysis in Communication Research’, Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
1320Morgan, D. L. (1993) ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’: A Guide to Paths Not Taken Qualitative Health 
Research, Vol. 3, pp. 112-121.  
1321Nandy, B. R., & Sarvela, P. D. (1997) ‘Content Analysis Re-examined’: A Relevant Research Method for 
Health Education. American Journal of Health Behaviour, Vol. 21, pp. 222-234. 
1322Downe-Wamboldt, B. (1992) ‘Content Analysis: Method, Applications, and Issues’, Health Care for Women 
International, 13, pp. 313-321. 
1323Hsieh Hsiu-Fang and Shannon Sarah E. (2005) ‘Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis’, 
Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 15 No. 9 pp. 1277-1288. 
1324Kondracki, N. and Wellman, N. (2002) ‘Content analysis: Review of Methods and their Applications in 
Nutrition Education’, Journal of Nutrition Education and Behaviour, 34, pp. 224-230. 
1325Mayring, P. (2000) ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’, Forum: Qualitative Social Research, Volume 1, No. 2, Art. 
20. 
1326Kyngas, H. and Vanhanen, L. (1999) ‘Content Analysis as a Research Method’, Finnish Hoitotiede, 11, pp. 3-
12. 
1327Coffey, A. and Atkinson, P. (1996) ‘Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary Research Strategies’, 




authors contend that the main differences among these three approaches are coding schemes, 
origins of codes and threats to trustworthiness.1328 
The analysis of content involves two stages: the first is a detailed description of the data in its 
authentic form known as the basic stage; the second is known as the higher or latent stage of 
analysis, and it is more interpretive and concerned with the response from participants.1329 This 
study uses a conventional content analysis approach to analyse research data. The justification 
of this approach stems from the analysis of the original content from the perspective of the 
respondents, obtained directly from the data with no pre-conceived grouping. This paves way 
for the researcher to fully engage themselves with the collected data and allow new insights to 
develop.1330  
 
6.13 Qualitative Coding  
Data analysis is a complex as well as definitive process in qualitative research due to its 
intuitive and creative method of inductive reasoning, thinking, and theorising.1331 Hence, 
codes, categories and themes are tools to explain the phenomena by organising and making 
sense of textual data.1332 According to Saldana,1333 a code in qualitative inquiry is a researcher-
generated construct that gives meaning to a participant’s input for analytic purposes. It could 
be a word or a short phrase that expresses the contents of collected data, the latter being in the 
form of interview transcripts, e-mail correspondence and participant observation field notes. 
Bailey1334 defines coding as a process of categorising an enormous amount of data into smaller 
sections that can be retrieved when needed.  
 
1328Ibid.  
1329Hickey, G. and Kipping, C. (1996) ‘Issues in Research. A Multi-Stage Approach to the Coding of Data from 
Open-Ended Questions’, Nurse Researcher, 4, pp. 81-91. 
1330Kondracki N. and Wellman N. (2002) ‘Content analysis: Review of Methods and their Applications in 
Nutrition Education’, Journal of Nutrition Education and Behaviour, 34, pp. 224-230. 
1331Basit Tehmina (2003) ‘Manual or Electronic? The Role of Coding in Qualitative Data Analysis’, Educational 
Research, 45:2, pp. 143-154.  
1332Ibid. 
1333Saldana Johnny (2013) ‘The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers’, Second Edition SAGE Publications 
Ltd. pp. 3-4. 




Miles and Huberman1335 present two methods of creating codes. The first is an inductive 
approach, also known as the ‘grounded’ approach, used by researchers who may not want to 
pre-code any data until after it has been collected to generate an idea based on the responses. 
An inductive approach means the themes identified are strongly linked to the data itself1336 and 
it is a process of coding data without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame.1337 
Inductive coding does not test pre-conceived hypotheses, allowing theory to emerge via the 
original data. The second is where the researcher creates a provisional ‘start list’ of codes prior 
to fieldwork, which according to Glaser and Strauss1338 could lead to an opportunistic use of 
theory.  
This study employs the inductive approach to coding for a clear and unbiased interpretation of 
the data collected. It is an uncomplicated approach and allows the flexible use of data to enable 
appropriate coding techniques. According to Delamont,1339 researchers must allow plenty of 
time and energy for the task of data analysis. Thus, coding, or categorising data plays an 
important role in the analysis by subdividing it and assigning categories for a better 
understanding of individual responses.1340  
Coding is a crucial aspect of analysis; however, coding and analysis are not synonymous. Thus, 
interpretation and organisation of data enables responses to become manageable in the analysis 
process.1341 Tesch1342 employs the terms ‘data condensation’ or ‘data distillation’ to describe 
the stage where the establishment of categories becomes an organising tool and an important 
part of the outcome. Codes allocate units of meaning to the descriptive information compiled 
during a study and are used to find commonalities, differences, patterns, and structures within 
a phenomenon.1343 Creating categories will also trigger the construction of a conceptual scheme 
applicable to the data. This process will induce the researcher to ask questions, compare across 
 
1335Miles M. B. and Huberman A. M. (1994) ‘Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook’, Second 
Edition. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 
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Research’, London, New York: Routledge. 
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1340Dey I. (1993) ‘Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists’, London: Routledge. 
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data and re-arrange categories to make a hierarchical order of them. According to Coffey and 
Atkinson,1344 codes are links between locations in the data and sets of concepts or ideas, which 
become a practical approach enabling the researcher to go beyond the data.  
Strauss and Corbin1345 contend that category headings can come from the blend of concepts 
derived from extant literature on the subject, or the words and phrases used by respondents 
themselves. Gough and Scott1346 identify two distinct, albeit linked, phases to data coding: the 
first focusing on meanings within the research context, and the other concerning what may be 
meaningful to outside audiences.  
 
6.13.1 The Coding Process 
The coding process of this study went through various preliminary stages before deciding on 
the appropriate themes. All key themes have been generated specifically for this study, based 
on an in-depth analysis and interpretation of the responses. None of the key themes were 
obtained from a previous study, existing theorists, or written literature.  
The coding process of this research followed the in vivo coding procedure to categorise the 
findings and generate the key themes:  
 
 Basic data  Preliminary codes  Key themes 
“Legal aid is an assistance 
rendered to an individual 
without the capabilities to 
afford a legal counsel.”  
“Legal aid is essential to 
guaranteeing equal access to 
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“Yes, I am familiar with 
customary legal practices in 
Nigeria. For instance, ethnic 
or non-Muslim customary 
legal practice and Muslim 
customary legal practice.”  
 
“…lack of access to 
information.” 
“They don’t attempt to get 
access because the system 
does not guarantee equal 
access to justice.”  
“…legal aid should be made 
more accessible.” 
“You must have some sort of 
connection to be able to gain 
access.” 
➢ Support  
➢ Demand 
➢ Guarantees  




“Inherent bias law, rights and 
violation.” 
“…even when access to legal 
aid is granted, the 
bureaucracies involved tend 
to lead to unnecessary delays 
and… perversion of justice.”  
“Such individuals suffer 
injustice in one form or 
another” 
➢ Violation of rights 
➢ Intimidation  
➢ Inequality 
➢ Discrimination  
 





 “The legal aid scheme is not 
quite effective enough to 
address the legal needs of the 
disadvantaged in Nigeria.” 
“The current legal aid scheme 
in Nigeria is not well funded.” 
➢ Flexibility  
➢ Capability 
➢ Scope 
➢ Limited resources 
 
➢ Effectiveness 
“I prefer to seek redress in a 
formal court.” 
“There should be a bit more 
formality in customary court 
proceedings.”  
“I would prefer legal 
representation via legal aid in 
a customary court.” 
➢ Confidence 
➢ Distrust 
➢ Preference  




“Customary law is not a 
single body of law…but varies 
from place to place.” 
“Customary courts tend to be 
more informal, and the rural 
communities would relate 
better with its proceedings.”  
➢ Fear  
➢ Pessimism 
➢ Optimism  
➢ Necessity 
 
➢ Scepticism and potentiality 
 









6.14 Trustworthiness in the Qualitative Approach  
Critics, who are mainly positivists, are reluctant to accept the trustworthiness of qualitative 
research.1347 However, writers such as Silverman1348 in addressing the matter of trustworthiness 
have proposed ways to incorporate measures that ensure research findings are reliable. 
Naturalist researchers have distanced themselves from the positivist paradigm; however, 
authors such as Guba,1349 in response to the need to maintain trustworthiness, reliability, and 
validity within qualitative research, have proposed four trustworthiness concerns that a 
researcher needs to address irrespective of their chosen research paradigm:  
➢ Truth value: How can a researcher establish confidence in his/her findings? Or how do we 
know if the findings presented are genuine?  
➢ Applicability: How do we know or determine the applicability of the findings of the inquiry 
in other settings or with other respondents?  
➢ Consistency: How can one know if the findings would be repeated consistently with the 
similar (same) participants in the same context? 
➢ Neutrality: How do we know if the findings come solely from participants and the 
investigation was not influenced by the bias, motivations, or interests of the researchers?  
To place further emphasis on the importance of trustworthiness in qualitative research, 
Wallendorf and Belk1350 added a fifth factor that was not addressed in Guba’s original paper: 
➢ Integrity: How do we know if the findings are not false information given by the study 
participants? 
Even though Lincoln1351 states that the whole area of qualitative inquiry is “still emerging and 
being defined”, Guba’s concept of trustworthiness has been widely accepted by many 
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researchers.1352 Joppe1353 argues that data must give an accurate representation of the total 
population under study, and that the true test of trustworthiness and reliability is when the 
findings of a study are reproduced under a similar methodology.  
The analysis of trustworthiness is vital to ensure that qualitative research is reliable. Seale1354 
advocates for proper quality through reliability and validity in qualitative research via a 
trustworthiness research report. Patton1355 adds that reliability is a consequence of the validity 
of a study. However, Stenbacka1356 contends that the debate on the relevance of reliability in 
qualitative study is of no essence since reliability concerns measurements and thus is more 
relevant in quantitative study. Lincoln and Guba1357 propose that there is no validity without 
reliability, and as such “a demonstration of the former is sufficient to establish the latter”.  
This study complies with the aims and objectives of the research, which are focused on 
examining the prospects of utilising the customary legal system to expand legal aid provision 
in Nigeria through the experiences of the respondents. To ensure reliability, validity, and 
trustworthiness, it adopts the various criteria defined by Guba (1981). 
 
6.14.1 Credibility  
Lincoln and Guba1358 argue that ensuring credibility in any research plays an important role in 
establishing trustworthiness. Positivist investigators support internal validity where they seek 
to confirm that their study tests what is proposed. According to Merriam1359 the qualitative 
researcher’s comparable notion of credibility must address the question of: ‘how congruent are 
the findings with reality?’1360 
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Guba1361 provides numerous ways in which a researcher can achieve credibility and emphasises 
that using different methods compensates for their individual shortcomings and exploits their 
benefits. Shenton1362 cites triangulation as the use of several methods to enhance research data. 
This study adopts authoritative research techniques in the form of in-depth interviews and self-
administered questionnaires to validate data and identify the consistency of emergent themes. 
Both techniques ask the same questions, however the mode of communication differs.  
Shenton1363 believes that to ensure credibility the participants must be given the chance to turn 
down participation and voluntarily take part in the study. They must understand the study and 
be prepared to take part willingly. Hence the detailed consent forms ensure that the respondents 
are aware of what the study entails and their right to decline to partake in or withdraw their 
responses at any point of the study or after the conclusion of the study. Necessary steps have 
also been taken to ensure that respondents are given enough information as well as access to 
support services if affected adversely by the questions. According to Morrow,1364 qualitative 
data can also be validated to reduce bias and increase trustworthiness in two ways: firstly, 
through respondent validation, which involves returning to the study participants and asking 
them to authenticate data; secondly, through peer review, which is where another qualitative 
researcher examines the data to verify its authenticity. To increase credibility of data, this study 
adopts the respondent validation process. The three telephone interview respondents were 
asked to go over their answers after it had been transcribed and interpreted by the researcher to 
authenticate, or disprove, the investigator’s final analysis of the data. 
 
6.15 Reflexivity 
The interest in this study stems from the concept of equal standing before courts as well as 
access to courts of convenience in Nigeria. The intention was to focus on disadvantaged 
individuals, especially the multitudes that reside in rural areas, and their ability to access courts 
of their own choosing, such as customary courts, and benefit from schemes such as legal aid 
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as those living in the urban areas of Nigeria do. The question that arose concerned the scope of 
the principle of equality in the various court systems in Nigeria and whether it extends to all 
individuals in practice. I decided to employ a qualitative research method to incorporate 
primary research data into my study because of the lack of in-depth research as well as factual 
data on my topic. In addition, I utilised other sources of qualitative data to broaden viewpoints 
on the subject matter and to ensure the credibility of study (i.e., semi-structured telephone 
interviews and self-administered questionnaires). Both methods were specifically designed to 
target working class to low-income individuals residing in Nigeria to examine their mindset on 
marginalised groups, the current status of legal aid and access to legal aid via customary courts. 
Thus, this study presents possible areas of further study on the impact of the lack of access to 
legal aid on disadvantaged individuals living in Nigeria.  
When sourcing respondents, I placed a request for volunteer respondents on social media 
(Facebook) for both methods. The study asked for Nigerian residents who had encountered or 
were familiar with the customary court process in Nigeria. For the online questionnaire, many 
responded and sent their email address to receive the questions. However, there was a limited 
response after they received the questionnaire and, on many occasions, I had to send out 
reminders to respondents via social media (Facebook and Facebook Messenger) to complete 
the questionnaire. Only a few responded, and the overall difficulty in getting respondents to 
complete the forms initiated the use of the snowball sampling method which provided access 
to other participants that fit the criteria. On the other hand, recruiting individuals for the 
telephone interviews was less tedious; all that was required was to schedule and agree on a 
convenient time. However, only a few opted for this method. The process in general was 
challenging; but in the end, it was a rewarding experience.  
In total, I spent over six months obtaining the necessary number of respondents for this study. 
However, I believe my research was successful because the undertaken area of study is an 
under-developed area of research which presented a large scope for an original contribution 
and for further research. In addition, the research question was focused, and the data collected 
presents a major contribution to academia as well as the extant literature on how individuals 
perceive the legal aid scheme and customary courts in Nigeria. It also addresses the all-
important question of whether customary courts could further increase the scope of legal aid to 





Chapter 7: Presentation and Discussion of Research Findings 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter represents an integral part of this study. It submits an analysis of the primary data 
gathered through the questionnaires and interviews. It is an appraisal of public opinion and 
illustrates the perception of individuals with regards to their thoughts, experiences, and 
viewpoints on the matter of the legal aid scheme in Nigeria. It also highlights various positions 
on the prospects of utilising the current customary courts system in Nigeria to expand legal aid 
provision to the vast rural areas to support individuals who have limited means but wish to 
have their case heard and determined in a familiar customary court.  
In total, data was collected from 15 respondents using 3 semi-structured telephone interviews 
and 12 self-administered online questionnaires. They were all required to answer the same 14 
questions.1365 Respondents are adults who reside in and are familiar with the Nigerian legal 
system and its institutions. The findings are categorised into key themes to address the aims 
and objectives of study and, most importantly, the research question. According to Maguire 
and Delahunt,1366 themes are patterns within qualitative data, identified within the study and 
utilised to address the research query. Thus, this study identifies six thematic categorisations: 
➢ Perception;  
➢ Accessibility;  
➢ Equitable Justice;  
➢ Effectiveness;  
➢ Credence;  
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Figure 7.1 - Key Themes 
 
The themes are original and derived from the responses gathered and analysed through the 
qualitative methods used in this research. They were initially ideas and concepts that arose 
from the data, based on the main categories which emerged. These then became the key themes, 
which represent the respondent’s opinions on the concept of legal aid and customary courts in 
Nigeria. For the purposes of this analysis, respondents are classified into two groups: QR for 
questionnaire respondents and IR for the telephone interview respondents.  
 
7.2 Perception  
According to a 2016 study on human rights in the Republic of Moldova,1367 measuring the 
public perception on fundamental rights is a pivotal tool to identify the actual impediments to 
the realisation of such rights. Understanding the principles of Nigerian legal aid provision from 
the viewpoint of the respondents is crucial to the outcome of this study. Riggs1368 contends that 
 
1367‘Perceptions of Human Rights in the Republic of Moldova’ (2016) p. 8. 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CRC/Shared%20Documents/MDA/INT_CRC_IFS_MDA_26438_E.pdf 
(accessed 22/08/19). 
1368Riggs F. W. (1979) ‘The Importance of Concepts’: Some Considerations on How They Might be Designated 















definitive definitions are essential to the identification of concepts. This study relies on the 
collected data to understand the concept of free legal representation as the basis of the principle 
of equality within the Nigerian judiciary. The declarations represent the perspective of 
individuals who may at one point require legal aid to gain access to the court system in Nigeria. 
According to Newman,1369 perception in this context examines the relationship between law 
and opinions. The author contends that, according to scholars, laws that are not in conformity 
with public opinion are detrimental to the general perception of law, especially among 
marginalised groups. In addition, Radin1370 highlights the importance of an individual’s 
perception when it comes to the legal concepts that guide them.  
 
7.2.1 Perception: Nigerian Legal Aid Scheme 
This section focuses on the understanding of and knowledge of respondents with regards to the 
legal aid scheme in Nigeria.  
“Legal aid is the assistance given to people who can't afford legal representation.” (QR 1) 
“Providing Legal assistance to those who don’t have access to it or cannot afford it (more like 
pro bono).” (QR 2) 
“Legal aid is the means by which the services of a legal practitioner are freely provided for an 
accused person by the government in a court of law.” (QR 3) 
“Legal aid is an assistance rendered to an individual without the capabilities to afford legal 
counsel.” (QR 4) 
“My understanding of legal aid is that it relates to providing legal assistance to people that 
cannot afford legal representation.” (QR 5) 
“Legal aid is the provision of assistance to people otherwise unable to afford legal 
representation and access to the court system. It is essential to guaranteeing equal access to 
justice for all, especially to citizens who do not have sufficient financial means [...] provided 
by the Legal Aid Council (LAC), and Public Defender Office.” (QR 6) 
 
1369Newman Graeme R., Wolfgang Marvin E. (2008) ‘Comparative Deviance Perception and Law in Six Cultures’, 
Taylor & Francis p. 1. 




“I think it has to do with the system put in place for people to get free advice or for people who 
seek practical help.” (QR 8)  
“It is free legal advice or representation for a person who cannot afford it.” (QR 9) 
 
“It means opportunity of assistance available to a litigant in the event of legal infraction where 
the litigant can’t afford the costs associated with court processes.” (QR 10) 
 
“Free legal representation is being made to help people with legal expenses.” (IR 1) 
 
“Legal aid supports people who are less able to pay for legal services […] supports low-
income people.” (IR 2) 
 
Respondents were able to identify the concept of legal aid as a judicial safety net closely linked 
with individuals who are unable to afford the services of legal counsel, and as a provision put 
in place by the government to assist disadvantaged individuals with limited to no financial 
means to acquire the services of a lawyer when faced with litigation. However, some 
respondents took another stance and went further than a mere definition to describe legal aid 
as a tool that guarantees justice for the less privileged. The comments imply that the 
respondents understood the significance of the principle of equality in the courts system and 
the implications if assistance is not made available to those who are entitled to it:  
 
“It is a free legal service; they ensure social justice and give voice to the voiceless.” (QR 7) 
 
“Legal aid is a kind of humanitarian organisation which provides free legal services to less 
privileged persons whose cases deserve to be defended.” (QR 12) 
“Legal aid is essential to guaranteeing equal access to justice for all.” (QR 11) 
“It is measure for people who are not financially stable to seek remedies in the court of law 
[…] it is given by the government.” (IR 3) 
None of the respondents claimed to have been a recipient of legal aid:  
“I have never been a recipient of Legal aid.” (QR 9) 




However, two respondents understood the concept and what it entails through third party 
experiences:  
“I haven’t had such experience, but I have witnessed it in the court.” (QR 3) 
 “I have a friend who is a Nigerian police officer as well as a lawyer who represents people 
who cannot afford legal representation once or twice a week in the Northern part of Nigeria.” 
(IR 1) 
 
7.2.2 Perception: Nigerian Customary Legal System 
In Nigeria, the majority of the population rely on customary norms to conduct their personal 
activities.1371 According to Hammett,1372 people generally recognise a moral authority in 
customary law and practices. However, not all conform to its practice or usage in all aspects of 
their life. Part of this study was intended to observe whether any of the respondents are 
acquainted with or comprehend the operation of the customary legal system in Nigeria. This 
section details the respondents’ familiarity with and understanding of the practice of the 
Nigerian customary legal system:  
“As far as I know, customary law in Nigeria is illegal, so access to legal aid will be very 
difficult. However, if I had the option, I would try as much as possible to make it legal, so they 
too can access legal aid.” (QR 1) 
“Yes, I am familiar with customary legal practice in Nigeria. For example, land and marital 
matters, but I have never been a litigant in a customary court setting.” (QR 2) 
 “I am not conversant with customary courts processes in Nigeria.” (QR 3) 
“I am not familiar with the Nigerian customary legal practice neither have I been a litigant in 
the customary court process.” (QR 4) 
“No, I am not familiar with the customary legal practice in Nigeria. I have not been a litigant 
either.” (QR 5) 
 
1371Idem Udosen Jacob (2017) ‘The Judiciary and Role of Customary Courts in Nigeria’, Global Journal of Politics 
and Law Research Vol. 5, No. 6, p. 34. 
1372Hamnett Ian (1975) ‘Chieftainship and Legitimacy’, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) cited in Bennett T. W. 
(1991) A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa, (Cape Town, Wetton, Johannesburg: Juta 




“Yes, I am familiar with customary legal practices in Nigeria. For instance, ethnic or non-
Muslim customary legal practice and Muslim customary legal practice.” (QR 7) 
“Not sure I have any knowledge on this.” (QR 8) 
“I am not that familiar with customary law practices in Nigeria. I have never been a litigant 
in a customary court process. I do not know much about it, so I don’t have any thoughts.” 
(QR 9) 
“I am not aware of the customary legal practice in Nigeria.” (QR 10) 
“Yes, claims over land […] landlord and tenant.” (QR 11) 
“Yes and no. The only thing I know has to do with this local court arrangement, where the 
head of a community would just make a decision and pass a judgement or sentence people.” 
(IR 1) 
“Yes, mainly family and the ones that deal with separation, divorce within the customary court 
[…] marriages under native law and custom” (IR 2)  
“No, my knowledge of customary courts is little.” (IR 3) 
Culture plays a definitive role in the day-to-day existence of a considerable number of 
individuals in Nigeria. Akanle1373 argues that culture comprises of interrelated frameworks that 
guide the lives and behavioural patterns of its indigenes. However, based on the responses, the 
majority of the respondents asserted that they were not familiar with the current Nigerian 
customary legal system because they have not been part of the process before. The general 
impression from those that responded was that customary legal systems dealt mainly with civil 
matters.  
 
7.3 Accessibility: Nigerian Legal Aid Scheme 
According to Middleton, “the role of legal aid should be to ensure that less well-off people 
have access to justice on a broadly equal basis to everyone else but that this objective has to be 
 
1373Akanle Olayinka (2012) ‘The Ligaments of Culture and Development in Nigeria’, International Journal of 




set against the background of limited resources.”1374 According to George,1375 the delivery of 
justice requires access to an efficient legal system. For instance, court case delays caused by 
complex court processes further impact the ability to access legal aid due to limited resources. 
Hence, the competency of legal aid is subject to whether it is accessible to those who need the 
service. A study conducted by HiiL1376 in 2018 confirmed that, annually, approximately 25 
million individuals encounter various types of legal problems in Nigeria. The study also noted 
that the legal aid scheme, whose main purpose is to serve as a safety net for individuals with 
no means to procure the services of a lawyer, was not visible enough. As a consequence, those 
who need it the most are unable to take advantage of the provision because they do not know 
how to effectively access it.1377 Another concern was that procedures involving access to legal 
aid were considered too complex. In addition, the 2018 study confirmed that the rich are more 
likely to take the necessary measures of securing legal counsel than the poor when faced with 
litigation, because they have the means to engage in litigation which means a likely favourable 
outcome on their part.1378  
Justice Oputa1379 contended that the majority of individuals who seek access to justice via 
competent judicial institutions in Nigeria were caught up in a vicious circle in different stages 
of the process because of one obstacle or another: “the people especially the illiterate masses 
of our country do not even know what their human rights are […] Where there is an awareness 
of the right and the knowledge or realisation of its breach or threatened breach and the courage 
to prosecute the claim, the prospective litigant may be too poor to embark on the luxury of a 
costly and prolonged litigation up to the Supreme Court.” Access to legal aid is dependent on 
the competence of the judiciary and legal institutions, whose main role in this context is to 
ensure that disadvantaged citizens are aware of their right to free legal representation to ensure 
that they are able to attain this right before litigation commences. The inability to access legal 
 
1374Sir Peter Middleton, (1997) ‘Review of Civil Justice and Legal Aid (UK)’: Report to the Lord Chancellor 35. 
Quoted in Moorhead Richard (1998) ‘Legal Aid in the Eye of a Storm: Rationing, Contracting, and a New 
Institutionalism’, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 25, No. 3 p. 3661. 
1375George James P. (2006) ‘Access to Justice, Costs, and Legal Aid’, The American Journal of Comparative Law 
Vol. 54 p. 300. 
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aid in Nigeria according to the respondents is deeply rooted in the lack of awareness of the 
provision, which is why it is termed a non-existent remedy.  
“It is like a non-existing protocol because it is either people are not aware or do not know how 
to access it. I have been privileged to know about it through a friend who offers free legal 
services to individuals a couple of times a week. I do not think an average Nigerian knows what 
it is to enjoy legal aid and I don’t think the government is doing enough to promote it so that 
people can be aware of what it entails. If people are in tune with what legal aid is all about, 
many of them will access it […] people will grab the opportunity.” (IR 1) 
 “The less privileged cannot pursue their cases or seek remedies and justice. Many are in 
prison because of lack of legal aid. That is one of the disadvantages of getting justice in 
Nigeria. When you have a good case and not originally liable for the offence for which you 
have been alleged or there are issues with the allegations or the offence and because of finances 
they cannot pursue it.” (IR 3) 
“It is patchy to non-existent. Certain states in the Federation, for instance Lagos state and 
another in the North, where there has been some development in the provision of legal aid. In 
Lagos there is a government institution that handles that on behalf of the state government. I 
don’t know if it is formalised to serve people of the state that are in need of the service […] not 
enough publicity on how individuals can access the service, not sure the system captures within 
its legislative practices the ideals of legal aid. I might be wrong, but I am certain that there 
isn’t something like that in place. There has been an election in recent times and none of the 
political parties to my knowledge discussed or broached the issue of legal aid as a tool or 
empowering the poor and needy.” (IR 2) 
“Government should try as much as possible to make it accessible to everyone who are in need 
of it.” (QR 1) 
“There has to be much awareness about the services of Legal aid, and an enlightenment 
campaign. They are a lot of people who aren’t aware of this organization where I am.” 
(QR 2) 





“For individuals who are in need of legal aid but are unable to gain access to it, society has 
failed them.” (QR 4) 
“We cannot deny the fact that the rate of poverty in Nigeria is still very high, and as such so 
many individuals are unable to afford legal representation and also cannot have access to legal 
aid.” (QR 5) 
“Access to legal aid in Nigeria from my own perspective is that even though legal aid is active 
and has been of tremendous help to citizens, it should be made more accessible […] legal aid 
service providers should not see their services as a favour but as a right of the citizens.”  
(QR 6) 
“There should be a process one must approach in order to get access. For instance, by looking 
at the legal aid societies in the community, visiting law schools, contacting the State Bar 
Association.” (QR 7) 
“I think Nigeria is a biased society which should not be the case. Legal aid should be easily 
accessible but not everyone has access to it. You must have some sort of connection to be able 
to gain access. A lot of these people who fall within the lower class and due to their level of 
exposure, they do not even understand their rights. More awareness should be created for 
people.” (QR 8) 
 “I believe individuals who are in need of legal aid and cannot get access to it are at a 
disadvantage as they cannot afford a lawyer and will not get the chance to be represented in 
court.” (QR 9) 
“The Government needs to make it available especially in women and children’s cases, as they 
are most vulnerable economically and culturally in the country.” (QR 10) 
“Access to lawyers through legal aid in Nigeria is not an easy task, because most lawyers are 
after their own pocket, so to get anybody to help is an uphill task […] hard luck for those who 







7.4 Equitable Justice: Nigerian Legal Aid Scheme 
According to Hennie van As,1380 the legal aid system is a creation of the state to ensure that its 
obligation to protect the rights of its citizens are met. Hence, the main purpose of legal aid is 
to safeguard the rights of disadvantaged individuals that are at risk of being violated by 
ensuring equality of standing before the courts. According to Abel,1381 legal aid promotes 
“equal justice under law” but maintains that its provision is one of the “limited redistributions 
that legitimates a system that consistently betrays its promises”. The majority of inequalities in 
society stems from the unequal distribution of income and affects the disadvantaged especially 
when accessing judicial institutions. Moorhead and Pleasence1382 contend that “inequalities are 
economic, social, and political and the capacity of legal aid programmes to redress them is 
limited”.  
Hence, a 2019 study by the World Justice Project1383 on access to justice affirms that legal 
problems are a universal occurrence; however, the severity varies depending on the country in 
question. The study also revealed that most people would prefer to negotiate directly and 
resolve the matter with the other party than acquire the services of a lawyer or go to court. In 
addition, a considerable number of individuals claimed it was difficult or nearly impossible to 
raise the funds needed to resolve their problem and as such have given up any further action to 
resolve it further. Unresolved legal problems have in return had an adverse impact on their 
daily living.1384 The results of the 2019 study specific to access to justice in Nigeria also 
revealed that, of the 60% who experienced a legal problem in the past two years, only 25% 
were able to access assistance, with only 13% being able to access legal aid. The data also 
revealed that typically it took respondents 14.2 months to find a solution to their problem.1385 
This section highlights the respondents’ thoughts on the implications faced by disadvantaged 
individuals if they are unable to secure access to legal institutions through legal aid.  
 
1380Hennie van As (2005) ‘Legal Aid in South Africa: Making Justice Reality’, Journal of African Law, Vol. 49, No. 
1 p. 54. 
1381 Abel Richard (2010) ‘The Paradoxes of Pro Bono’, Fordham Law Review Volume 78 Issue 5 pp. 2443-2450. 
1382 Moorhead Richard and Pleasence Pascoe (2003) ‘Access to Justice after Universalism: Introduction’, 
Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 30, No. 1, After Universalism: Re-Engineering Access to Justice pp. 1-10. 
1383 World Justice Project (2019) ‘Global Insights on Access to Justice’: Findings from the World Justice Project 
General Population Poll in 101 Countries p. 7. 





 “In Nigeria today, there is really no free access to legal aid. Even when such access is granted 
or obtained the bureaucracies involved tends to lead to unnecessary delays and at the end of 
the day a perversion of justice. Individuals who are unable to access legal aid tend to suffer in 
silence as there is no means for their grievances to be addressed.” (QR 5) 
“I consider it a depravity of right as it is the right of every citizen to have access to legal aid 
[…] Prisoners should be given the opportunity to access legal aid; in fact, it should be 
additional duties of police to ensure that contact is made with the nearest legal aid service 
provider.” (QR 6) 
“They don’t attempt to get access to legal aid because the system does not guarantee equal 
access to justice and equality of justice that satisfies the aspirations of the people. In this 
context, lack of access to justice is a natural disagree.” (QR 7) 
“I am aware of people who were denied legal aid because of how complicated their issue was.” 
(QR 8) 
“They also don’t have access to justice by ensuring equality before the law, the right to counsel 
and the right to a fair trial.” (QR 9) 
“If I am able to change anything about the current customary court system in Nigeria, it would 
be to let the people determine their leaders. The present traditional leadership is hereditary 
and biased in favour of men, currently women are never in a position to make any inputs.”  
(QR 10) 
“Due to the social, political and economic problems of our time, there is a duty to help rescue 
our society from pervasive lawlessness, corruption and anti-social activities.” (QR 11) 
“In Nigeria I think there is a multitude of people who need it particularly those who are un-
educated, unemployed, market women, poor people […] [they] really need the service in 
landlord/tenant relationships, where there is no balance of power and the landlord takes 
advantage of the lack of knowledge of the tenant and the fact that they are unsupported by legal 
services. Coupled with the fact that the state and federal government do not provide for a 
formal legal aid system and do not publicise it […] and do not provide a system at the point of 




“Justice today in Nigeria is given to the highest bidder no matter how eloquent your lawyer is. 
I doubt if there is any legal aid and if there is, it is ineffective.” (IR 3) 
 
7.5 Effectiveness: Nigerian Legal Aid Scheme  
In addition to the general drawbacks to the scheme, caused by lack of sufficient funding and 
inadequate legal personnel to take on cases, the legal aid scheme in Nigeria has also been 
subject to implementation difficulties. This is due to other factors, such as the roles of the 
police, the prosecutors, and the judges in facilitating and enforcing rules guiding access to legal 
aid, as well as the lack of public knowledge and clear understanding of the right to legal aid 
and the overall benefits.1386 According to Cappelletti and Garth,1387 “the possession of rights is 
meaningless without mechanisms for their effective vindication”. The post-2015 development 
agenda1388 and the Sustainable Development Goal 16 of the 20161389focuses on effective and 
accountable institutions to actively engage and help improve the legal wellbeing of its citizens. 
Hence, fair institutions ensure equal rights and access to judicial systems. However, with 
regards to the scope of legal aid in Nigeria: 
 “I can’t say much […] because I don’t have any experience with the subject […] looking at 
the overall system in Nigeria, nothing is effective.” (QR 1) 
“I can’t say much on the subject because I don’t have any experience on it.” (QR 2) 
“The current legal aid scheme in Nigeria is not well funded. It is not effective enough to meet 
the challenges of the disadvantaged in Nigeria. This is because it is not considered a priority.” 
(QR 3) 
“It is virtually non-existent, if it does exist, people don’t know about it. Also, a general 
conception among disadvantaged Nigerians is that the legal system is rigged against them.” 
(QR 4) 
 
1386United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014) ‘Early Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Processes’: A 
Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners Criminal Justice Handbook Series pp. 38-40. 
1387Cappelletti M. and B. Garth B., (1981) ‘Access to Justice and the Welfare State’, Sijthoff and Noordhoff 
1388The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Post-2015 ‘Reflections Building 
more Effective, Accountable, and Inclusive Institutions for all’, Element 6, Paper 1 pp. 1-2. 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/_POST-2015%20effective%20and%20accountable%20institutions.pdf (accessed 
29/07/19).  





“I believe the current legal aid scheme is not effective enough to address the needs of the 
disadvantaged in Nigeria. The reason for this I believe, stems from the fact that the number of 
legal officers drafted to render this service are on an all-time low. In addition, there are 
inadequate resources to fund the scheme in Nigeria.” (QR 5) 
“The legal aid scheme in practice is not quite effective enough to address the legal needs of 
the disadvantaged in Nigeria. This is because in spite of the establishment of the Legal Aid 
Council, the poor and indigent in society still find access to justice quite challenging. Many 
prisons across the nation are congested by awaiting trial persons.” (QR 6) 
“I do not believe the current legal aid scheme in place is efficient due to the lack of access to 
information, inherent bias law, rights and violations, inadequate number of lawyers and the 
need to address barriers to access.” (QR 7) 
“Legal aid is virtually non-existent […] people don’t know about it.” 
“Sadly, I do not believe in Nigeria legal system for anything. It isn’t a fair society for the poor 
and most times the middle class suffer as well.” (QR 8) 
“I do not have any opinion because I have never been a recipient of legal aid.” (QR 9) 
“I am not conversant with the processes and dynamics of legal aid especially in Nigeria. 
However, the Legal Aid Council seems more to be a political and non-effective system.”  
(QR 10)  
“Legal aid is driven by lawyers to meet the ‘legal needs’ of those they have identified as poor, 
marginalised or discriminated against. Legal aid provision is supply driven, not demand 
driven, leading to wide gaps between provisions that meet perceived needs and actual demand. 
A number of delivery models for legal aid have emerged, including duty lawyers, community 
legal clinics and the payment of lawyers to deal with cases for individuals who are entitled to 
legal aid.” (QR 11)  
“The current legal aid scheme is not effective. Why? Because justice in Nigeria today is now 
given to the highest bidder, whatever you offer will determine the verdict no matter how 
eloquent your lawyer is.” (QR 12) 
“I do not believe that the current legal aid scheme is effective enough. Firstly, there are over 




expenses and the judicial system is not functioning as expected. If legal aid was to be fully 
implemented, most of these cases would not have gone far as getting custodial sentences. How 
do we address this problem? The third arm of government; the legislators are not doing 
enough, and I am not sure if there is any law put in place to encourage people to harness what 
is on ground. Most offenders could not afford the legal expenses and that is why they never 
had any legal representation. Most importantly the funding, where would it be coming from? 
Ministry of Justice budget? Or is the government to put in a new funding portfolio so that 
people can access it? Because no one would want to work for free and I believe the lawyers in 
Nigeria probably would not want to work for free either.” (IR 1) 
“I do not believe that the current legal aid scheme is effective to address the needs of the 
disadvantaged […] in the whole of the Federation of about 36 states including the Federal 
Capital Territory (Abuja), only a handful of states could you point out as having a formalised 
legal aid scheme in place […] and even at that it is extremely patchy.” (IR 2) 
 
7.6 Credence: Nigerian Customary Legal System     
Many individuals have limited confidence in customary legal practices because they believe it 
is an unreliable and unfair system to the most vulnerable, especially to women and children. 
Respondents cited corruption and favouritism as a major barrier to equitable justice in a 
customary court setting. In addition to the lack of resources, the non-formal process and the 
lack of legal qualifications by those presiding over such customary courts was also quoted as 
another concern with the Nigerian customary court process. However, Bennett1390 argues that 
in several respects customary legal processes offer a better guarantee of procedural fairness 
than its western counterpart. Bennett1391 further contends that formal court processes are alien 
to many indigenous people and tend to confuse the litigant. In addition, Gluckman1392 affirms 
the benefits of customary courts where litigants have every opportunity to state their case in a 
relatively sympathetic and familiar environment. According to HiiL,1393 most legal issues in 
Nigeria are dealt with through informal outlets which consist of traditional or customary 
 
1390Bennett T. W. (1993) ‘Human Rights and African Cultural Tradition’, Transformation Issue 22 p. 32. 
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justice, and the organisation highlights how such informal legal institutions might fail to deliver 
fair results in complicated matters such as a violation of rights. However, in conclusion, the 
HiiL study acknowledges the unified judicial structure in operation in Nigeria via the formal, 
customary and sharia court systems, and the extra benefits if all legal systems are easily 
accessible, fair, and linked to enforcement mechanisms.1394 This section presents the 
respondents’ viewpoints on accessing legal aid through customary courts as opposed to formal 
courts in Nigeria:  
“I would prefer legal representations via legal aid in a customary court to make it easier for 
people who are in dire need of legal assistance.” (QR 1) 
“If I have the option, I would prefer to use a formal court because it has authority over the 
customary court.” (QR 2) 
“I think customary legal practices are playing their part in the practices of law in Nigeria to 
some extent, but my preference is for a formal court. However, I would want a situation where 
more education and funds are made available to the current customary court system in Nigeria. 
The reason is simply because they will dispense justice more effectively at the grassroot level 
than what it presently obtains.” (QR3)  
“I am not comfortable with customary courts processes. Given the option, I would prefer to 
seek redress in a formal court as the proceedings are more organised. There should be a bit 
more formality in customary court proceedings.” (QR 5) 
“I would prefer legal representation via legal aid in a customary court; however, inadequate 
manpower would be a possible obstruction to the implementation of legal aid in customary 
courts.” (QR 6) 
“Customary courts change gradually over time as people change their ways of doing things 
and getting a current lawyer might be difficult. It is often not written down and most lawyers 
brainstorm to fit in such positions. I am not confident with the Nigerian customary courts 
process, but I would not change the system as it loses its flexibility when changed. The people 
in such communities know what to do and what ought not to do. However, given the option, I 






would not be effective and efficient because it is done for free. The zeal and determination for 
winning a case would be low. There is nothing motivating such lawyers.” (QR 7) 
“I am not comfortable with customary legal practices. I think a lot has to be done to improve 
our legal system in general. However, if I am sure there will be fair justice in the customary 
process then I am open to any route as corruption is a huge barrier in Nigeria.” (QR 8) 
“With the little I know about customary courts, I am not so comfortable with the processes […] 
I do not [know] so much about it, so I can’t give any substantial change that I would like to do. 
I don’t have that much knowledge on how things work in those kinds of courts.” (QR 9) 
“The customary court experience is very slow and unacceptably fraught with bought 
judgements, so the poor is not well represented. My preference is for formal courts [as] the 
customary courts do not respect women and children especially when pitted against the male-
dominated society.” (QR 10) 
“No, I am not comfortable with customary practices, but nothing can be done. However, if 
given the opportunity to change the current customary court system, I would try as much as 
possible to work softly from the perspective others could not work on.” (QR 11)  
“To a certain extent, I am comfortable with customary courts processes and, as such, would 
prefer legal representation via legal aid in a customary court. I believe it would be better 
because there is lesser injustice there. However, ‘justice buying’ may hinder the operation of 
legal aid in customary courts.” (QR 12) 
“I am not comfortable with customary court processes because sometimes people just flow 
with the emotional being in them instead of taking a critical look at what is being presented to 
them. Unfortunately, with the Nigerian setting, you will have to know the man that knows the 
man […] it is not about people really following the rules of judgement. However, customary 
court operators should go through the normal process of studying law so that they can have a 
strong footing on the interpretation of law and how to exhibit what is expected of them rather 
than relying on emotion to pass judgement. To make it look like a normal court system e.g. 
High Court, Supreme Court.” (QR 13) 
“Corruption stands to be a problem with customary courts if legal aid was implemented 
because the highest bidder will always make a way. Nigeria is a country where the highest 




Secondly, commitment and putting those that are truly qualified to interpret the law rather than 
relying on what A said or B said kind of mentality. Thirdly the language being spoken should 
remain indigenous instead of importing a foreign language into their operations.” (IR 1) 
“I do not know the customary court process, so I cannot say if it would be a preferred option. 
The customary cases I have read about do not represent or talk about the proceedings. The 
introduction of qualified lawyers would certainly help and enhance the existing process. 
However, I would choose a formal court simply because most of the processes I am used to are 
essentially formal and western orientated and have very limited need for customary courts; but 
having said that, family matters whether they are western orientated [or not] will benefit from 
customary legal practices. I do not rule myself out in the future if confronted by any situation 
that needs to approach a customary court. Access to finance would probably be a barrier to 
the legal aid scheme via customary courts. Does the customary court system have the expertise 
to locate and get finance for legal aid? What are the administrative tools within the customary 
legal system that would aid the provision of legal aid? If the government were to say they want 
to introduce legal aid in customary courts and donate vast sums of money into it, not sure if 
the system has the capacity to apply it in a way that would be useful to those that need it the 
most. Another one would be the education within the system itself, that is those who are 
providing the service, is the level of education of the service provider tooled up to provide the 
service? I am not so sure; meaning a sizeable amount of the money would be used to train up 
personnel to handle that.” (IR 2) 
“To some extent I am comfortable with customary legal practices […] we need to look at the 
importance of customary practices because they are close to the grassroots and considering 
the advantages of proximity and availability. Hence, I would prefer legal representation via 
legal aid in a customary court because culture and tradition are given more consideration. I 
believe lawyers should be able to follow the practice as expected in rural areas because 
tradition and culture are very important to customary legal practices. The customary legal 
system would benefit more if the administrators are more professional and consolidate on the 
code of practice. However, possible barriers to the legal aid scheme in customary legal settings 
could be due to non-adherence to technological developments as most customary courts are 
still carrying files from one place to another. Favouritism can also be another problem; as they 





7.7 Scepticism and Potentiality: Customary Legal System  
This section offers a close insight into the respondent’s thoughts on the efficacy of the 
customary courts system as a tool to expand the legal aid scheme in Nigeria. According to 
Bennett,1395 African society was disrupted by four centuries of indirect colonial rule and then 
its decolonisation, which had an adverse impact on customary legal practices. Weinrich1396 
posits that during the colonial era tribal authorities evolved and became a body of local 
government officials who were mostly elderly men and answerable directly to the state. The 
sanction by the state, according to Motshabi and Volks,1397 empowered them to rule the courts 
oppressively. Hence, there is a mixture of viewpoints regarding the credibility of customary 
courts, as revealed by some of the respondents of this study. A few respondents were 
apprehensive and unconvinced of the legality and viability of customary courts in 
administering justice. However, a considerable number of respondents were optimistic with 
regards to its operations. They acknowledged the advantages of having a customary court 
system with the same privileges available in formal courts for individuals residing in the rural 
areas of Nigeria, but felt it still needed improvement.  
The outcome of the collected data ultimately highlights the value of custom and traditional 
practices in the day to day living of individuals who are bound by them. The feedback also 
reflects this stance via a number of respondents’ notion regarding the concept of customary 
courts. This includes the possibility of its inclusion in the legal aid scheme helping to transform 
this failing system in Nigeria. In addition, a noticeable number of the responses revealed that 
customary courts are considered a potential tool of developing the administration and operation 
of customary legal practices if the needed attention is given. The collected data also confirms 
the possibility of expanding the legal aid scheme to cover the various neglected regions in 
Nigeria if the provision is made available to those who require it:  
“I believe customary courts can be utilised to expand legal aid in Nigeria if it is made legal. 
Due to the fact that it is illegal, those seeking legal aid in customary courts would be deprived 
of legal aid and the right judgement won’t be passed.” (QR 1) 
 
1395Bennett T. W. (1993) ‘Human Rights and African Cultural Tradition’, Transformation Issue 22 p. 34 
1396Weinrich, AKH (1971) ‘Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarchal to Bureaucratic Power’, 
(London: Heinemann). 
1397Motshabi, K and Voiles S. (1991) ‘Towards Democratic Chieftaincies’: Principles and Procedures, in Acta 





“I don’t know, but I believe that customary legal practices can be utilised to expand the legal 
aid scheme in Nigeria.” (QR 2) 
“I do not believe that customary legal practices can be utilised to expand legal aid provision 
in Nigeria neither do I agree that the disadvantaged would benefit from legal aid in customary 
courts. This is because the practice of law in customary courts is very limited and most cases 
end up in the formal courts.” (QR 3)  
“Yes, I agree that the disadvantaged will benefit from legal aid via legal counsel in a customary 
court.” (QR 4)  
“Maybe customary courts could expand the legal aid scheme in Nigeria. With regards to 
whether the disadvantaged would benefit from legal aid via legal counsel in a customary court, 
I tend to agree a bit with this proposition. This is on the basis that customary legal settings 
tend to be more informal, and the rural communities would relate better with its proceedings 
as opposed to the formal setting. With the legal aid counsel, it would aid proper organisation 
and make room for more people to have unhindered access to justice. However, the informal 
nature of the proceedings may impede its progress and not encourage some persons to 
patronize the method” (QR 5)  
“I agree that the disadvantaged will benefit immensely from being heard in a customary legal 
setting aided by legal counsel, especially in the vast rural areas of Nigeria because it will give 
the opportunity to put forward all legitimate defences and be defended properly.” (QR 6) 
“I disagree that the disadvantaged will benefit from being heard in a customary court via legal 
aid and legal counsel. This is Nigeria, cases are being heard in customary legal settings aided 
by legal counsel. All these need to be put into action. However, customary law is not a single 
body of law throughout the country but varies from place to place. We have millions of 
communities in Nigeria, which we must put into consideration. We don’t expect legal aid to be 
present in all communities in Nigeria. In addition, in order to get accurate information of 
customary legal practices and succeed in such communities, legal aid must be aware of the 
customary laws in the community.” (QR 7)  
“I believe customary legal practices can help expand legal aid in Nigeria. However, they need 




“I believe customary legal practices can be used to help expand legal aid provision in Nigeria. 
I believe the disadvantaged will benefit a lot from being heard in a customary legal setting 
because this way they have access to good lawyers and know that they will be judged fairly. 
(QR 9) 
I believe customary legal practices can be utilised to expand legal aid provision in Nigeria but 
only when the state becomes precedent over the cultural/customary practices. I also accept 
that the disadvantaged will benefit immensely from customary legal practices via legal counsel 
and legal aid. For a fact, legal representation costs are exorbitant and this action in customary 
courts will subsidize things for every litigant. However, I foresee lack of government budgetary 
support and discriminatory customary practices as barriers to customary legal practices.” 
(QR 10) 
“I am not sure if customary legal practices can be utilised to expand access to legal aid. 
However, I do not agree that the disadvantaged would benefit from litigation with legal aid in 
a customary court. The disadvantage of legal aid in customary courts is that the predictability 
and objectivity are sacrificed and that the ‘madness du jour’ can influence the quality of legal 
judgments in such instances where customary law becomes either the sole or the main source 
for normative behaviour.” (QR 11) 
I agree that the disadvantaged will benefit immensely from being heard in a customary legal 
setting aided by legal counsel, especially in the vast rural areas of Nigeria. However, if I had 
the option I would abolish some outdated traditional laws because they do not fit into the system 
any longer. This is because there are a lot of outdated practices in rural areas and the heads 
of th[ese] courts are not helping matters. Whenever the cases involve parties from outside the 
rural areas via legal aid, they handle the cases accordingly.” (QR 12) 
“I believe legal aid via customary courts would help improve the legal aid service. If it [were] 
fully utilised, over 60% of people thrown into custody would have had their cases dealt with in 
a simple manner. It’s a case of giving them the opportunity to be represented by those that 
know the law and also by those that can interpret what the law says. Most cases in the 
Magistrate and High Court are supposed to be handled by customary courts rather than going 
through high profile stages. However, I would prefer to go to a formal court if it were a high-
profile case to avoid being judged based on emotion. If at the end of the day the judgement 




from legal aid via customary courts because over 70% of the people of Nigeria fall under the 
illiterate bar and for customary courts it is all about understanding their culture and their 
wellbeing. Given that opportunity, they can easily express themselves in their language, 
languages, or dialect. They can explain better and whoever is representing them can add their 
two words under the law. It will definitely help reduce the massive influx of cases in the formal 
courts. The majority of people in custody in Nigeria today would not be there but are, because 
they have no legal representation. If such cases can be handled in a customary court through 
legal aid, why not? (IR 1)  
“Firstly, I think there is a huge need for access to legal aid with the assistance of lawyers in 
customary legal institutions and what is difficult to take is government abandonment of its 
responsibility to serve the needy. I am aware that there are legal practices that supply lawyers 
that are newly qualified lawyers on a Pro Bono basis to serve customary courts as part of the 
learning process for new lawyers, but this is nowhere near enough to the lack of service to 
those that need it the most. A way should be found where lawyers are encouraged to supply 
their services to customary courts. A lot of the experienced ones do not like to go to customary 
courts because there is lack of legal aid to pay for their services. If there is a legal aid scheme 
in place, lawyers would probably begin to take a look and consider the possibility of servicing 
the customary courts. As such, I believe very deeply that the disadvantaged would benefit from 
legal aid in a customary court simply because by definition they deal with local matters that 
are of importance to the local people. They live and breathe the community […] it therefore 
follows by definition that it would be of great advantage to the local people to have a service 
that provides and listens and services their needs.” (IR 2)  
“I believe customary legal practices can expand the scope of legal aid in Nigeria because of 
the population of the people. There are more people in the rural areas than the urban locations 
[…] [hence] the need. If the need of legal aid is of a higher percentage in the local areas, I 
think attention should be given so that legal aid can be provided in customary legal systems. 
The disadvantaged would benefit from legal aid in customary courts because there are a lot of 
outdated practices in the rural areas and legal aid would handle such cases accordingly.”    
(IR 3) 
Customary legal systems are an integral part of the Nigerian legal system, considering the vast 
population and multifarious ethnic network of Nigerian citizens they service. Advocates 




beneficiaries efficiently in their respective communities. Toomey1398 appreciates the 
complexities involved in the administration of customary legal systems alongside state law but 
argues that they also have a valuable role to play in facilitating a functional state judicial 
system. Odinkalu’s1399 perception of customary legal practices is that they are contradictory. 
On the one hand, it is a set of discriminatory, oppressive, and unfair institutions; on the other, 
it is a system that is considered legitimate by the majority of Africans. The author recognises 
the need for competent access to legal institutions for Nigerians and calls for a reform and 
adaptation of the customary legal system to serve the disadvantaged. Nwocha1400 maintains 
that, given to the high level of illiteracy and substantial reliance on native custom and tradition 
by many, customary legal practices have the capacity to motivate both legal and social justice 
in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, results from the data collected recognise the obstacles the Nigerian customary 
legal system may present, especially on matters of favouritism, corruption, gender 
discrimination and its nonchalant attitude towards children. These practices are deeply rooted 
and considered archaic and in conflict with the human rights principles of fairness and equality. 
The analysed data also suggests that some respondents believe that the interests of a 
considerable number of individuals would be duly served if legal aid via legal counsel is made 
available in customary courts. This step according to the respondents would allow civil and 
criminal matters under customary jurisdiction to be handled accordingly. It would also ensure 
that the various unlawful, discriminatory, and inequitable operations were systematically 
eradicated through the assistance of legal counsel who understands the customs and the 
implication on the victims if the fundamental rights aspect of the constitution is ignored. In 
time, such unfavourable practices will be forced to dissipate as precedence is set within the 




1398Toomey L.T. (2010) ‘A Delicate Balance: Building Complementary Customary and State Legal Systems’, The 
Law and Development Review, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp. 156-207. 
1399Odinkalu, C. A., ‘Poor Justice or Justice for the Poor? A Policy Framework for Reform of Customary and 
Informal Justice Systems in Africa’ In Sage C. and Woolcock M. (eds.), (2006) World Bank Legal Review: Law, 
Equity and Development Vol. 2 p. 141.  
1400Nwocha, M. (2016) ‘Customary Law, Social Development and Administration of Justice in Nigeria’, Beijing 




Chapter 8: Conclusion  
 “The notion of due process of law permeated indigenous law; deprivation of personal liberty 
or property was rare; security of the person was assured, and customary legal process was 
characterized not by unpredictable and harsh encroachments upon the individual by the 
sovereign, but by meticulous, if cumbersome, procedures for decision-making. The African 
conception of human rights was an essential aspect of African humanism sustained by religious 
doctrine and the principle of accountability to the ancestral spirits.”1401 
“It is the duty of the State to ensure that every individual enjoys his or her rights to justice1402 
and it attempts to comply with this obligation through its legal aid system.” 1403 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study and is a deliberation of the opinions and perceptions that are 
pivotal to it. It also presents the outcome of the research inquiry. This chapter provides an in-
depth interpretation of the study by re-visiting the research question and objectives to establish 
that both factors have been addressed through the research findings. It will then appraise the 
research contributions and indicate the implications for the current legal aid scheme in Nigeria. 
In addition, it will also discuss the constraints encountered during study and the prospects of 
future studies on the expansion of the legal aid scheme via customary legal systems in Nigeria. 
 
8.2 Re-examination of the Research Question and Objectives 
This section will review the research question in relation to the objectives of the study and how 
they have been addressed. This study adopted a qualitative methodological approach to 
consider: 
 
1401Asante, SKB (1969) ‘Nation Building and Human Rights in Emergent African Nations’, Cornell International 
Law Journal Vol. 2 pp. 73-74. 
1402Abramowitz N. (1960) ‘Legal Aid in South Africa’, 77 South African Law Journal 351. Quoted in Hennie van 
As (2005) Legal Aid in South Africa: Making Justice Reality Journal of African Law, Vol. 49, No. 1 p. 54. 
1403Hennie van As (2005) ‘Legal Aid in South Africa: Making Justice Reality’, Journal of African Law, Vol. 49, No. 




➢ To what extent can customary courts be utilised to bridge the gap and solder relations 
between the legal aid scheme and the disadvantaged in Nigeria? 
 
8.2.2 Research Objectives  
The aim of this study was to establish the current status of legal aid provision as well as an 
intelligible understanding of customary legal practices in Nigeria. It also advances the 
possibility of expanding the legal aid scheme and increasing the scope of its operations through 
alternative legal systems such as customary courts. Meeting the objectives of this study would 
require a confirmation that the current provision of legal aid in Nigeria is not sufficient to meet 
the legal needs of all individuals who require legal protection in courts. As such, it is reasonable 
that the legal aid system would consider expanding its enterprise by utilising other legitimate 
Nigerian legal systems as an addition to the traditional, formal common law system.  
 
8.3 Research Question, Objectives and Findings  
The research question of this study was addressed through themes that portray the thoughts, 
opinions and perceptions that were gathered via the respondents to address the issue of 
expanding the legal aid scheme through alternative legal systems in Nigeria. This study seeks 
to confirm the viability of customary legal systems as a tool to expand legal aid and establish 
that access to it in Nigeria should not be limited to one legal system, particularly in 
circumstances where there is a plurality of legal systems and ethnic categories. The research 
concluded that all respondents knew what legal aid was and its role within society as a tool to 
ensure the right of all to equality of arms before the courts and to ensure the fulfilment of the 
obligations of the state through the judiciary, thus ensuring that such rights are fulfilled 
regardless of social status. The responses also demonstrated that the current legal aid system 
was limited in scope and insufficient to fulfil the needs of the disadvantaged in Nigeria. It also 
revealed that, on average, the adult Nigerian respondents of this study were aware of the 
existence of customary legal practices and its importance to individuals who are bound by 
them.  
The findings also suggest that there were reservations from some of the respondents with 




customary legal system, referring to the unfair, biased, and discriminatory traditions that have 
been a major matter of concern in the customary legal settings.  The drawbacks mentioned are 
crucial factors of interest because some respondents felt the promise of justice would not be 
upheld if such practices were still considered the norm and judgements were based on their 
directives. Hence, state legal institutions are required to adhere to human rights mandates,1404 
which place duties on the state to ensure that all constitutionally protected rights including the 
right to preserve one’s custom and tradition are secured in conjunction with the principle of 
human rights. Hence, Article 17 (3) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR), which Nigeria ratified and domesticated into its law in 1983, emphasised the 
obligation of the state to ensure ‘protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the 
community’.1405 
Tobin1406 highlights the conflicts between customary practices and human rights, and argues 
that the effectiveness of customary legal systems as a tool for securing human rights will 
depend on the former’s recognition and support by the predominant domestic and regional 
law.1407 However, a significant number of respondents submitted that more efforts should be 
made to reform and improve customary legal systems and their services, citing that it would 
ensure that they operate in a way that is transparent and equitable and would potentially be a 
preferred channel for cases to be heard and determined. They contend that litigants who are of 
little to no means would benefit immensely if legal aid were made available through the 
medium of legal counsel in such customary courts. This is especially the case on matters that 
are closely linked to custom and tradition, and of importance to their day-to-day existence, for 
instance, land, marriage, and inheritance matters. 
Nwocha1408 argues for the advancement of customary legal systems within the Nigerian 
judiciary and highlights the importance of customary courts in ensuring that cases are heard 
and determined within a reasonable space of time in a court of convenience and familiarity. 
The author admits that the system is in need of reform but emphasises the benefits to the 
 
1404(a)See Chapter I (Human and Peoples' Rights) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.   
(b)See Chapter IV (Fundamental Rights) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
1405Diala Jane C. (2015) ‘Implications of the Disconnection between Law and Practice in the Context of Gender 
Inequality in South-East Nigeria’, Journal of Culture, Society and Development Vol. 12 pp. 67. 
1406Tobin, Brendan Michael (2011) ‘Why Customary Law Matters: The Role of Customary Law in the Protection 
of Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights’ pp. 302-305. 
1407Ibid.  
1408Nwocha M. E. (2016) ‘Customary Law, Social Development and Administration of Justice in Nigeria’, Beijing 




Nigerian judiciary and the people if customary law is blended with the conventional English 
legal system. This would allow the people, who are bound by their traditions, the right to choose 
a legal institution of convenience as opposed to being compelled to attend a court system that 
is regarded by a great majority as an alien and elitist institution.1409 Nwocha further contends 
that a lot of time, effort and money would be conserved if cases were dealt with in a customary 
court of jurisdiction. Hence, without the documented difficulties peculiar to the operations of 
formal courts, such as high cost of litigation, complex procedures, language barriers and 
prolonged delay in adjudication of disputes, members of a community would be able to deal 
with disputes promptly and accept the attained judgement,1410 or seek the decision of a 
Customary Court of Appeal if not content with the customary court ruling.  Feedback from the 
respondents suggests that customary legal systems are considered part of Nigerian society, 
albeit in need of regeneration, and as such they cannot be eradicated.  
In addition, Tobin1411 believes customary legal systems deserve better recognition as an 
authentic statutory legal process. The author terms it an ‘important dynamic source of law’ 
because it has survived distortion and modification by various regimes such as colonialism and 
continues to evolve and remain relevant in the lives of indigenous individuals. It is also able to 
adapt to the changing social and political realities.1412 The author acknowledges the drawbacks 
of certain customary practices which the indigenous people also recognise as improper but 
argues that the people should be able to collectively take charge on what form of ‘recovery, 
restitution or reformulation’ would be required to ensure that such inequitable practices are 
expunged 1413 to meet the lawful standards of impartiality. Eliminating unfavourable customary 
practices would have the propensity to reform and improve confidence in the Nigerian 
customary legal system and create a pathway for other significant benefits such as legal aid to 
protect worthy customs and values as a well as promote and guarantee justice.  
The research findings were able to address the objectives of the study, which was to examine 
the extent to which customary courts could be utilised to expand legal aid to reach the vast, 
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do not have a resident magistrate’s court in their community and may need to travel to a 
neighbouring community or local government to attend a magistrate’s court that they are not 
familiar with. Travelling back and forth may not be an easy option for litigants if there is no 
guarantee that the case will be dealt with and concluded on the day. In addition, the magistrate’s 
court may not be familiar with the matter in question if it is linked to the custom and tradition 
of a different community. This could cause more conflict in the ruling if all crucial 
circumstances are not carefully taken into consideration.  
According to Ubink,1414 the reality of access to judicial institutions in Nigeria is that many rural 
areas do not have access to public transport facilities or the financial means to visit courts that 
are outside their jurisdiction, and therefore would not attempt to pursue litigation if the process 
would seem unachievable from the onset. The author further contends that magistrate courts in 
Africa tend to operate unprofessionally, displaying poor ethical standards, especially in their 
imposition of a common law approach on the application of customary law. The 
unpredictability in such courtrooms has led to distrust in formal court structures.1415 
 
8.4 Research Contributions  
This study contributes to the current understanding of the legal aid scheme in Nigeria. It also 
presents an inclusive viewpoint on how the provision is perceived in practice. Hence the 
contributions are as follows.  
8.4.1 Theoretical Contribution  
There have been various studies giving ample insight into the legal aid system in Nigeria: 
Udombana J. (2006); Frynas J. F. (2001); Alcock P. C. (1976); Blasi G. (2004); Cottrell J. 
(1976); Dada J. A. (2013); McQuoid-Mason D. (2003); Bamgbose O. (2015). The extant 
literature highlights the benefits of an effective legal aid provision as well the various barriers 
that are impeding its successful operation in Nigeria. There are also existing in-depth studies 
on the law that governs custom and traditional practices, and its operations as a valid legal 
system, as well as the need to reform the current Nigerian customary legal system to meet the 
required standards of equitable justice. Supporters include: Obilade A. (1973); Mukoro A 
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(2011); Nwocha M. E. (2016); Odinkalu, C. A. (2006); Oba A. A. (2011); Bennett T. W. 
(1993).  
However, this study further advocates for an efficient legal aid system that is easily accessible 
and has sought to make a unique contribution to knowledge by introducing an original narrative 
on the prospects of expanding legal aid provision through customary legal systems in Nigeria. 
This is based on the notion that a substantial number of Nigerians live by their custom and 
traditional beliefs. The current knowledge on the obstacles facing the legal aid scheme focuses 
mostly on the lack of funding and the limited to non-existent access to courts. Another noted 
impediment is the insufficient legal personnel willing to take on cases that are subject to free 
legal assistance. Such barriers are accurate and well documented in the current literature on 
legal aid in Nigeria. However, this research expands the scope of knowledge regarding the 
impediments to the expansion of legal aid in Nigeria to reveal the theoretical imbalance 
between the right to legal aid and directives put in place by national legislation.1416 This 
includes other relevant Resolutions, Declarations and Principles1417 to ensure eligible 
individuals are not denied access. Consequently, it exposes the provision as being inadequate 
in practice and in need of an overhaul to cover the remote, rural areas of Nigeria.  
The findings extensively affirm the importance of a person’s perception of their individual 
surroundings when understanding a social phenomenon that influences their lives and 
development. This study shows that customs have always played a significant role in the 
formation of law.1418 Societies with a high prevalence of custom and traditional beliefs, 
according to Obilade,1419 do not necessarily indicate an absolute interest in customary practices. 
However, advocating for customary legal systems in Nigeria implies there is a need for them, 
and consideration must be afforded to individuals that do have interests vested in their culture 
and who depend on its guidance for their existence. Therefore, it also suggests that such 
individuals should be granted access to legal institutions that are closely linked to their 
customary beliefs if they believed it would efficiently address the matter in question and uphold 
 
1416Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Legal Act of Nigeria 2011. 
1417African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People Rights (1986); The Resolution on the Right to Recourse and 
Fair Trial (1992); The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003) 
and The Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Africa (2006). 
1418Leon Sheleff (2000) ‘The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law and Legal Pluralism’, Routledge 
p. 4.  
1419Obilade A. (1973) ‘Jurisdiction in Customary Law Matters in Nigeria: A Critical Examination’, Journal of 




justice as required. Hence, this study has initiated a new theoretical framework addressing a 
possible solution to expanding legal aid provision in Nigeria and the obstacles undermining 
access to legal aid in courts of convenience. 
 
8.4.2 Contributions to Socio-legal Research in Nigeria 
The consideration of expanding legal aid via customary legal systems is non-existent in current 
literature and reports on legal aid in Nigeria. Socio-legal studies are also an underdeveloped 
area of inquiry, in need of more recognition within Nigerian academia. The inter-disciplinary 
model adopted here challenges the conventional black letter law approach, which merely 
describes the principles of law with no consideration of its implications for the realities of the 
wider public. Unlike this approach, a socio-legal model aims to investigate the link and far-
reaching relationship between society and the law that structures judicial decision-making in 
Nigeria. This study adopted an empirical approach via a qualitative methodological model to 
offer an exhaustive theoretical understanding of access to legal aid and the prospects of 
customary judicial institutions to expand the scheme in Nigeria.  
This study also reveals how various viewpoints are experienced and expressed in the real world 
through selected individuals and providing new knowledge through findings based on their 
input. This was achieved by analysing the various viewpoints derived from the respondents 
and creating a medium of socio-legal research that is advantageous to the expansion of the legal 
aid scheme in Nigeria and capable of development by future research. Consequently, the socio-
legal approach of this study has provided empirical evidence on the subject of increasing the 
scope and benefits of legal aid through customary legal systems. The aim of this study is to use 
this evidence to inform and influence stakeholders that are responsible for reform in areas of 
access to appropriate judicial institutions, such as policymakers, legislators, the judiciary, 
NGOs, and practitioners through the analysis of collected data. In addition, the methods used 
for data collection in this research also support the notion that telephone interviews and self-
administered questionnaires are equally as effective as traditional face-face interviews. The 
preferred research method thus provides a reliable approach, valid results, and an increased 






8.5 Limitations of the Study  
The findings of this study highlight and affirm the individual’s constitutional rights to equal 
protection and due process before the courts through the availability of legal aid for individuals 
who require it. The findings also support the notion that every individual should have access 
to a court of their choosing in the interest of a fair trial, which is also a fundamental right. This 
latter need principally concerns matters that are specific to a certain type of court. For example, 
a legal matter firmly guided by custom and tradition is more than likely to be better dealt with 
in a court within its jurisdiction with the assistance of legal counsel than in a formal court. 
Formal courts are unlikely to be inclined to consider the matter due to complexities that might 
arise from a judge’s inadequate knowledge on the custom that guides the issue.   
The adopted methodology explored social interactions with Nigerian legal systems and their 
processes and was able to produce a valuable theoretical outcome. As already established in 
this research, there is pre-existing literature that covers both areas of interest to this study: 
access to legal aid and the customary courts process in Nigeria. However, the literature only 
explores them in isolation, and I am not aware of any current literature that combines both 
topics as a single entity of inquiry, as is being done in this study. Hence, it is considered a major 
limitation of this study because I was not able to create a literature review of past studies 
specific to the research, nor was I able to cross validate and compare my findings with other 
similar studies.  
 
8.6 Future Research Directions 
8.6.1 Introduction 
Over the years, customs and traditions in the legal context have broken out of the local mould 
to become widely accepted as a legitimate source of law in many societies.1420 The purpose of 
this study is to examine the viability of customary legal institutions as an alternative mechanism 
to further expand legal aid provision in Nigeria. During colonial rule in Nigeria, the British 
considered the Native Courts system a necessary adjunct to the British colonial practice of 
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indirect rule.1421 This system enabled the British Empire to expand extensively through the 
incorporation of existing indigenous political structures or political agents, such as native 
chiefs.1422 The process also helped improve the standard of administration of justice in 
customary courts.1423 The findings of this study point to a similar strategy where customary 
courts are allowed to develop and evolve through the implementation of legal aid into its 
operations. This also means that the wider population would be able to benefit from free legal 
representation in a court of their choosing. Consequently, individuals with legal knowledge 
who are legally qualified to represent litigants via the legal aid scheme according to the 2011 
Legal Aid Act (such as Lawyers, NYSC law graduates, NGO representatives and paralegals) 
are able to form close relations with potential litigants. They can also gain an understanding of 
the custom and norms of a certain province through the advice of the native chiefs and elders 
to form a balance between customary law and justice.   
 
8.6.2 Adopting a Theoretical Framework for Legal Aid  
Currently the legal aid scheme has not been duly aligned with a distinct theoretical framework 
other than that of human rights, which is generalised. This is prevalent with many other human 
rights phenomena. Albiston and Sandefur1424 recognise the pressing need to expand the 
research on legal aid in terms of theoretical and empirical innovations. They argue that such 
innovations will “close the gap between the need for, and the availability of, quality legal 
assistance”. The authors went further to highlight the benefits of independent research and the 
application of a theoretical framework regarding potential recipients of legal aid. They contend 
that researchers who lack an explicit theory of what an effective legal system should entail risk 
deferring to the policy audience.1425 In this case, researchers adopt measures to fit the needs of 
policymakers in terms of the identifying the problems and offering a solution to suit the policy 
 
1421‘The Principles of Native Administration and their Application’, (1934) by Sir Donald Cameron, para. I. 
quoted in The Interaction of English Law with English Law with Customary Law in Western Nigeria: By Ajayi F. 
A. (1960), Journal of African Law, Vol. 4, No. 1 pp. 40-50. 
1422Fisher Michael H. (1984) ‘Indirect Rule in the British Empire: The Foundations of the Residency System in 
India’, (1764-1858) Modem Asian Studies 18, 3 pp. 393-428 p. 393. 
1423Obilade A. (1973) ‘Jurisdiction in Customary Law Matters in Nigeria: A Critical Examination’, Journal of 
African Law Vol. 17. No. 2 pp. 227-240. 
1424Albiston Catherine R. Sandefur Rebecca L. (2013) ‘Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice’, 





goals. Alcock1426 advocates for the need to adopt a theoretical explanation of legal aid and 
argues that legal aid for disadvantaged individuals can only be fully assessed after identifying 
those interests that the law has been enacted to protect. 
The scope of this thesis was not wide enough to apply a theoretical framework; however, it 
may be possible in future studies to adopt the Kramer’s Interest Theory of Rights to understand 
the legal aid phenomena and the consequences on disadvantaged individuals if access is 
inadequate. Throughout the course of this study, I was able to delve into the interest theory as 
well as personally meet and interview Professor Matthew Kramer,1427 who pioneered the 
theory. Interest theory is a concept that claims that the function of rights is to preserve the right 
holder’s interests and human rights are the mechanism through which these are best identified 
and secured.1428 Crucial to this is legal aid, which is fundamental for the protection of equal 
standing before the courts.  
A theoretical framework would provide guidance regarding the concept of legal rights, and 
identify other crucial issues lacking in the extant research on legal aid and expand existing 
knowledge on the topic to produce attainable future results. Kramer1429 posits that for “Interest 
theorists, the essence of legal rights consists in its tendency to safeguard some aspect of the 
wellbeing of its holder”. It could also be argued that the interest theory framework is 
constructed on the concept of individual rights and duties, which are owed in return to the state 
for protecting their rights. Custom and culture remain a crucial aspect of an individual’s 
wellbeing and a constitutionally protected right. Hence, the need for a theoretical approach to 
further understand the concept of customary rights in relation to access to legal aid and the 
benefits if such rights are extended to customary courts in Nigeria.   
 
8.7 Summary 
This research has raised various questions with regards to whether Nigeria’s customary legal 
system is sufficient to administer an effective legal aid scheme in its courts, as well as the 
 
1426Alcock P C (1976) ‘Legal Aid: Whose Problem?’  British Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 3, No. 2 p. 160. 
1427Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy, Churchill College University of Cambridge United Kingdom.  
1428Andrew Fagan (2009) ‘The Basis and Scope of Human Rights In:  Human Rights: Confronting Myths and 
Misunderstandings’, Edward Elgar Chapter 1 p. 9. 
1429Mathew H. Kramer (2010) ‘Refining the Interest Theory of Rights’, The American Journal of Jurisprudence 




implications of unwritten law in today’s legal discourse. Ubink1430 inquires if there is enough 
guidance for legal practitioners who have had no previous exposure to customary law. 
According to Mukoro,1431 there are doubts regarding the authenticity of customary law, being 
mainly unwritten if compared to the documented common law in Nigeria. Tobin1432 
acknowledges the pending difficulties if unwritten legal concepts and rules are to become a 
tool for the administration of justice and protection of indigenous people’s resources and 
knowledge. However, the author maintains that international law also includes many unwritten 
elements, and the unwritten nature of customary law should not be a barrier to its 
recognition.1433 Mukoro further argues that customary law remains flexible because it changes 
from society to society and from custom to custom. On the other hand, the customary legal 
system has begun to evolve, and judgements are now being recorded in some courts as a 
reference point, particularly in areas with very similar and blended cultures.1434 The current 
state of customary legal system in Nigeria reveals it is in need of development, and Badaiki1435 
declares the need to initiate a “scientific and systematic study of the customary laws of the 
various culture groups in the country”.  
Tooley 1436 contends that empirical evidence suggests that customary legal systems are of high 
preference to indigenous people, and he advocates for practices that will harness the strengths 
of both customary and state legal systems and enable them to co-exist effectively. 
Oyovbaire1437 proposes the autonomy of local governments to legislate on laws that would be 
respected and enforced by the state in the various communities under their jurisdiction, 
ensuring the involvement of community members in process. Thus, there is a need for a more 
exhaustive investigation of the Nigerian customary legal system and its impact on society 
 
1430Ubink Janine M. (2015) ‘Access v. Justice: Customary Courts and Political Abuse, Lessons from Malawi’s 
Local Courts Act’, American Journal of Comparative Law pp. 12-13. 
1431Mukoro Akkpomuvire (2011) ‘The Interface Between Customary Law and Local Government Legislation in 
Nigeria: A Retrospect and Prospect’, The Social Science Journal 26(2): pp. 139-145. 
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of Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights’ pp. 303-305. 
1433Ibid. 
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Nigeria: A Retrospect and Prospect’, The Social Science Journal 26(2) pp. 140-141.  
1435Badaiki A.D. (1997) ‘Developmental of Customary Law’, Lagos, Tiken Publishers. In Mukoro Akkpomuvire 
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Prospect the Social Science Journal 26(2) p. 145. 
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through an ethnographic research method. This will give more insight into their operations and 
facilitate an observation of real time events as they occur and allow researchers to draw credible 
conclusions from findings of their study. One matter this might elucidate concerns the long-
term implications of the lack of access to legal institutions on individuals that are unable to 
afford the expense of legal representation, as well as persons that require legal aid but are not 
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Telephone Interview and Online Questionnaire enquiry: 
1) Have you heard of legal aid before? What is your understanding of legal aid? 
2) Have you ever been a recipient of legal aid? What was your experience? 
3) If yes, what is your opinion on the current state of the legal aid provision in Nigeria?  
4) Do you believe the current legal aid scheme in practice, is effective enough to address 
the legal needs of the disadvantaged in Nigeria? Please state why? 
5) What is your opinion with regards to individuals who are in need of legal aid but are 
not able to gain access to it?  
6) Are you familiar with the customary legal practice in Nigeria? Which ones? 
7) Have you ever been a litigant in a customary court process? What was your experience? 
8) What are your thoughts on customary legal practices and access to lawyers via legal aid 
in the Nigeria? 
9) Are you comfortable with customary courts processes? 
10)  If given the opportunity, what changes would you make to the current customary court 
system in Nigeria? Why? 
11)  Do you believe customary legal practices can be utilised to expand the legal aid    
provision in Nigeria?  
12)  Given the option, would you prefer legal representation via legal aid in a customary  
court or would you prefer to seek redress in a formal court? Why? 
13)  Do you agree or disagree that the disadvantaged will benefit immensely from being  
heard in a customary legal setting aided by legal counsel, especially in the vast rural 
areas of Nigeria? Why? 
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